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FROM THE EDITORS
There are many features unique to submarines among modern naval platforms
that have long made them attractive to navies around the world. This is especially
true today, given the increasing threat to surface naval vessels of all kinds posed
by advanced intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and precision-strike
capabilities. As Jan Joel Andersson demonstrates in “The Race to the Bottom:
Submarine Proliferation and International Security,” there are today some four
hundred submarines in the navies of forty nations, and both of these numbers are
on the rise. Because attack submarines are weapons of choice for weaker states,
this trend is especially pronounced among second- or third-tier navies. What are
the broader implications of such a development? While plausibly contributing
to greater stability at the strategic level, for example, does it create a dangerous
instability at the tactical level? In fact, Andersson argues, the impact of submarine
proliferation is easily exaggerated, and numbers alone can be highly misleading.
Daunting maintenance problems, burdensome training requirements, and crew
recruitment and retention issues can be expected to remain serious impediments
to actual operational capability in many small submarine fleets, and even larger
ones, such as India’s or Australia’s, given submarines’ technical complexity and
the unforgiving undersea environment. Jan Joel Andersson is currently a senior
analyst at the European Union Institute for Security Studies in Paris.
In “Deconstructing Nimitz’s Principle of Calculated Risk: Lessons for Today,”
Robert C. Rubel argues that the U.S. Navy would be well served by recapturing
an understanding of the principle of “calculated risk” famously formulated by
Admiral Chester Nimitz in a message to his fleet commanders on the eve of the
battle of Midway. Although concluding—surprisingly—that the principle was
for all practical purposes essentially ignored by Admirals Fletcher and Spruance
(and evidently by the Japanese fleet commander as well), Rubel argues that at a
time when the Navy no longer has assured control of the western Pacific, given
the rapid rise of Chinese antiaccess and area-denial capabilities, it needs to think
carefully about the level of risk it can accept to its high-value capital ships (its
aircraft carriers) relative to the strategic gains at stake in any conflict with that
nation. Robert C. Rubel is the former dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College.
The rise of Chinese naval power, and in particular the apparent Chinese determination to project that power into the Indian Ocean and beyond, continues
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss1/20
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to offer circumstances favorable to the development of U.S.-Indian relations in
the maritime domain and more broadly. In “The American ‘Pivot’ and the Indian
Navy: It’s Hedging All the Way,” Harsh V. Pant and Yogesh Joshi review the current state of Indian thinking about that country’s naval role in the Indian Ocean
and, prospectively, the western Pacific, where it has already stepped up maritime
security cooperation with American friends and such allies as Australia and Japan. In spite of the logic of a closer U.S.-Indian relationship, however, they argue,
India’s political leaders remain wary of too close an American connection. They
trace this attitude to the mixed signals emanating from Washington in the first
several years of the current administration about the degree of American commitment to the region and to, in particular, containment of a rising China. They
conclude, however, that there are steps the United States could take to advance
a relationship that is clearly of great potential advantage to both sides. Harsh V.
Pant is professor of international relations at King’s College London; Yogesh Joshi
is currently a fellow in the Defence Studies Department, also at King’s College.
Two articles address, from different perspectives, the continuing menace of
piracy. In “China’s Blue Soft Power: Antipiracy, Engagement, and Image Enhancement,” Andrew S. Erickson and Austin M. Strange review the history of
Chinese antipiracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden, with particular attention to their
growing role in Chinese naval diplomacy and “soft power” projection generally.
They argue that these operations have been a watershed in China’s emergence
as a fully “blue-water-capable” sea power as well as a demonstration of China’s
interest in being seen as a cooperative player in the global maritime arena—in
stark contrast to the poor image it continues to generate by its unilateral actions
in the seas closer to home. Ali Kamal-Deen, in “The Anatomy of Gulf of Guinea
Piracy,” reminds us that Africa’s pirate problem is no longer confined to Somalia.
Indeed, the threat to coastal and international shipping and infrastructure (i.e.,
oil platforms) in the Gulf of Guinea has gained in intensity over the last five years
even as Somali piracy has been much reduced. This comprehensive review of
recent piracy trends in the Gulf of Guinea broadly speaking concludes with a
series of recommendations for countering this (very underreported) threat. Ali
Kamal-Deen is a commander in the Ghana Navy and its Legal Director.
WINNERS OF OUR ANNUAL PRIZES
The President of the Naval War College has awarded prizes to the winners of the
annual Hugh G. Nott and Edward S. Miller competitions for articles appearing
in the Naval War College Review.
The Nott Prize, established in the early 1980s, is given to the authors of the best
articles (less those considered for the Miller Prize) in the Review in the previous
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publishing year. Cash awards are provided by the generosity of the Naval War
College Foundation.
The winning article is “Smart Defense: Brave New Approach or Déjà Vu?,” by
Paul Johnson, Tim LaBenz, and Darrell Driver, which appeared in our Summer
2013 issue ($1,000, shared among coauthors).
Three articles won honorable mention: “The Gaza Flotilla Incident and the
Modern Law of Blockade,” by James Farrant (Summer 2013); “The Senkaku/
Diaoyu Island Controversy: A Crisis Postponed,” by Paul J. Smith (Spring 2013);
and “Globalization, Security, and Economic Well-Being,” by Stephen M. Carmel
(Winter 2013).
The Miller Prize was founded in 1992 by the historian Edward S. Miller for
the author of the best historical article appearing in the Naval War College Review
in the same period. The winner is Thomas C. Hone, “Replacing Battleships with
Aircraft Carriers in the Pacific in World War II,” appearing in our Winter 2013
issue ($500).
IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are now located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College
Coasters Harbor Island complex, on the third floor, west wing (rooms W334,
335, 309). For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at
the main entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time (8412236).
STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, AND CIRCULATION
Statement of ownership, management, and circulation (required by 39 USC 3685, PS Form 3526-R, July
2014) of the Naval War College Review, Publication Number 401390, published four times a year at 686
Cushing Road, Newport, R.I., 02841-1207. General business offices of the publisher are located at the
Naval War College, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, R.I., 02841-1207. Name and address of publisher is
President, Naval War College, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, R.I., 02841-1207. Name and address of editor
is Dr. Carnes Lord, Code 32, Naval War College, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, R.I., 02841-1207. Name
and address of managing editor is Pelham G. Boyer, Code 32A, Naval War College, 686 Cushing Road,
Newport, R.I., 02841-1207. Owner is the Secretary of the Navy, Navy Department, Washington, D.C.,
20350-1000. The purpose, function, and nonprofit status of this organization and its exempt status for
federal income-tax purposes have not changed during the preceding 12 months. Average number of copies of each issue during the preceding 12 months is: (a) Total number of copies: 8,566; (b)(1) Requested
subscriptions (outside Newport County): 7,263; (b)(2) Requested subscriptions (inside Newport County):
228; (c) Total requested circulation: 7,491; (d)(1) Nonrequested distribution by mail (outside Newport
County): 110; (d)(3) Nonrequested copies by other classes: 93; (d)(4) Nonrequested distribution outside
the mail: 660; (e) Total nonrequested distribution: 863; (f) Total distribution: 8,354; (g) Copies not distributed: 212; (h) Total: 8,566; (i) Percent requested circulation: 89%. Issue date for circulation data: Summer
2014; (a) Total number of copies: 8,347; (b)(1) Requested subscriptions (outside Newport County): 7,277;
(b)(2) Requested subscriptions (inside Newport County): 235; (c) Total requested circulation: 7,512; (d)(1)
Nonrequested distribution by mail (outside Newport County): 108; (d)(3) Nonrequested copies by other
classes: 95; (d)(4) Nonrequested distribution outside the mail: 420; (e) Total nonrequested distribution:
623; (f) Total distribution: 8,135; (g) Copies not distributed: 212; (h) Total: 8,347; (i) Percent requested
circulation: 92%. I certify that all information furnished is true and complete.
Pelham G. Boyer, Managing Editor
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Rear Admiral Howe became the fifty-fifth President
of the U.S. Naval War College on 8 July 2014. Rear
Admiral Howe is a native of Jacksonville, Florida. He
was commissioned in 1984 following his graduation
from the U.S. Naval Academy.
Howe’s operational assignments have included a full
range of duties in the Naval Special Warfare and joint
Special Operations communities. He commanded
Naval Special Warfare Unit 3 in Bahrain, Naval
Special Warfare Group 3 in San Diego, and Special
Operations Command, Pacific in Hawaii. His service
overseas includes multiple deployments to the western Pacific and Southwest Asia and participation in
Operations EARNEST WILL , PROVIDE PROMISE , ENDURING FREEDOM , and IRAQI FREEDOM .
His key joint and staff assignments include current
operations officer at Special Operations Command,
Pacific; Chief Staff Officer, Naval Special Warfare
Development Group; Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Policy at Naval Special Warfare
Command; Director of Legislative Affairs for U.S.
Special Operations Command; and Assistant Commanding Officer, Joint Special Operations Command.
Howe graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School
in 1995 with a master of arts in national security affairs (special operations / low-intensity conflict), and
from the National War College in 2002 with a master
of arts in national security.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM

The Twenty-First International Seapower Symposium

THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE recently hosted, on behalf of the Sec-

retary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO),
one of the most important events conducted on our campus in more than three
years. The Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard “Cooperative Strategy for 21st
Century Seapower” challenged the nation’s maritime services to help “foster and
sustain cooperative relationships with more international partners.” A major step
toward meeting this challenge took place in September 2014, when the College
hosted the Twenty-First International Seapower Symposium (ISS). The theme
this year was “Global Solutions to Common Maritime Challenges.”
First held in Newport in 1969, the biennial ISS offers a unique opportunity
for the world’s maritime leaders to discuss and promote international maritime
security cooperation. These discussions offer opportunities for future voluntary
regional and international collaboration in searching for solutions to challenges
facing the global network of maritime nations. Through these symposia, the
CNO seeks individual inputs and proposals for enhancing regional and global
maritime security. ISS is indeed unique, as it is the only forum in the world that
brings together the heads of so many navies at the same time to enhance maritime security and collaborative operations. Discussions at ISS have resulted in
many successful efforts to enhance cooperation in countering piracy, providing
disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, coordinating search and rescue at sea
(including submarine rescue), and planning and conducting coalition military
operations and joint law enforcement to counter arms, drug, and human trafficking, as well as fishery and pollution violations.
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At the 2014 symposium, 217 naval leaders representing 110 countries came
together to discuss issues of common concern in the maritime environment.
Within this distinguished group were eighty-six Naval War College alumni and
thirty-two U.S. Navy flag officers. Among the heads of navy in attendance was
Admiral Wu Shengli, the first delegate from the People’s Liberation Army Navy
to attend ISS.
In plenary sessions, the delegates heard from Secretary of the Navy Ray
Mabus; Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert; Pulitzer Prize–
winning global energy expert Dr. Daniel Yergin; Hoover Institution Distinguished Visiting Fellow General James Mattis, USMC (Ret.); and nationally
recognized climatologist Rear Admiral David Titley, USN (Ret.). To encourage
face-to-face discussion of issues with geographical focus, regional breakout
groups were formed for the areas of the

• Atlantic Ocean
• Caribbean Sea
• Gulf of Guinea
• Indian Ocean / Gulf of Aden / Arabian Sea / Red Sea
• Norwegian Sea / North Sea / Baltic Sea
• Mediterranean / Black Sea / Caspian Sea
• Pacific Ocean.
In each breakout group, the discussion focused on issues such as

• Future Trends in Maritime Security
• Enhancing Coalition Operations
• Regional Maritime Agreements
• Lessons learned during the search for Malaysian Airlines Flight MH-370.
The discussions held over the three-day symposium helped establish the foundation for a more stable global maritime environment for many years to come.
In his remarks, Secretary Mabus said,
The truth is sailors of all nations have much in common with other sailors. The chief
of one of our partner navies in Asia who is here today once offered me his view of
the difference between soldiers and sailors. Soldiers, he said, by necessity focus on
boundaries and obstacles, man-made or natural. They are constantly looking down at
the ground. Sailors, on the other hand, head out to sea and see no boundaries, no obstacles. They look out and they see nothing but the horizon, nothing but possibilities.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015

13

Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 1, Art. 20

P R E S I D E N T ’ S F O RU M

9

The formal ISS XXI proceedings will be published in the spring and will be available on the Naval War College website, www.usnwc.edu/.
The Naval War College is fortunate to have Admiral Guillermo E. Barrera,
Colombian Navy (Ret.), on its faculty as a CNO Distinguished International
Fellow. He is in the unique position of having attended ISS events at the Naval
War College since 2007. His reflections on the value of the ISS series included
the following:
During ISS XXI, I felt that the assembled CNOs were much closer to one another
than they were at ISS XVIII in 2007, both as human beings and as friends. I think
this is one of the reasons why they more fully understand that the challenges at sea
are common for many countries, and therefore for their navies. Several of the visiting
CNOs used phrases from the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard’s “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” (which had been announced at ISS XVIII)
in their presentations. Many of them subscribed to the notion that “trust cannot
be surged.” Virtually every speaker referred to the need for enhanced cooperation.
The CNO of China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy publicly supported the concept
of cooperation and suggested the universal application of the Code for Unplanned
Encounters at Sea (CUES),* which was an outgrowth of the Western Pacific Naval
Symposium held in Qingdao, China, in 2014. It was great to hear how the afternoon
panel on the first day set the example of familiarity and friendship that followed until
Friday. Many close friendships were started or strengthened during those three days.
One very important aspect is that ISS provides a great framework for a number of
bilateral and multilateral meetings that helped the assembled CNOs to grow in cooperation and friendship. Many of these meetings and reunions could never happen
outside of ISS. Looking to the future, I believe that there must be a continuous effort
to connect this year’s event with the next ISS in 2016, in order for ISS to have a truly
positive impact on the navies of the world.

I echo Admiral Barrera’s thoughts and believe that the ISS series is one of the
single most influential factors in increasing maritime trust and cooperation
around the globe.
Secretary Mabus very succinctly summarized the mission that all in attendance shared: “All of you here today are sailors and marines; you are focused on
the horizon, on possibilities, on future opportunities. All of us in this room face
a similar job. We have the task of explaining to our governments and our citizens
* CUES is a nonbinding, voluntary agreement to follow certain set procedures for communicating
with other military forces encountered at sea or in the air. It covers what steps should be taken to
reduce interference and uncertainty during unexpected contact between naval vessels or aircraft.
Communication methods include the firing of different-colored flares and the use of signal flags, as
well as using a list of English-language terms.
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why our navies matter. We have to make sure they understand how important the
maritime world is to our success economically and to our security. We have to
encourage them to look outward, across the sea to that far horizon.”
I salute the combined Naval War College / CNO Staff team for the years of
planning and organization that ensured success in this important endeavor.

P. GARDNER HOWE III

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
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THE R ACE TO THE BOT TOM
Submarine Proliferation and International Security
Jan Joel Andersson

T

he growing need to protect global shipping routes and the intensification
of maritime territorial conflicts have led to a naval arms buildup around
the world.1 Perhaps the most-cited example of this new focus on naval power is
the increasing number of countries building or planning new aircraft carriers,
but many analysts are more concerned about the proliferation of modern attack
submarines.2 Often considered the ultimate weapon of naval warfare, submarines
are versatile platforms able to attack surface ships, conduct antisubmarine warfare (ASW), deploy mines, and, as they are increasingly equipped with missiles,
attack land targets.3 In addition, submarines are also highly capable intelligencegathering platforms, able to monitor ship movements over vast distances, cut
undersea communications cables, and insert reconnaissance teams covertly on
hostile shores.4 Since submarines can operate without prior sea and air control,
they allow a weaker actor means to attack a stronger one. Submarines also create
uncertainty for an opponent, since the presence of an enemy submarine is difficult to confirm until an attack takes place. Countering a hostile submarine force
is not only difficult but also very time consuming.5 Given such strong offensive
capabilities, submarines are viewed as especially detrimental to crisis stability.6
Nevertheless, despite the rapidly increasing number of countries buying
submarines and counter to conventional wisdom, I argue that the threat to international security from the current submarine proliferation around the world
may have been exaggerated. In reality, it is very difficult and costly to operate
submarines safely and even more difficult to create and sustain a submarine force
capable of conducting effective combat patrols. Furthermore, the strategic value
of a submarine force in comparison with other defense assets in times of limited
budgets is not always self-evident, and some longtime operators of submarines
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have even abandoned them in favor of larger surface vessels.7 In this article I
analyze the threat to international security from the global proliferation of submarines by focusing on the challenges of maintaining boats and training crews.
The article consists of three main sections: the first maps the global proliferation
of submarines; the second analyzes the threat from this proliferation in terms of
having enough submarines in a fleet, maintaining them, and training and retaining enough personnel; and the third concludes.
THE GLOBAL PROLIFERATION OF SUBMARINES
Given submarines’ versatility, many navies around the world are currently procuring or actively contemplating the acquisition of new ones.8 Although the total
number of submarines in the world has fallen since the height of the Cold War,
mainly due to the retirement of large numbers of old Soviet and Chinese boats,
the current global submarine inventory stands at over four hundred submarines
operated by some forty countries (see the table).9 Of these some 390 are attack
submarines or nonstrategic guided-missile submarines. It is estimated that more
than 150 new submarines will be built by 2021 and that up to three hundred
could be launched in the next fifteen to twenty years.10 According to industry
sources, the global submarine market was valued at U.S.$14.4 billion in 2013 and
is expected to grow to $21.7 billion by 2023.11 Such longtime submarine builders and operators as China, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, Sweden, the United
Kingdom, and the United States are all renewing their current fleets.12 The main
export markets are, however, in the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America. In
these regions, many existing submarines from the Soviet era, as well as early German export models, are reaching the ends of their operational lives and need to
be replaced. In addition, several navies without previous experience with the type
are ordering submarines.13 National security is a main reason driving the demand
for submarines in some areas, particularly in Asia, but domestic industrial and
technological development goals, as well as national prestige, are also important
factors.14
The submarine world used to be controlled by the great powers and a handful
of technologically advanced countries, such as Germany, Japan, the Netherlands,
and Sweden. Today, in contrast, submarine operators can be found on every inhabited continent, including Africa.15 In the Middle East, the navies of Algeria,
Egypt, Iran, and Israel have submarines, while Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates are contemplating acquisitions.16 In Latin America too, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela all have submarines,
and several of them are in the process of adding to their fleets. In South Asia,
India and Pakistan have long operated submarines and deployed them in war,
while Bangladesh and Burma (Myanmar) are planning to procure submarines
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in the near future.17 In Northeast Asia, Japan and South Korea are adding new
submarines to already impressive fleets to counter China’s and North Korea’s
very large submarine forces. In Southeast Asia, Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore, Taiwan, and Vietnam all have attack submarines, and many plan new
acquisitions.18 In addition, the Philippines and Thailand recently announced that
they too are seeking to obtain submarines.19 Given that many of these countries
are parties to territorial disputes and close to some of the world’s busiest shipping
lanes and maritime choke points, it is not surprising that the proliferating number of submarines around the world has many observers concerned.20
There are not only more submarine operators than ever, but many of the
boats they operate are also more sophisticated than ever.21 India recently joined,
China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States in the nuclearpowered-submarine club.22 Brazil may soon join too, as it has plans to build a
nuclear-powered submarine in the coming decade.23 While it does not enable
submarines to match the underwater endurance of nuclear-powered boats, the
increasing availability of air-independent propulsion (AIP) allows conventionally
powered submarines to remain submerged for weeks rather than days.24 Submarine manufacturers in France, Germany, and Sweden all offer this technology
to prospective buyers around the world.25 China may soon be added to this list;
it is rumored that it may sell AIP-equipped submarines to Pakistan, though no
technical specifications have yet been confirmed.26 Another advanced technology
increasingly being offered to global submarine customers by France, Russia, and
the United States is that of submarine-launched antiship cruise missiles. Among
recent buyers of cruise missiles for submarines are China, Egypt, India, Israel,
Malaysia, Pakistan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam.27 These new technologies, in combination with more sophisticated sensors, combat systems, and torpedoes, make today’s submarines more capable and versatile than ever.
ANALYZING THE SUBMARINE THREAT
Reflecting the proliferation of submarines, the literature on the global naval arms
buildup is dominated by descriptive accounts of the latest submarines acquisitions and procurement plans of navies around the world. These accounts are
important indicators of armament trends but primarily focus on technical specifications of boats and details of their weapons systems.28 Counting submarines is
easy. It is far more difficult to evaluate the capabilities of a submarine force; rising
numbers alone do not necessarily equate to a rising threat. In fact, few serious attempts are made to evaluate actual status or combat capabilities of the many submarine operators around the world.29 Even in the large literature on the Chinese
submarine program, most studies focus on equipment and overall strategy, rather
Continued on page 17
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Country

Region

SSBN

SSGN

SSN

SSG

SSK/SS

Canada

North America

United States

North America

France

Europe

Germany

Europe

4

Greece

Europe

8

Italy

Europe

6

Netherlands

Europe

4

Norway

Europe

6

Poland

Europe

5

Portugal

Europe

2

Spain

Europe

3

Sweden

Europe

5

Turkey

Europe

14

Ukraine

Europe

1

United Kingdom

Europe

4

Russia

Russia

11

Australia

Asia

China

Asia

India

Asia

Indonesia

Asia

2

Japan

Asia

18

North Korea

Asia

20

South Korea

Asia

12

Malaysia

Asia

2

Pakistan

Asia

5

Singapore

Asia

6

Taiwan

Asia

4

Vietnam

Asia

2

Algeria

Middle East / North Africa

4

Egypt

Middle East / North Africa

4

Iran

Middle East / North Africa

3

Israel

Middle East / North Africa

3

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015

4
14

4

4

53
6

7
8

17

20
6

4

5
1

1
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Country

Region

SSBN

SSGN

SSN

SSG

SSK/SS

Libya

Middle East / North Africa

2

Argentina

Latin America / Caribbean

3

Brazil

Latin America / Caribbean

5

Chile

Latin America / Caribbean

4

Colombia

Latin America / Caribbean

4

Ecuador

Latin America / Caribbean

2

Peru

Latin America / Caribbean

6

Venezuela

Latin America / Caribbean

2

South Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa

3

Total

37

12

89

1

17

277

Grand Total: 416
Sources: The Military Balance (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2014); U.S. Navy; “Submarine Proliferation Resource Collection,” NTI,
21 October 2013, www.nti.org/.

than analyzing capability in terms of readiness of boats and training of crews.30
These omissions lead to problems in correct assessment of the threat from the
growing submarine forces around the world.
To deploy a submarine force effectively requires not only boats but the technical skills necessary to service and maintain them and enough trained personnel to operate them. Moreover, an effective submarine force requires means to
communicate with boats and ability to control them once they deploy. These
requirements are hard to fulfill and are far more complex than their application
to surface ships.31
Minimum Numbers
An effective submarine force requires some minimum number of submarines.
Because of the heavy maintenance requirements of submarines, it is generally
held that at least four are necessary to keep one or two continuously on station or
available for deployment.32 A smaller fleet will not provide enough opportunities
for crew training, regular patrol deployments, or maintenance to sustain a capability over time. However, many of the world’s submarine forces are very small,
over a quarter smaller than that threshold size. Of the forty-two current operators, thirteen (see table) have fewer than four submarines (not counting coastal
or midget submarines): Argentina (three), Ecuador (two), Indonesia (two), Iran
(three), Israel (three), Libya (two), Malaysia (two), Portugal (two), South Africa (three), Spain (three), Ukraine (one), Venezuela (two), and Vietnam (two).
Moreover, the submarines in several of these small forces are very old, reaching
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the ends of their safe service lives. Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Indonesia, and
Venezuela all operate thirty-to-forty-year-old submarines that are increasingly
“maintenance heavy” and limited in their ability to go to sea. In a small fleet, this
fact even further restricts opportunities for necessary crew training and patrol
deployments. Some of these countries have recently ordered new submarines
but in most cases will only replace existing boats without significantly increasing
numbers. Some other submarine forces have four or more submarines but only
on paper; in reality, many of their submarines are very old and in extended or
even indefinite maintenance, seriously impacting the training and deployment
of the remaining units.
Maintenance and Logistics
Owing to their taxing underwater environment, submarines are particularly
challenging to keep operational. This is especially the case in the tropics, where
higher salinity and temperature of seawater increase corrosion on equipment
that in many cases was designed for much colder and less corrosive northern climates.33 Modern submarines are complex systems of systems, requiring substantial skills in not only regular ship maintenance but also the upkeep of advanced
propulsion and technology employed in acoustics, electronics, and periscope
optics.34 The catastrophic consequences of mechanical or equipment failure underwater require particular attention to quality control and regular maintenance.
By no means all countries are capable of fully servicing and refitting modern
submarines; many operators are forced to hire foreign help or send their boats
abroad for extended periods of time and at great cost. Any deferment of regular
service and refits quickly renders boats unsafe for operations.35
Maintaining and servicing complex systems like submarines require both
technical expertise and suitable shipyards. The challenges of maintaining submarines with inadequate support organizations can be illustrated by the experience
of the South African navy and its German Type 209 submarines, a minor local
overhaul of one of which commenced in 2007. Inadequate infrastructure and
technical understanding of onboard electrical systems reportedly kept the boat
out of commission for more than five years.36 In August 2012, it was reported,
all three of South Africa’s submarines were in dry dock, the only operational
vessel having crashed into the seabed.37 The problems of maintenance also increase when there are many different types of boats in a fleet.38 The complexity
of servicing the Indian submarine fleet—comprising German Type 209, Russian
Kilo, Russian nuclear-powered Akula II, indigenously designed nuclear-powered
boats, and soon also French Scorpène—must be daunting, to say the least. In fact,
a lack of adequate domestic repair facilities and difficulties in obtaining spare
parts have forced India to send many of its submarines to Russia for lengthy refits
over the years.39
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Even long-established, single-class submarine services can have great difficulties in maintaining their boats. The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) currently
operates six Swedish-designed Collins-class submarines that were coproduced in
Australia and commissioned between 1996 and 2003. These boats, among the
largest and most advanced conventional submarines in the world, have suffered
from persistent maintenance problems that have resulted in reduced availability
and opportunities for crew training. The RAN’s stated goal is to have always two
submarines deployed or available for immediate deployment, two in training,
and two in maintenance. However, this goal has reportedly never been achieved;
the navy has at times been
Counting submarines is easy. It is far more
left with only one operational
difficult to evaluate the capabilities of a subsubmarine, sometimes none
marine force; rising numbers alone do not
at all.40
necessarily equate to a rising threat.
Many of the problems of
the Collins-class submarines
are not design related but stem from a failure by the RAN to make adequate
maintenance and logistical arrangements when they entered service.41 This early
lack of attention to maintenance and logistics and subsequent failure to adopt
processes for reliability control led to maintenance backlogs that greatly reduced
the number of available submarines for the RAN. Despite improvements, the
Australian submarine force still has problems with availability, and RAN submarines have reportedly had to withdraw from three recent international exercise
deployments, among them RIMPAC 2012, because of technical problems.42 The
failure of the RAN to establish adequate and comprehensive maintenance procedures for its submarines shows that even experienced operators with access to
domestic comprehensive shipbuilding industries may have trouble keeping their
fleets at sea.
Another case in point is Canada, whose current fleet of four Victoria-class
submarines, bought secondhand from the United Kingdom, has since the boats’
commissioning between 2000 and 2004 suffered ongoing mechanical problems
and accidents. The Royal Canadian Navy has never had more than two of these
boats in operational condition, sometimes none.43 Servicing the boats has proved
not only far more complicated than expected but also far more costly.44 According to defense experts, shortsighted management decisions in the procurement
process, such as failing to acquire sufficient spare parts or establish supplier
relationships beforehand, have led to repeated and significant delays in restoring
submarines to operational status.45 The Canadian submarine fleet is at this writing expected to reach a steady state for the first time in late 2014, whereby three
of its four submarines will be available for operations at any one time, on a rolling
schedule. It will have taken more than a decade to reach this point.46 According
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to the Canadian navy, the four Victorias together managed to spend only around
1,300 days at sea over the ten-year period 2003–13.47
Maintaining submarines is costly. Any submarine force lacking funds for
maintenance and training will struggle to maintain any useful level of readiness.
To get Canada’s submarine force fully operational, the nation’s Treasury Board
approved in 2008 the expenditure of up to Cdn.$1.5 billion over as many as
fifteen years for the in-service support for the Victoria class. After a competitive
bidding, the Victoria In-Service Support Contract was awarded to the Canadian
Submarine Management Group, currently known as Babcock Canada, Inc.48 In
June 2013 the Canadian government extended the submarine maintenance and
support contract with Babcock Canada, valued at Cdn.$531 million, for another
five years.49
Given that submarines are among the most complicated machines in existence, maintaining them is of central importance. Rigorous and regularly
scheduled maintenance periods are essential. Failure to include the costs of
submarine upkeep in defense budgets may therefore be an indication of a low
level of attention to the issue. As a case in point, in 2011 the Malaysian Ministry
of Defence was awarded an additional allocation of RM 493.3 million ($167 million) to maintain its two recently bought Scorpène submarines, raising the total
defense budget to RM 11 billion ($3.77 billion). Apparently the defense ministry
had not allocated any funds to maintain or administer the submarines in the
original budget.50 Moreover, owing to the lack of necessary local technical expertise to service them, the Malaysian navy’s two Scorpènes are now maintained
by the French company Boustead DCNS Naval Corporation. According to press
reports, Boustead provides full logistics support to the Malaysian navy—spare
parts, workshop equipment, yard facilities and equipment, submarine safety
conditioning facilities, support, and maintenance. The company even provides
tugboat services and operates and maintains ship lifts, and submarine umbilical
services (shore electrical power and the like).51
Submarine operators that do not have the required expertise or the funds to
buy it on commercial terms are left to improvise. Iran, for example, has three
Russian Kilo-class submarines but cannot afford, or does not dare, to send them
back to Russia for refurbishment and upgrade. Russia refuses to provide necessary technical information and spare parts, so Iran has undertaken upgrades
at home. Forced to complete refurbishments and repairs to one of its Kilos on
its own, Iran relaunched it in 2012 after seven years in refit. According to Iranian press releases, replacement parts and components (pumps, compressors,
engines, sound-absorbent tiles, control surfaces, etc.) were locally produced
and installed.52 Some were commonly available, but many others were not. It is
unknown how adequate the Iranian replacement parts have proved, but the fact
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that it took Iran seven years to refit one submarine indicates how challenging it
is to keep modern submarines at sea.
Maintenance and repair needs increase with age, as do difficulties in obtaining
spare parts. Many submarines around the world are over thirty years old, some
over forty. Both Colombia and Venezuela, for example, have 1970s-era Type
209s.53 Taiwan’s two World War II–era Guppy-type submarines are even older
and can be used only for training purposes.54 Indonesia’s two Type 209 boats,
bought from Germany in 1981, have been repeatedly refitted, but they are not
to be replaced until 2020, at which time they will be forty years old.55 Given the
work required to keep such old boats running in tropical climates, their sea time
must be limited and their safety an issue. Some submarine operators simply have
run out of money and seem to do little maintenance or none at all. The Argentine navy as a whole is reportedly in disrepair owing to the absence of funds for
maintenance and training. According to media reports, all three of its submarines
have defects and barely left port in 2012.56 Given the poor maintenance performance of many countries, the operational status of many submarine forces must
be seriously questioned.
Training and Deployment
Operation of a submarine is very different from the case with a surface vessel.
A submarine without a properly trained crew cannot do much more than sail in
and out of harbor. Training submarine crews, however, is especially difficult and
time consuming. To become qualified, a submariner needs between one and two
years of intensive training; fully mastering some high-technology systems, such
as advanced sonar, takes even longer.57 It can take at least six years of training
to make a crew a cohesive unit able to operate at sea effectively.58 A submarine
captain requires, to reach the highest skill levels, between ten and fifteen years
of training and deployment. A submarine’s crew, to remain qualified and maintain its skills, needs regular deployments. While surface sailors and officers can
practice many of their skills on any surface vessel, a submarine crew can train
effectively only on a submarine. Although simulators are becoming increasingly
powerful, many submarine-related skills cannot be learned or maintained except
during actual deployments.59 A lack of training boats and shore facilities quickly
atrophies skills. In navies having only one, two, or a handful of submarines, the
availability of boats on which to train directly bounds the possibility of achieving
trained crews and effective deployments.
In the U.S. Navy, with a large submarine fleet and a high operational tempo,
submarine crews gain experience and maintain skills from repeated and extended
deployments. Other highly regarded submarine services are, for example, the
British, Dutch, German, Japanese, and Swedish. Two common traits among these
services are focus on maintenance and close relationships with original design
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firms and building yards, as a result of which their boats can be used effectively
for training and deployment. For these submarine services, a greater challenge is
to recruit and retain enough personnel. The shortage of personnel means that, for
example, British submarines regularly leave for deployments with less than full
crews; that only three of the Dutch navy’s four submarines can be fully manned;
and that the Swedish navy would be able to send its five submarines to sea simultaneously only by drawing on submarine-qualified personnel assigned to central
staff and shore duties.60
In fact, many if not most submarine services around the world suffer from
recruitment problems. South Korea and Taiwan both have difficulty recruiting
and retaining submariners.61 The Australian navy is so short of submariners that
it can find crews for only three or four of its six boats and actively seeks recruits
from overseas.62 The South African navy needs about 150 submarine-qualified
sailors to form full-time crews for its three boats, but over the last several years it
has had enough sailors to operate only one. Moreover, owing to high operating
expenses and a lack of funds, the ships and submarines of the South African navy
spend a very limited amount of time at sea. On 17 July 2012 the South African
submarine SAS Queen Modjadji collided with the ocean floor during an exercise
because of what a member of parliament described as negligence and poor training.63 Since the other two South African submarines were in long-term maintenance, the crash put the country’s entire submarine fleet in dry dock simultaneously, effectively precluding training.64 In Latin America, many submarines
are in a poor state, resulting in little or no training for crews. According to one
report, Argentina’s submarine crews spent only nineteen total hours submerged
in 2011.65
All submarine services experience incidents and accidents, but with inexperienced crews minor incidents are more likely to have fatal consequences. A
case in point is the Indian navy, where personnel shortages have plagued the
submarine service since its inception in the 1960s. Rapid introduction in a short
time of large numbers of submarines from different countries, while simulta
neously setting up shore support facilities, made recruitment difficult.66 Selection procedures had to be made less stringent, and pay was increased several
times. According to naval historians in India, it was only in the 1990s that the
Indian navy began to attract personnel of the desired caliber to submarines.67
Even today, despite increases in pay, the Indian submarine service seems to suffer from training and maintenance problems.68 In August 2013, explosions sank
INS Sindhurakshak (a Russian-built Kilo) in Mumbai Harbor, killing its crew of
eighteen; the cause, according to preliminary findings, was an accident with or
mishandling of ammunition by inexperienced crew members in the weapons
compartment.69 Another possible explanation for the catastrophic explosion is,
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according to Russian experts, a violation of safety standards and instructions by
the crew during the recharging of the submarine’s batteries.70 The Sindhurakshak
disaster and subsequent publicity in Indian media on the harsh living conditions
on board Russian-built submarines will hardly make future recruitment any
easier for the Indian submarine service.71
All established submarine services conduct their own training. Some cooperate and send students to each other’s schools. The Australian and Canadian navies, for example, both collaborate with Britain and the United States
in submarine training. Joint submarine training is also common within NATO.
The British and Dutch advanced “Perisher” courses
The threat to international security from the
for prospective submarine
current submarine proliferation around the
commanders are increasingly
world may have been exaggerated.
open to other friendly nations’
submarine communities. Students from Australia, Brazil, Canada, Denmark,
Norway, Singapore, South Korea, and the United States have all participated in
these legendary courses.72
However, navies with little or no previous submarine experience must seek
training elsewhere. All major exporters of submarines provide some degree of
training to their customers. There is little available information on such programs, but they seem to last between six months and four years, depending on
the nations involved. Sometimes such training is organized by the host navies;
in other cases the companies building the submarines are in charge. The level of
training also depends on the quality of crews sent. Two of the biggest purveyors
of submarine training of this kind are France and Russia.
Malaysia is the most recent beneficiary of French submarine training. In January 2005, 156 Malaysian sailors began a program in France that included at-sea
training on a retired French navy Agosta-class submarine. In December 2005,
twenty-three crew members qualified as submariners, and in January 2009, after
four years of training, the first Malaysian submarine crew became operational.
Information on the level of Malaysian submarine training is scant, but it is known
that the Malaysian navy has long-standing problems recruiting qualified sailors
and coping with technologically advanced systems.73 In this case, after the Malaysian submarines were brought home, local sea trials were repeatedly delayed,
owing to technical and maintenance problems. The submarines have reportedly
been unable at times to conduct basic diving exercises, and they have been criticized for not being deployed.74 Malaysia has since turned to DCI, a French company, which is participating in the creation and running of a submarine school at
the Kota Kinabalu base in Malaysia.75
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Russia is providing training to its many submarine customers in both the
Baltic Sea and in the Far East. Russian submarine training heavily emphasizes
classroom teaching and dockside drills.76 Because Russian submarines have
shorter design life spans than Western boats, Russian-trained crews spend less
time at sea, to minimize wear and tear on components and equipment. Also,
foreign officers are apparently given command of their boats after comparatively
little sea time. The first Vietnamese sailors arrived in Russia in January 2013,
with no experience with the type, to begin the theoretical part of their submarine
training.77 Sea training was conducted near Kaliningrad, on the Baltic Sea, in
April and May 2013 and included “five 10-days [sic] sea voyages,” according to
press reports.78 The first boat was officially accepted by the Vietnamese navy on
15 January 2014, and its crew began to operate it, after some ten total months of
submarine training.79
Vietnam lacks a domestic submarine training school; India has offered to
train Vietnamese sailors at its own. Even with sustained Russian and Indian
support, however, there are major questions regarding the ability of Vietnam to
develop a fully functioning submarine force over the coming years.80 Moreover,
it is far from clear how these submarines will communicate and fit together with
all the other new ships and aircraft Vietnam is currently acquiring from Russia,
the Netherlands, Canada, and France. Given the Vietnamese military’s limited
experience operating each of these platforms even separately, industry analysts
predict that Vietnam will fall somewhere between Singapore (at the high end)
and Indonesia (at the low end) in ability to create eventually an effective submarine capability.81
COMPLICATED AND COSTLY
There is a great concern among many defense analysts that the rapid spread of
submarines around the world will threaten international crisis stability. More
countries than ever are fielding submarines, but it is less than clear that the risk
of conflict and war has increased thereby. In this article I argue that the threat
from the growing number of submarines around the world may have been overstated. At the very least, the available evidence indicates that building up and
maintaining an effective submarine force are far more complicated and costly
than is commonly understood. By examining maintenance facilities and logistics
organizations we learn that many countries are not able to keep their boats safely
at sea. Having few submarines available, they cannot properly train their crews;
the costly mistakes and deadly accidents that result leave even fewer boats and
personnel for actual deployment.
Accordingly, any assessment of the strategic threat posed by submarine proliferation should focus on the effectiveness of submarine forces’ maintenance and
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logistics organizations, the quality of their recruitment and training processes
for crew and commanders, the rates of deployment, and the numbers of patrols
conducted. Many of the world’s navies are finding it hard to maintain and service
their submarines properly or even to recruit and retain qualified personnel, and
these services have little opportunity to conduct enough patrols to give their
crews the operational experience necessary to deploy effectively.
However, any evaluation of a submarine threat must also take available antisubmarine warfare capabilities into account.82 Hunting submarines is difficult
and time consuming. Even advanced navies find ASW taxing; as the British
discovered during the Falklands War, locating even an old and poorly operated
submarine can be a challenge.83 Nevertheless, the very presence of advanced
ASW capabilities can be expected to have a deterring effect on a hostile submarine force. For example, during the East Timor crisis in late 1999, Indonesia’s two
submarines shadowed the fleet carrying the Australian-led peacekeeping force
toward Dili. The presence of Indonesian submarines obliged the force to intensify
the protection of its sea lines of communications and step up the ASW operations
of the escort group of frigates, a destroyer, a cruiser, and ASW patrol aircraft.84
However, once the Indonesian submarines had been detected and their locations
clearly communicated to the Indonesian authorities the submarines withdrew
from the area rather than facing the escorting warships.85 (This incident is, of
course, also a reminder that any maritime force protection ought to include
advanced ASW capabilities, which means that ASW needs to be maintained and
further developed as a naval core competency.)86
While, then, even poorly operated and maintained submarines can never be
completely discounted as threats to international security, we should nevertheless be mindful of the very significant challenges facing many submarine forces
around the world. The conclusion is therefore that the general threat to international security from the growing number of submarines appearing in annual
naval reviews around the world should not be exaggerated; instead, each case
must be carefully examined.
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DECONSTRUC TING NIMITZ’S PRINCIPLE OF
C ALCUL ATED RISK
Lessons for Today
Robert C. Rubel

United States Pacific Fleet
USS Pennsylvania, flagship
Flagship of the Commander-in-Chief

Serial 0114W
May 28, 1942
SECRET
From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet
To: Commander Striking Force (Operation Plan 29-42)
Subject: Letter of Instruction
1. In carrying out the task assigned in Operation Plan 29-42 you will be governed
by the principle of calculated risk, which you shall interpret to mean the avoidance
of exposure of your force to attack by superior enemy forces without good prospect
of inflicting, as a result of such exposure, greater damage to the enemy. This applies to the landing phase as well as during preliminary air attacks.
C. W. Nimitz1

A

ll military operations are attended by various forms of risk. Risk permeates
the fabric of war—from the actions of individual soldiers, sailors, and airmen to the policies, strategies, and decisions of national leaders. Decisions and
actions have both potential and real consequences, and intelligent decision making normally involves a calculation of the odds for success and failure, as well as
consideration of the consequences of potential failure. When success is less than
a sure thing but through analysis of the salient aspects of the problem, including
costs and consequences of failure, a commander decides to proceed nonetheless,
we can say that he is taking a “calculated risk.”
Making a decision by such a method is different from proceeding on the basis of doctrine, ideology, or a heuristic. Commanders have adopted tactics and
strategies based solely or substantially on prewar plans, political imperatives, or
other factors that displace a calculation of risks involved in the issue at hand. In

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss1/20

36

32

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

War College: Winter 2015 Review

such cases no calculation of risk is made, but risks are nonetheless incurred. It is
the element of consideration and explicit weighing of the odds, of the potential
payoff and the potential costs, that distinguishes the calculated risk from other
forms of decision making.
In this article we will focus on a very specific kind of calculated risk—the kind
that attends the commitment of naval capital ships to battle. While this scenario
may seem a subject of interest only to naval historians, the emerging realities of
the U.S. Navy’s operational environment demand that we revisit it and examine
the prospects for its inclusion in doctrine. The logical starting point is Admiral
Chester Nimitz’s famous “letter of instruction” (actually, of course, transmitted
as a message) to Rear Admirals Frank Jack Fletcher and Raymond Spruance on
the eve of the battle of Midway. To quote a U.S. Navy website, “Nimitz clearly
possessed tremendous faith in his subordinates, who were nevertheless guided
by very clear instructions. His principle of calculated risk is, perhaps, his most
brilliant contribution to the battle, in that it precisely and economically conveyed
his intentions to his task force commanders. There was no doubt about what they
were supposed to do, how they were supposed to do it, and what level of risk was
acceptable.”2 We will deconstruct his instruction, teasing out its underlying logic
and examining the context in which it was crafted, and then see how the results
of the analysis might apply in today’s environment.
CAPITAL SHIPS
Before we can start deconstructing Nimitz’s calculated-risk instruction, we must
establish the basis for calculation—the currency, so to speak, of naval power. For
most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries this unit of measurement was the
capital ship. The original capital ship was the ship of the line, a large sailing vessel carrying seventy-four or more guns. These ships singly could dominate any
other ship type, but they were expensive, so governments could afford to build
them only in limited numbers. However, even marginal superiority in numbers,
assuming that such factors as seamanship were roughly equal, tended to confer
decisive strategic advantage. Capital ships thus became the units of currency in
strategic calculations.
The shift from fighting sail to steel dreadnoughts did not appreciably alter
the situation. The advent of the submarine and the torpedo at the dawn of the
twentieth century was thought by many to spell the doom of capital ships, but
the focus on the latter as the basis for naval arms limitation belied that claim.
The 1922 Washington Naval Treaty was based on the ratio of capital ships of the
principal naval powers of the era. The introduction of the aircraft carrier did not
result in the immediate displacement of the dreadnought as the capital ship (and
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if one follows the logic of capital ships, there can be only one type at a time), but
of course Pearl Harbor propelled the transition.
By early 1942 the aircraft carrier was the ship type that mattered in the Pacific;
the numbers available to each side governed where its forces could and could
not operate and what missions it could perform at an acceptable degree of risk.
Exact numbers of available types of carriers entered prominently into the plans
and calculations of both sides. The first encounter between Japanese and American carriers occurred in the battle of the Coral Sea, 4–8 May 1942. In that fight
the Japanese lost the light carrier Shoho, and the large fleet carrier Shokaku was
heavily damaged. The U.S. Navy lost Lexington, and Yorktown was damaged. This
left Admiral Nimitz with three carriers—Enterprise, Yorktown, and Hornet—at
his immediate disposal and Admiral Yamamoto with four fleet carriers and two
light carriers for his contemplated Midway operation. The United States was
furiously building aircraft carriers, but these would not start to come on line for
at least a year. The Japanese were also building, but because their capacity to do
so was limited, each of their carriers was more of an irreplaceable strategic asset
than one of the Americans’ was.
At this early point in the war, in carrier-versus-carrier battles, the offense had
the advantage. It was thought that one carrier air wing could put more than one
carrier out of action.3 As a consequence, carrier battles were risky, unstable affairs
that hinged on striking effectively first. To do so, a carrier force had to locate its
adversary before it was detected itself, or not long after. This was problematic for
American carrier forces, because Japanese strike aircraft significantly outranged
their U.S. counterparts. This meant that if the U.S. force were to engage on anything like equal terms, it had to avoid detection while at the same time detecting
the Japanese force. If timing permitted, the U.S. force would use the cover of
darkness to rush toward the Japanese force so that at daybreak its strike aircraft
would be in range. However, the use of carrier aircraft as scouts produced a difficult zero-sum situation, as generally these aircraft could not be used in a strike
until they had been recovered, refueled, and armed with bombs. When possible,
land-based, long-range bombers and patrol planes were used for searches, to increase their “density” (intensity of coverage) and lessen the need for carrier-based
scouting. Nonetheless, the ocean is a very large place, and any search scheme,
however well designed, involves an element of chance. Most portions of a search
area would eventually get covered, but the exact timing of detection was critical.
CALCULATED RISK AT MIDWAY
We start by considering how Nimitz’s letter of instruction might have come into
play. The principle of calculated risk hangs on the notion of relative attrition of
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symmetrical forces. As just discussed, after Pearl Harbor aircraft carriers became
the coin of the realm of naval power. Nimitz had only three at his immediate
disposal, and he was throwing them all into the fray. In theory, any naval ship is
a “consumable” under the right circumstances, but Nimitz understood that if he
lost more carriers than the enemy in this battle, its command of the sea would
extend all the way to the U.S. Pacific coast; Japanese carriers would be able to
strike where and when they wished. American naval airpower had to be preserved, regardless of what became of the small Midway archipelago. In their haste
to mount their next operation, the Japanese relied on radio communications to
coordinate planning. U.S. Pacific Fleet cryptanalysts were able to read enough of
this traffic to establish that Admiral Yamamoto’s next target would be Midway,
and in fact they were able to determine intended force dispositions in some
detail. This was precious information for Admiral Nimitz. His battle plan was
thus predicated on the assumptions that, first, American intelligence on Japanese
plans based on code breaking was accurate; second, the Japanese did not suspect
the compromise; and third, this forewarning would permit the U.S. task force to
get in a devastating first strike.
Tactical Level: Fletcher’s Choice
Nimitz’s letter of instruction states explicitly that Admirals Fletcher and Spruance
were to avoid engagement with superior enemy forces unless by so doing they
had the chance to inflict greater damage on the enemy than they would expect to
receive. As we have seen, the key was to find and strike the Japanese first. How
would the task force commanders find out if any of Nimitz’s assumptions were
false, at least in time to execute effectively the “avoidance” part of his instruction?
First, any enemy radio traffic that could be decoded might give timely warning
that the Japanese were on to the fact that their plans were known to the Americans. However, the Japanese navy had just changed its codes, and code breaking
was out of the picture at this point.4
Beyond that, the key indicator could have been failure of the Japanese carrier force to show up where it was expected to. If air searches by aircraft flying
from Midway had failed to yield a sighting of Admiral Chuichi Nagumo’s fourcarrier striking force north-northwest of Midway by daybreak on 4 June, as predicted by Nimitz’s intelligence officers, a decision point would have been upon
Fletcher. Should he hang around, hoping for a sighting? What if a Japanese scout
plane had found him first? (As it happened, the Japanese cruiser Tone’s scout
plane might have done just that by seven o’clock that morning if it had been
launched on time.) Assuming that the Japanese carriers’ flight decks were “spotted” for an antiship strike, as Yamamoto had directed be done and an American
commander would have in any case to assume, the prospects for running away
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from such a strike were poor. Thus by moving the night before toward the
expected position of the Japanese force, Fletcher would have violated Nimitz’s
guidance. Given that long-range search aircraft had spotted the Japanese invasion
force far to the west the day before, one had to assume the carriers were around
somewhere.
The decision whether to stay and fight or to cut and run was balanced on a
knife-edge. With the omniscience of hindsight we can see that the two forces
were about two hundred miles apart when Midway planes first sighted the Japanese carriers. If Fletcher had turned away at that point, the Japanese aircraft, if
they got into the air by 0730 and cruised at around 150 knots, could have overtaken him. In theory, then, Fletcher would have needed to break and run no later
than about 0600 if no sighting had been made. In fact, the first conclusive sighting report came in at 0552.5
Absent any specific information on whether Fletcher had calculated a “fight
or flee” time, the razor-thin margin we have calculated suggests that the previous
day’s sighting of the Japanese invasion force was what triggered commitment,
presumably confirming that the intelligence was correct.6 For better or worse, by
sunrise on 4 June the American task force had been committed to battle and the
calculated-risk instruction overtaken by events. Relative attrition was now a matter of tactical skill and luck, the parameters of the battle having been established
by the planning and command skills of the respective fleet commanders in chief.
There was, however, in the actual conduct of battle one instance of adherence
to the calculated-risk directive, and that was Spruance’s decision on the evening
of 4 June to run eastward to avoid a night surface battle with the Japanese force.
Calculated risk or not, this made good tactical sense, as Nagumo’s force included
two battleships and the American force had only cruisers. We must assume that
Nimitz’s calculated-risk order at least reinforced Spruance’s natural caution.
Operational Level: Nimitz’s Calculation
We now back up half a step and look over Nimitz’s shoulder as he composes
his message on calculated risk. Aside from the intelligence gleaned by his code
breakers, there was no good indication of Japanese intentions. They might have
been targeting any of a number of places in a vast theater, and Nimitz was under
pressure to protect the Aleutians, Hawaii, and even the West Coast. From his
perspective, this priceless intelligence represented an opportunity for an ambush. But he would have to go in with all his available carrier forces to have any
chance of favorable reciprocal attrition. This was his calculated risk; the prospect
of truncating the Japanese strategic initiative was the upside potential that justified the inherent risks of concentrating his three aircraft carriers. Did Nimitz
have his own “fight or flee” decision point? Of course, he could have chosen to
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second-guess his code breakers and keep his carriers safely out of the range of
the Japanese carriers.7 If he had, the decision would have occurred in late May.
Task Forces 16 and 17 would never have sortied to battle, or—in consideration
of the concern of Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet
(COMINCH), that Hawaii was a target—they might have taken up a conservative
position to the east.8 Nimitz might, in contrast, have banked on Fletcher, as the
senior task force commander, being able actually to execute the calculated-risk
order on the avoidance side. As we have seen, however, by sunrise on 4 June the
likelihood that Fletcher could do so was marginal at best. One wonders what
would have been the thought processes of the American chain of command had
no sightings been achieved on 3 June.
The possibility of Nimitz’s plan’s unraveling did not hinge only on a potential
absence of timely sightings by reconnaissance aircraft. There was concern from
his staff that radio chatter by U.S. Navy units might “tip” the Japanese that the
Americans were on to their plans.9 The cryptanalysts certainly felt that way,
even up to the eve of battle: “HYPO’s analysts worried that the Japanese might
put two and two together, grasp what was going on, and spring a trap of their
own.”10 In fact, Japanese analysts were picking up on such indications, but for
various reasons their assessments were not passed to Nagumo. Nagumo’s staff
actually did intercept some of this information but apparently did not “put two
and two together”—at least not in time.11 As with so many aspects of the battle,
the Japanese force failed to capitalize on such “seams” and defects as there were
in the American plan and its execution. However, from the standpoint of sound
military planning, we see that the Americans really had no effective “branch
plan” to cover instances like this, a plan that would have brought the principle of
calculated risk to the fore.
Strategic Level: King’s Order
What did the situation look like from the vantage point of Admiral King, sitting
in Washington? King was ostensibly operating under the Allies’ agreed “Germany first” strategy, which envisioned an invasion of North Africa in 1942. This
operation would require aircraft carrier support; the small carrier Ranger had
been assigned. Otherwise, King’s eye was keenly focused on the Pacific, and he
was determined to take the offensive there as soon as conditions permitted. An
American defeat at Midway—that is, the loss of two or three carriers—would
have set this objective back many months, if not a year or more, whereas the loss
of Midway itself, the carriers being preserved, would likely have meant a lesser
delay. Thus Nimitz’s calculated risk made good sense from King’s global perspective, less with respect to other operations than from a timing standpoint. That
is probably why, as we will see, he had directed Nimitz to use caution with the
carriers and cruisers.
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There is another angle on Nimitz’s instruction that bears scrutiny. It turns out
that the whole idea of calculated risk was likely not Nimitz’s in the first place. In
a 17 May message to Nimitz, COMINCH provided the following injunction: “In
view of last clause of para two chiefly to employ strong attrition tactics and not
repeat not allow our forces to accept such decisive action as would be likely to
incur heavy losses in our carriers and cruisers.”12 Moreover, there is an entry in
Nimitz’s records for 25 May that several COMINCH suggestions that had been
received by message had been complied with.13 Nimitz’s estimate of the situation
of 26 May is pretty explicit about the matter:
3. Not only our directive from Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, but also common
sense dictates that we cannot now afford to slug it out with the probably superior
approaching Japanese forces. We must endeavor to reduce his forces by attrition—
submarine attacks, air bombing, attack on isolated units. The principle of calculated
chance [sic] is indicated, as set forth in a letter of instructions to Task Force EIGHT.14
If attrition is successful the enemy must accept the failure of his venture or risk battle
on disadvantageous terms for him.15

Indeed, paragraph 3(a)(1) of Operation Plan 29-42 orders, “Inflict maximum
damage on enemy by employing strong attrition tactics. Do not accept such decisive action as would be likely to incur heavy losses in our carriers and cruisers.
A letter of instructions is being furnished separately to striking force commanders.”16 The mechanisms internal to Nimitz’s staff are not known, but here is at least
evidence that the calculated-risk principle originated with King. The implications
are not only interesting in the context of the history of the battle but also perhaps
important for today. The picture that emerges is of an American commander who
has gone “all in” to do battle with the Japanese because he believes he has exquisite
intelligence that will allow him to gain a decisive victory. This view is backed up
by Joseph Rochefort, Nimitz’s chief cryptanalyst, who said of a meeting to which
he was called on 27 May, “It was obvious when Nimitz sent for me that he had
already decided his course of action. He had already made up his own operation
orders by this time and the matter was closed.”17
The Japanese Perspective
Although we are dissecting Admiral Nimitz’s calculated-risk order, examining
the issue from the Japanese perspective gives additional insights. Setting aside the
widely reported issue of “victory disease”—the overconfidence that infected the
Imperial Japanese Navy at that point in the war—we can see whether there was
any corresponding calculation of risk on that side. The Japanese certainly faced
potential logistical challenges in seizing and holding Midway, but so long as they
avoided pitched battles with land-based American aircraft, their carriers were at
liberty to conduct hit-and-run raids almost wherever they wished. In this way the
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Japanese could have significantly disrupted and delayed the U.S. Navy’s war effort
in the Pacific. However, the Midway operation has to be viewed in the context of
their larger strategy. Admittedly the operation had a number of nested objectives,
among which was eliminating the threat of American interference with projected
operations in the “southern resource area.” In other words, their carriers would be
needed elsewhere later, especially if Midway produced a Japanese victory. However, if the Japanese lost too many carriers in the process, even in victory, these
other operations might be delayed or compromised. Thus Admiral Yamamoto
might have done well to issue his own calculated-risk directive.
It is also worthwhile examining Admiral Nagumo’s actions at Midway on the
afternoon of 4 June. The morning had brought disaster, putting three of his four
carriers out of action. He had one left, Hiryu. Setting aside all the Japanese cultural baggage concerning aggressiveness and focusing instead on the battle at hand,
we might apply our calculated-risk reasoning to his decision-making situation.
He had just lost three of Japan’s six large fleet carriers, and Japanese industry was
not in a position to spew out replacements like its American counterpart. Hiryu
was now more precious than ever.18 A set of calculations like those we performed
before, for Fletcher and Spruance, reveals that shortly after the devastating
American attack at 1020, Nagumo would have been at the calculated-risk choice
point. If at 1100 he had decided to run west at thirty knots with Hiryu, he would
have been just outside the range of Spruance’s aircraft by the time protective dusk
fell. By launching an attack against American forces he ensured the doom of
Hiryu. Our intent is not to criticize Admiral Nagumo but to illustrate the tactical
dynamics of calculated risk. Key decision points sneak up on a commander or
can pass unnoticed. These choice points might be tactical, but they necessarily
have strategic consequences.
CALCULATED RISK IN TODAY’S ENVIRONMENT
It has been a long time since Nimitz’s calculated-risk instruction has had other
than historical interest for American naval officers. This, of course, is due to nearly absolute U.S. command of the sea since the end of World War II. Now, however,
the rise of China and its navy presents a situation in which calculated-risk logic
might very well come into play. The difficulty of actually adhering to this logic,
as illustrated by our parsing of Nimitz’s directive, suggests that both careful study
and analysis are needed, as well as a determined effort to incorporate the logic
into education and doctrine.
First, and most obviously, the strategic context for any new instantiation of
calculated risk is radically different now than in 1942. The United States enjoys
global command of the seas as a default condition; it does not have to win it.
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What the United States does do is exercise its command of the sea through the
forward deployment of its carrier battle groups around the periphery of Eurasia.
It does so to deter potential aggressors and generally contribute to the “strategic
stability” that allows the global system of trade and security to function smoothly.
It is the power-projection-ashore capability of the carriers, coupled with their
mobility and ability to be “ready on arrival,” that makes them broadly useful to
American presidents. However, the United States has only eleven of them (ten,
temporarily), and while this number exceeds the total in the rest of the world
combined, it is small enough when all the factors underpinning forward presence
are factored in. In view of the strategic purposes of American carriers and the
scope of their missions, eleven is not much more sufficient to us today than were
three to Nimitz. So American carriers are still scarce strategic assets.
The Global (Strategic) Level
Let us parse today’s version of calculated risk in a top-down manner. Today there
is no position of naval command authority equivalent to that of Admiral King,
but we can at least take his view in terms of asset management. The recent “rebalance” to the Pacific would seem to mirror a bit the conditions in 1942, when fleet
carriers were not a critical asset in the Atlantic. However, the current crisis in
Crimea and Ukraine may signal an increased need for carriers in and around the
European theater. In the 1960s and ’70s it would have been unthinkable to strip
the Atlantic Fleet of carriers, despite the war in Vietnam. However, in those days
the U.S. Navy had, at various times, from thirteen to twenty-three carriers. Eleven
just barely allows the maintenance of three stations continuously with single
carrier strike groups. Any concentration of carriers such as occurred in DESERT
STORM (seven) would require the gapping of one or more stations and would
disrupt the logistic cycle for years. In 1990 this was an acceptable risk, given the
unraveling of the Soviet Union and a China that had not yet built a significant
navy. In today’s world such a risk is less strategically acceptable.
Of course, none of this logic has yet considered the notion of carrier losses.
The United States can build only one at a time, and each takes four or five years,
plus another two for outfitting and workups. In wartime this could be compressed somewhat, but in no way will the Chief of Naval Operations today have
the industrial production backstop enjoyed by King and Nimitz. For all intents
and purposes, we are in the position of Yamamoto and Nagumo; losses to carriers could not be made good in the likely span of a modern war. This being the
case, it becomes important to consider the ends for which the carriers are being
risked. Is there a strategic imperative or an upside potential that makes such risk
acceptable? This is unknown intellectual territory for admirals several generations removed from June 1942.
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The first problem we encounter is that although Russia and China have one
aircraft carrier each and China is building more, these ships do not constitute the
foundations of their navies’ strategic capabilities. So the kind of symmetrical attrition calculation that underpinned Nimitz’s instruction does not exist now. We
must also note that China’s potential military objectives lie close to home, generally beneath a dense missile and airpower umbrella. Defeating Chinese military
aggression against Taiwan or various islands in the East and South China Seas
would be desirable, but what things can aircraft carriers do that would satisfy the
upside of the calculated-risk equation? It is beyond the scope of this article to
define what those things might be; the main point here is that we must ask the
question, instead of reflexively committing carriers as the Japanese—and perhaps
the Americans—did in 1942.
The Regional (Operational) Level
Let’s “drill down” a level and examine the issue from a theater order-of-battle
perspective. What if Nimitz had possessed a submarine fleet that was perhaps
not much larger than the one he had—several American submarines actually got
in among Nagumo’s carriers at Midway but to no good effect—but was equipped
with torpedoes with the range and lethality of the Japanese Long Lance? Maybe
that would have changed things. If Nimitz had had enough confidence in such
boats, he would not have needed to risk his precious carriers and would still have
had a good prospect of sinking Nagumo’s. Such a situation would essentially take
the calculated-risk equation off the table. Nimitz might lose several submarines
in the battle, but these could be made good more quickly than could Japanese
losses. We can see that a dozen or so well-placed torpedoes would have been the
functional equivalent of several carrier air wings of the era. Such a comparison
cannot be made today, because of the fundamentally different warfare environment wrought by missiles and other modern technology, but the overall lesson
is still clear and valid—dispersal of credible combat power among submarines
or smaller surface combatants removes the embedded dilemma inherent in the
calculated-risk equation.
The Local (Tactical) Level
However, we should not stop with the submarines-versus-carriers discussion. Let
us descend farther, to the level of Fletcher and Spruance—in today’s parlance, the
carrier battle group commander. Let’s also imagine some kind of crisis involving
China or perhaps Iran. The United States has elected to dispatch one carrier or
more to the scene as a show of force and resolve. If such positioning puts the
carriers inside the threat arcs of hostile missile systems or mixes them among
potentially hostile combatants (as was the case in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war),
a new version of the calculated-risk equation emerges. Assuming the carrier’s
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escorts cannot create an impregnable bastion around the carrier, the battle-group
commander has a decision to make. Does he or she break and run at some point
before shots are fired in order to get untargeted? Doing so could have adverse
political effects. In 1973, had U.S. carrier groups run west of the Strait of Sicily
to extract themselves from the spiderweb of Soviet missile shooters, the Soviets
would have been left in possession of the eastern Mediterranean and Israel would
have been isolated. Does simply showing up at the scene of a crisis automatically take the battle group commander past the calculated-risk decision point? It
would seem so, as modern aircraft carriers are no more able to outrun antiship
missiles than were Nimitz’s carriers to outrun Japanese carrier aircraft.
The Chain of Command
In 1942 the U.S. Navy chain of command in the Pacific consisted of three layers.
As we have seen, the notion of limiting risk to the aircraft carriers appears to have
originated with Admiral King, whose strategic perspective allowed him to weigh
objectively the potential costs and benefits of a pitched battle off Midway. His
guidance was processed by Nimitz’s staff and turned into a letter of instruction
to Fletcher and Spruance. Even with so straightforward a process, it appears that
neither Nimitz nor his task force commanders really took the principle to heart.
Today the chain of command is not as short or as straightforward, at least
from a naval perspective. In the Pacific, a carrier task force commander has above
him or her four levels of command: the numbered fleet (say, Seventh Fleet), the
theater naval component (Pacific Fleet), the combatant commander (U.S. Pacific
Command), and finally the Secretary of Defense. Whatever may be all the potential problems with this arrangement, two are salient here.19 First, and perhaps
most problematic, is the lack of a naval commander with global perspective. The
Joint Staff has no command authority, and the secretary’s staff is neither designed
nor manned to exert direct operational control. Rather, both provide broad
policy guidance to the regional combatant commanders. It is therefore not likely
that finely tuned assessments of allowable risk to naval forces will emanate from
the Pentagon. The second issue resides within Pacific Command itself. Absent
any useful risk guidance from Washington, the burden of assessment falls on the
combatant commander. However, this officer’s perspective is regional, not global,
and his or her preoccupation will be obtaining political access—always a consuming challenge—and achieving overall synchronization of joint forces. This
leaves the commander of the Pacific Fleet as the uppermost command echelon
positioned to assess allowable risk. As we have seen from the battle of Midway
example, objectivity about risk can be hard to attain.
Our analysis suggests several potential fixes for this critical emerging issue. The first and perhaps most effective would be for the Navy to develop a
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calculated-risk doctrine and ensure that it be incorporated into almost every
level of training and education. It needs to become almost an instinctive reflex
of officers selected for operational command. We cannot count on the current
military command structure to generate such calculations. The second potential
fix, much more difficult to put into operation, would be to establish a global-level
naval component commander, with staff, responsible for the management of
scarce naval resources from a global perspective. Most practically, this would be
a collateral duty of the Chief of Naval Operations.
Finally, we have the somewhat murky issue of staff objectivity. Much has been
made in the literature of war about the French adherence on the eve of World
War I to the doctrine of all-out offense, which produced disaster in the Battle of
the Frontiers in 1914. Admiral William F. Halsey’s reflexive aggressiveness is also
a subject of criticism. Our analysis here provides at least some indication that
Nimitz and his staff had developed a collective determination that their communications intelligence was correct—and, of course, there they had good reasons.
However, this underlying belief seemed to undercut the written guidance from
King, which was put in both the operations order and the letter of instruction.
What was not in the instruction was any decision branch that envisioned what
to do if the enemy were not located first or by a certain time. This indicates there
was no real thought given to a “Plan B” should the searches not have produced
results; the American planners were committed to executing a battle plan based
on the assumption that their intelligence was accurate. Historically, the results
justified that confidence. However, in retrospect we can see that the principle of
calculated risk was not observed in the lead-up to the battle. The general danger
here is of the development of a form of “groupthink” that leads to unexamined
assumptions and potentially lures commanders and staffs into military blunders.
Intelligence is a mesmerizing thing. The Allies used it with some effect in the
European theater before the invasion of Sicily when they put fake invasion plans
in a briefcase and attached it to a cadaver dressed as a diplomatic messenger. The
body washed ashore in Spain, where the plans were found and taken to Hitler,
who bought the ruse conveyed by the planted papers that the invasion would
be in Greece and persisted in believing so in the critical first weeks of the actual
invasion.20 It is one thing to rely on intelligence; it is quite another to fail to make
provision for retrieving the situation if the intelligence proves false.
Avoiding the Problem
Earlier, we speculated about how Nimitz might have been spared the dilemma
inherent in the principle of calculated risk if he had had a substantial flotilla of
submarines armed with good torpedoes. The principle of calculated risk, as defined in this article, is a consequence of concentration and scarcity, manifested
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in the form of a capital ship—the aircraft carrier. If combat power is distributed
and units are relatively numerous, the principle, with its embedded command
dilemma, is avoided. In today’s environment, this approach would take the form
of smaller combatants, including submarines, armed with antiship missiles and
other advanced weapons and sensors. Also embedded in the logic of calculated
risk is the idea of the “decisive battle.” Risking scarce and expensive strategic
assets in an engagement that does not figure to be strategically, or even operationally, decisive makes no sense. Calculated risk, as specifically defined herein,
cannot enter into the decision-making calculus in such a situation. Therefore, if
an engagement is likely to be part of a campaign of cumulative attrition—such
as the Battle of the Atlantic in World War II—the forces committed ought to be
appropriate to the form of warfare envisioned. Given the projected objectives of
revisionist coastal states in today’s world, however, it is more likely that drawnout attrition warfare will result from our attempts to counteract their aggression,
unless the United States inappropriately commits its strategic forces to a high-risk
environment. Understanding the internal logic of calculated risk can assist in
revising the U.S. Navy’s approach to warfare in the littorals.
A NEW SET OF INTELLECTUAL REFLEXES
Our inquiry has revealed several things. First, unless there was in fact some
understanding among American commanders on 3 June 1942 that Fletcher and
Spruance would “bail out” if there was no sighting of Japanese forces before
sunrise on the 4th, the calculated-risk directive was not worth the paper it was
written on, regardless of its vaunted clarity. Japanese operational and tactical mistakes only served to cover over this uncomfortable fact. That being said, the logic
of calculated risk certainly applied on both sides of the battle. Nagumo had his
chance to abide by the logic of relative attrition, but of course no such guidance
existed in the Imperial Japanese Navy. In retrospect, if someone were going to
back off, it would have been Nimitz himself. However, if the notion of calculated
risk was not his in the first place, one wonders whether he was even thinking in
those terms. The sighting of the Japanese invasion force on 3 June spared him the
decision, if indeed he ever anticipated having to make one. What was really going
on was that two fleets were hell-bent on destroying each other, and the subtleties
of calculated risk had little or nothing to do with the matter.
Such a negative judgment notwithstanding, we can see that the principle of
calculated risk has salience today, perhaps even more than in 1942. Among the
many “warfare gaps” that afflict the U.S. Navy today in terms of readiness to fight
a high-end war at sea is the intellectual preparation of the officer corps, which has
been accustomed to projecting power across the shore with impunity. As China
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builds its capability to deny access to the high seas within the first and second
“island chains” and as advanced antiship missile technology proliferates, the risks
to U.S. aircraft carriers and other forces will escalate, and a new set of intellectual
reflexes will be needed, from the local to the global level in the naval command
structure. The need is particularly great in view of all the rhetoric that has been
advanced over the years asserting the “dominance” that is presumed to be possessed, or else aspired to, by U.S. forces. While dominance is certainly desirable,
the facts quietly taking shape in the world suggest that the Navy’s situation is
more like that which Admiral Nimitz faced in 1942 than what he enjoyed in 1945.
Recognition of the problem is the first step in solving it. There is a particular logic
that attends war at sea, and calculated risk, as so elegantly but perhaps futilely articulated by Admiral Nimitz in 1942, is an emerging critical element that deserves
more study and consideration.

NOTES

1.	This now-declassified document can be
found in “Command Summary of Fleet
Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, USN: Volume
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been primarily to hedge—which translates into reluctance and caution when it
comes to actively participating in the pivot.
This article first discusses the current strategic landscape in the Asia-Pacific,
underlining the transition of power taking place in the region—that is, China’s
ascending relative power vis-à-vis the United States. Further, it reflects on the
strategy of the pivot as a response to this strategic flux, suggesting that this
power transition is more likely to unfold on the high seas rather than on Asia’s
continental landmass and that the Indo-Pacific region, therefore, is geostrategically significant for the success of the pivot. Subsequently, this article focuses on
the Indo-Pacific nature of America’s pivot, then on India’s emergence as a potent
naval power in the region. India’s maritime strategy, ambitions, and objectives are
seen as largely compatible with those of the United States. An empirical appraisal
of the Indian Navy’s response to the pivot follows, along three dimensions: naval
exercises with the U.S. and regional navies, progress on interoperability with the
U.S. Navy, and change in India’s constabulary services in the region. Finally, the
article explains the unresponsiveness of the Indian Navy to the American strategy
in terms of the larger Indian foreign-policy paradigm. It concludes with some
policy recommendations for better coordination between the two countries in
the Indo-Pacific, given their mutual apprehensions over China’s regional aims
and their compatible objectives in seeking greater regional stability.
THE “PIVOT” AND THE NEED FOR STRATEGIC PARTNERS
In late 2011, the Barack Obama administration issued a series of official statements and policy directives indicating a shift in America’s strategic focus. In
a major foreign-policy speech to the Australian parliament, President Obama
declared the strategy of a “pivot,” a shift that entailed a strong military commitment to the Asia-Pacific.2 Action followed words: it was announced that 2,500
U.S. Marines would be stationed in the Australian port city of Darwin.3 By January 2012, the Pentagon was ready with a major policy directive, Sustaining U.S.
Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense.4 The terminology it used
to define the new strategic vision—one geared toward the Pacific—was “strategic
rebalancing.”5
This rebalancing entailed a comprehensive shift in America’s military and
diplomatic commitment to the Asia-Pacific. By the summer of 2012 the Department of Defense had declared that 60 percent of America’s naval assets would be
stationed under the U.S. Pacific Command.6 Washington followed up by increasing its defense cooperation with Vietnam, renewing its military engagement with
the Philippines, promising more conventional arms to Taiwan, and permanently
stationing a flotilla of littoral combat ships in the port city of Singapore.7 New
missile-defense systems were installed in East Asia, and similar plans were made
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for Southeast Asia. Naval reallocation to the Pacific was followed up with the
dedication of 60 percent of the U.S. Air Force to the Pacific theater by mid-2013.8
In April 2014, to reassure its Asian allies, President Obama visited a number of
key countries in the Asia-Pacific. In Tokyo, Obama declared that the Senkaku
Islands fall under the purview of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.9 He also signed
a ten-year defense pact in Manila, paving the way for a greater U.S. military presence in the Philippines.
This dramatic change in U.S. military commitment to the region is largely a
function of the astonishing rise of China. Riding high on two decades of doubledigit economic growth, China is now on the cusp of becoming a serious regional
military power. Capabilities notwithstanding, the transition appears all the more
menacing because of China’s aggressive posturing in the East and South China
Seas, challenging the freedom of navigation in these waters. This behavior has
aggravated concerns that a rising China may jeopardize America’s basic commitments in the region, such as respect for international law, free and open commerce, open access to the global commons, and the principle of resolving conflict
without the use of force.10
Since most of China’s territorial conflicts are spread across the East and South
China Seas, naval force projection has gained uncharacteristic momentum for
a country that has had for most of its history a continental mind-set. China’s
maritime strategy and its increasing capabilities underscore, for some, Beijing’s
Mahanian ambitions.11 It may simply overwhelm the smaller powers in the
region. With respect to extraregional powers such as the United States, China’s
singular objective is to deny them any operational space in its oceanic sphere of
influence.12 Its robust submarine fleet and antiaccess/area-denial capabilities are
aimed against any possible intervention by the U.S. Navy.13 The Chinese might
also use these sea-denial platforms to conduct “anti-SLOC operations” (that is,
against sea lines of communications), which its naval doctrine identifies as one
of the six legitimate offensive and defensive campaigns it might carry out in the
open seas.14 According to the Pentagon, trends in Chinese military power suggest that the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN’s) DF-21D antiship ballistic
missile will soon be able to target the entire South China Sea, the Malacca Strait,
most of the Bay of Bengal, and parts of the Arabian Sea.15
Against this background, the pivot strategy “represents a simultaneous attempt
to warn China away from using heavy-handed tactics against its neighbors and
provide confidence to other Asia-Pacific countries that want to resist pressure
from Beijing now and in the future.”16 The focus of the pivot has been extensively
on America’s freedom and capability to intervene in Asia’s littorals to maintain
a healthy balance of power. The U.S. Navy, not surprisingly, has received enormous attention in recent years. It is the only service that has escaped the worst
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consequences of budgetary sequestration and new capabilities continue to be
introduced. Its activity in the Asia-Pacific theater has also seen a spike. However,
China’s oceanic offensive is not limited to its immediate neighborhood. Though
the eastern Pacific is its immediate area of operation, where it would like to have
absolute control, lately the Indian Ocean too has gained currency in China’s
grand strategy. Most of China’s trade—energy or otherwise—passes through the
SLOCs in the Indian Ocean. China considers the Indian Ocean, with its multiple
choke points, its “soft underbelly,” where constant vigilance might be required.
America’s articulation of a strategy of the pivot has catapulted the Indian Ocean
to the center stage of the geopolitical tussle between Washington and Beijing. The
Pentagon’s “post-pivot” declarations underline that America’s “security interests
are inextricably linked to developments in the arc extending from the western
Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean and South Asia.”17
The Indian Ocean region (IOR) is the highway of international commerce. Fifty percent of the world’s container traffic and 70 percent of its crude and other oil
products go through the SLOCs in the Indian Ocean. Securing the Indian Ocean’s
SLOCs is extremely important for sustenance of U.S. allies in the eastern Pacific,
as well as for the international economy.18 The Indian Ocean’s geography makes
it an extremely difficult place for an extraregional power to operate. Encircled by
strategic choke points such as the Strait of Malacca and Gulf of Aden, the Indian
Ocean highway can easily be blockaded by sea-denial strategies. Maintaining a
constant presence in the Indian Ocean is therefore a strategic necessity. As two
American analysts have argued, the U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean “provides
important defense-in-depth for countering threats to strategic chokepoints.”19
The Indian Ocean may well be the space wherein India and China compete
for supremacy in Asia. Whereas China is trying hard to spread its influence in
the IOR, India—the preeminent power in the Indian Ocean—is turning its gaze
toward the Pacific. This quest for “mastering space” in the Asia-Pacific has led
to a naval competition between the two Asian giants.20 The probability that any
future conflict over the unsettled Himalayan frontier may spill over to the Indian
Ocean and the eastern Pacific remains high. The clash of these geopolitical tectonic plates may ultimately render the Indian Ocean a “cockpit of great power
rivalries.”21 For all these reasons, the Indian Ocean occupies a distinct place in
America’s strategic imagination, and therefore the pivot is not restricted to the
Pacific. It has redefined Asia’s oceanic geography—the Indian and Pacific Oceans
have converged to become a “single strategic system.”22 However, as one American scholar cautions, “this reorientation will demand the redeployment of [U.S.]
naval forces that have been traditionally split between the Atlantic and the Pacific
to the Indo-Pacific, a unified, albeit massive, stretch of water.”23
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Contemporary Asia is witnessing a transition of power largely unfolding in
its oceans. As in the great-power transitions of the past, naval force will be the
principal determinant in the end result of this strategic flux. However, the success of the pivot and “strategic rebalancing” is far from assured. The ultimate
outcome, as has been argued, “will turn on whether Washington has the will, and
the wallet, to follow through the initiatives of the last several years.”24 Owing to
a large debt burden, the United States is going through an era of austerity. Cuts
in defense outlays may range anywhere from $450 billion to a trillion dollars.25
Though “pivoting” toward Asia means strengthening U.S. naval forces, if the
military sequestration continues the Navy will suffer. Cuts in American defense
outlays will impinge on the U.S. Navy’s ability to operate simultaneously and with
effect in both the Pacific and Indian Oceans, just as the pivot to the Indo-Pacific
entails greater commitments in the region.26
It has rightly been suggested that as the United States directs its attention toward the Indo-Pacific and assumes more responsibilities there, “a potential mismatch between US policy objectives and the structure of American naval power
looms over the coming decades.”27 This is true especially given that the Indian
Ocean’s numerous choke points may demand that “American naval forces confront transcontinental distances, complex strategic geography, and the emergence
of anti-access threats that will severely complicate future operations.”28 There is
also a growing debate in America about finding suitable partners to share the
load of strategic rebalancing. Any overcommitment by Washington would provide an incentive for potential partners to shift the burden onto U.S. shoulders;
undercommitment, however, might force them to “bandwagon” with Beijing.29
It is therefore important for the United States to be extremely careful in forging
meaningful partnerships with credible strategic partners.
American officials have found a strategic partnership with India extremely
enticing, especially in guarding the Indian Ocean from the negative fallouts of
China’s rapid rise. Washington continues to express its appreciation of India “as a
net security provider in the IOR.”30 Maritime security cooperation between India
and the United States has become a strategic necessity, especially for sustaining
a favorable strategic equilibrium as Chinese power rises. American strategy, according to some, “should focus on supporting Indian pre-eminence in the Indian
Ocean and closer U.S.-India strategic cooperation.”31
In both the U.S. government and strategic circles there is an emerging expectation that India should play a significant role in maintaining the maritime balance
of power in the Indo-Pacific. The readiness of India to assume that role, however,
remains ambiguous, despite New Delhi’s assertions about India’s emergence as an
Indo-Pacific maritime power.
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INDIA AS AN INDO-PACIFIC MARITIME POWER
India’s political leaders, diplomats, and strategic thinkers have been articulating
an Indo-Pacific vision for the nation’s maritime power in the twenty-first century
for some time now. On a visit to Japan in May 2013, Manmohan Singh, then
prime minister, mentioned the increasing “confluence of the . . . Pacific and the
Indian Oceans,” even as he cautioned his audience that “this region faces multiple challenges, unresolved issues and unsettled questions. Historical differences
persist despite our growing inter-dependence.” This was clearly an allusion to the
rise of China and its impact on the region. Maritime security in the Indo-Pacific,
therefore, in Singh’s view, is “essential for regional and global prosperity.”32 The
idea of the Indo-Pacific as an arena of geopolitical tussles also informs the Indian
Navy’s assessment of the strategic environment: “It signifies the fusion of two geopolitically sensitive and economically vibrant regions . . . [and] could well define
the future trajectory of political interactions in the 21st century.”33 Accompanying
this shift of focus toward the Indo-Pacific is a larger shift in self-perception, in
that India’s unique geography in the Indian Ocean “gives [it] a point of a pivot”
in the Indo-Pacific region.34
In the last two decades, the geographical extent of India’s maritime interests has expanded to cover the whole of the Indo-Pacific. This geographical
reimagination of India’s maritime interests has been driven by India’s economic
performance and the growing economic opportunities in the East. India’s trade
with the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and
with Japan, South Korea, and Australia has increased considerably (see the table).
Moreover, with its booming economy, India’s energy dependence on the Middle
East has also increased; maintaining the flow of energy and commodities has become a prime concern. India is the fourth-largest consumer of oil and gas in the
world, and its dependence on imports increased from 40 percent of total demand
in 1990 to about 70 percent in 2011.35 Sixty-four percent of these imports come
from the Middle East and 17 percent from Africa, making security of supply
INDIA’S TRADE WITH ASEAN, AUSTRALIA, JAPAN, AND SOUTH KOREA
Partners

Trade
(billions of dollars, 2007–2008)

Trade
(billions of dollars, 2012–13)

India–ASEAN

40.

80.

India–Australia

10.9

13.8

India–Japan
India–South Korea

9.89
11.22

16.
17.44

Sources: Government of India, Annual Report 2012–13; idem, Annual Report 2007–08.
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routes in the Indian Ocean a vital national interest.36 Economics, however, is only
one among a number of drivers in this reorientation. Strategic necessities have
hugely influenced India’s approach to the Indo-Pacific.
India views growing Chinese naval power with concern. For the first five
decades of India’s independence, its geographical advantage of the Indian Ocean
and its limited interests in the East facilitated its lackadaisical approach to
maritime security in the Indo-Pacific. China’s rapid naval modernization and
its forays into the Indian Ocean have forced New Delhi to rethink the role of its
navy in maintaining the maritime balance of power. In the last decade, China
has developed naval facilities in Burma, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan and is planning
to build naval infrastructure in Seychelles.37 Though Beijing considers these
installations as economic hubs, some strategists in India argue that economics
notwithstanding, they can be later converted into military facilities and used
against India as an elaborate “string of pearls” to contain New Delhi’s influence
in the Indian Ocean.38 The Indian Navy, as is evident from its 2007 doctrine, is
particularly alarmed by China’s growing naval presence in the region.39 As one
senior naval official underlined to the authors, “They [the Chinese] are definitely
not building these facilities to develop golf courses.”40 Though the Indian national
security adviser has tried to allay the fears engendered by the “string of pearls”
theory, the Indian strategic community remains wary of China’s ultimate intentions.41 China’s antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden have also raised hackles
with some in the Indian Navy who question the need for the PLAN’s continuous
deployment of two frontline warships and a tanker.42 But the rivalry also extends
to waters beyond Malacca. If for China the Indian Ocean is not an Indian lake,
New Delhi’s imperative is to contest impressions in Beijing that the waters east
of Malacca automatically fall under the latter’s sphere of influence.43 India’s naval
engagement in the East, therefore, has also been a reaction to China’s expansion
in the Indian Ocean region. The turf war between the two navies, as both nations
further prosper and seek greater roles in regional dynamics, is set to grow. This
was illustrated even in the search and rescue operations for the missing Malaysian jetliner MH370 in April 2014. China deployed eight major naval warships in
this operation, a presence that may have been unthinkable a decade ago.44 China
also requested that India allow four of its warships to conduct search operations
in the Andaman Sea, which New Delhi categorically rejected, insisting that
search operations in that area are its own responsibility.45
Another strategic imperative that has facilitated India’s naval engagement in
the Indo-Pacific is New Delhi’s burgeoning relationship with Washington. The
end of the Cold War forced India to mend fences with the world’s only remaining superpower. However, nuclear proliferation and India’s own nuclear status
kept bilateral relations tense. Change accompanied the presidency of George W.
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Bush. President Bush transformed Indo-U.S. ties by offering India the landmark
civil nuclear energy cooperation pact.46 His administration perceived India as
a rightful competitor with China, with its growing clout in Asia, and foresaw
India playing a particularly important role in the Indian Ocean.47 Management
of maritime threats in the IOR gained further momentum after 11 September
2001. The Indian Navy launched Operation SAGITTARIUS, providing escorts and
protection to U.S. ships passing through the Indian Ocean, operationally relieving the U.S. Navy of its constabulary services in the region, and facilitating the
American operations in Afghanistan.48 Annual joint naval exercises, suspended
since 1998, were restarted by India and the United States in 2002, with a series
now code-named MALABAR. This interaction fostered “operational cooperation”
between the two navies, which, according to the U.S. Department of Defense,
was evident in the post-tsunami relief operations in the Indian Ocean in 2004.49
Learning from those experiences, the two navies established a “U.S.-India Disaster Response Initiative to spur greater training and engagement to prepare for
combined responses to future disasters in the Indian Ocean Region.”50
Following the footsteps of the Comprehensive Defence Agreement of 2005, India and the United States signed a Maritime Cooperation Agreement in 2006 that
institutionalized cooperation between their navies. INS Jalashwa, a Trenton-class
amphibious ship, joined the Indian Navy in 2007, augmenting its capability to
undertake “amphibious and expeditionary warfare.” Subsequently, P8I maritime
reconnaissance aircraft were obtained from Boeing, the Indian Navy thereby becoming the “first [foreign] navy in the world,” as India’s external affairs minister
told his audience at Harvard University, to operate this “state of the art” aircraft.51
Strategic necessities notwithstanding, an important agent of change in India’s
maritime ambitions has been the Indian Navy itself. Least ideologically driven
and also the most strategic minded of all the services in India’s defense establishment, the navy has long articulated the need to expand India’s maritime vision.
This ambitious streak in the Indian Navy’s thinking is evident in its policy documents, as well as in its increasing maritime engagement with states across the
Indo-Pacific. Indian naval officials and maritime strategists seem to be “intent on
a ‘naval forward strategy’ that, logically speaking, could extend eastward into the
South China Sea and the Pacific Rim.”52 Forward defense of the subcontinent or of
India’s traditional sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean means a forward presence on the very edge of the Indian Ocean and beyond in the Pacific. The logic of
forward presence is manifest in the Indian Maritime Doctrine, a policy document
released by the naval arm of the Integrated Headquarters of the Indian military
in May 2004.53 Unlike the “limited framework of defensive limited coastal ‘seadenial’” that had defined the navy’s strategic thinking for the first fifty years of independence, the maritime doctrine in 2004 “moved to a more assertive competitive
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strategy for projecting power deeper into and across the Indian Ocean.”54 Recognizing that a shift in global maritime focus is taking place “from the AtlanticPacific to the Pacific-Indian Ocean region,” the document envisages as one of
the major missions of the navy raising the costs of intervention by extraregional
powers in India’s maritime sphere of influence.55 Equal emphasis was given to the
navy’s role as an instrument of diplomacy in the larger interest of India’s foreign
policy.56 Moreover the doctrine, given the navy’s experiences in escorting U.S.
cargo during SAGITTARIUS, also paid attention to the service’s ability to supply
international “public goods,” such as the protection of SLOCs, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief.57 The nation’s first document on maritime doctrine
in the twenty-first century had an ambitious vision for India’s maritime power.
The Indian Navy also seemed to walk the talk. In 2005, India finally established the Far Eastern Naval Command in the strategic islands of Andaman and
Nicobar. The strategic value of the base is evident in the fact that it provides the
Indian Navy a forward operating platform in the Indian Ocean only sixty nautical miles from the Strait of Malacca. In consonance with the changing maritime
realities and roles the doctrine envisaged, the Indian aircraft carrier INS Viraat
visited in 2005 for the first time a number of ports in Southeast Asia while transiting to the western Pacific.58 The year 2007 was quite eventful for the Indian Navy,
insofar as its expansion into the western Pacific is concerned. The MALABAR
exercise with the United States was conducted off the coast of Okinawa from 6
to 11 April, followed by a trilateral exercise, called TRILATEX, with the navies of
the United States and Japan.59 Later, the Indian Navy participated in West Pacific
Naval Symposium multilateral at-sea exercises with regional navies in the South
China Sea.60 If the Indian Navy was sailing across the western Pacific in the spring
and summer of 2007, major navies of the region—those of Japan, Australia, and
Singapore—and that of the United States gathered in the Bay of Bengal in September to conduct with India a joint multilateral naval exercise called MALABAR
07-02.61 This was in addition to the annual MALABAR bilateral exercise between
India and the United States, and it was one of the largest exercises ever conducted
in the region, involving approximately twenty-five ships, 150 aircraft, and twenty
thousand personnel. For the first time in the Bay of Bengal, three carrier strike
groups, two from the United States and one from India, participated.62
If the underlying reason behind the exercise was to signal to China an impending shift in the regional balance of power, the 2007 policy document issued by the
navy, Freedom of the Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategy, conveyed the same.
Forewarning India’s decision makers of China’s creeping influence and powerprojection capabilities in the Indian Ocean, it stated that the “Chinese navy is
set on the path to become a blue-water force [along with] attempts to gain [a]
strategic toe-hold in the IOR.”63 This allusion to China’s growing capabilities, in
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss1/20

60

56

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

War College: Winter 2015 Review

conjunction with the strategy document’s acknowledgment that “strategic objectives of a majority of extraregional navies are broadly coincident with India’s own
strategic interests,” suggests that India’s naval strategy in some sense had become
China focused.64 It is therefore important to note that the document laid great
emphasis on maritime cooperation with regional powers, with a clear intention
“to prevent . . . incursions by powers inimical to India’s national interests.”65 In
2008, the Indian Navy organized the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, inviting all
navies of the IOR to address regional security challenges multilaterally. The scope
of its annual naval exercises with regional navies has also expanded considerably;
the MILAN exercises, initiated in 1995 with just five members, have now fourteen
regional navies under their ambit. Engagement with other navies has also been
institutionalized; the Indian Navy now conducts institutional staff talks with
fifteen other national naval forces.
This shift in strategy can also be located in India’s increasing capabilities. In
a span of two decades, the Indian Navy has seen a growth of 30 percent in its
military wherewithal, emerging as the third-largest navy in Asia, after China’s
and Japan’s.66 In 1992–93, the navy’s share of the defense budget stood at 11.5
percent; by 2012–13, it had grown to 19 percent. Though compared to Japan and
China these financial figures may appear small, “in local terms India’s military
spending now being channeled into naval purposes is significantly greater than
naval spending by all other Indian Ocean states.”67 Capital investment in future
capabilities constitutes 50 percent of its budget, much higher than in its sister
services. The navy’s strategic decision to invest in long-term capabilities has lately
started manifesting itself. INS Vikramaditya, India’s second aircraft carrier and
by far the largest ship in its kitty, joined the force in 2013. Though the ship took
more than a decade and double the initial cost, the Indian Navy now boasts a very
capable force-projection capacity in the Indian Ocean and beyond. Indigenous
production of defense equipment is also high on the navy’s agenda, with all fortyfive vessels currently on order being constructed within India. The nation’s first
indigenously designed aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant, 37,500 tons, was launched in
August 2013, entering the second phase of construction, during which it would
be fitted with weapon and propulsion systems and the entire aircraft complex. It
is set to enter sea trials in 2015–16 and is estimated to be introduced into service
by 2017. Designs for another aircraft carrier, INS Vishal, are in preparation. The
Indian Navy plans to operate three battle groups by the end of this decade.
Its underwater fleet, though a cause of concern both in the Indian Navy and
among observers outside, is now bolstered by the advent of its first nuclear submarine. After a long gestation period of over three decades, INS Arihant, built
under the pseudonym of “Advanced Technology Vessel,” may now provide the
navy a perennial presence in the depths of Asia’s waters.
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The navy also has some very ambitious plans for asset acquisition and construction. Under the new five-year Defence Plan for 2012–17 and the Long-Term
Integrated Perspective Plan for 2012–27, the “Indian Navy is aiming to induct
more than 90 fighting platforms in another ten years.”68 Given its past record, incorporation of all these platforms may eventually face delays. It is also important
to acknowledge that lately the Indian Navy has been under great scrutiny due to
a series of accidents on board major vessels, including the sinking of a submarine
owing to malfunctioning electric batteries.69 This has further beleaguered a force
that already suffers from lack of political clout in New Delhi, as was evident in the
speedy acceptance of the resignation of the Chief of the Naval Staff by the defense
ministry soon after another accident marred its reputation in February 2014.70
Though these developments have undermined the navy’s credibility, its motivation to modernize and to master the space around the Indian Ocean remains as
potent as ever.
The above discussion suggests that India’s engagement in maritime Asia is
not restricted to the Indian Ocean alone; in fact, the nation is increasingly being
perceived as an Indo-Pacific power. India’s official declarations and its naval proactiveness attest to this ambitious portrayal of its maritime sphere of influence.
Second, this reimagining of India’s traditional maritime outlook is a result of
India’s ascending economic profile. However, China’s growing power and capabilities, its impressive naval modernization, and its slowly advancing footprints
in the Indian Ocean area have catapulted the Indo-Pacific to the very center of
India’s strategic considerations. These changes in the scope of India’s maritime
interests have been facilitated by engagement with other regional powers, such
as Japan and Australia, but particularly with the United States. New Delhi’s core
strategic objectives in the region are largely compatible with those of Washington.
India’s naval expansion has occurred in a period of relative stability in the
Indo-Pacific region, secured by American military supremacy. Aside from a few
occasions of activism, India has been reluctant to provide public goods in the region, relying on the United States to do the heavy lifting. However, after the 2008
financial crisis, the sustainability of the U.S. commitment came under increasing scrutiny. Moreover, the U.S. strategy of pivot and rebalancing focuses much
more on the Pacific, especially the East and South China Seas, than on the Indian
Ocean. Given its geography, threat perceptions, and maritime ambitions, India
may now be the natural heir to the American role in the region and particularly
in the Indian Ocean.
THE INDIAN NAVY AND THE U.S. “PIVOT”
India’s growing capabilities suggest that it can be an important player in maintaining the maritime balance in the Indo-Pacific. The United States also expects,
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and has actively encouraged, India to increase its footprint in the region. The
pivot therefore represents a strategic opportunity for India to realize its true potential as an Indo-Pacific power. The Indian Navy’s response to this new strategic
paradigm can be discerned in naval exercises with the U.S. and regional navies;
in progress in interoperability between the Indian and U.S. Navies; and in the
constabulary services the Indian Navy offers in the IOR.
The “flagship” naval program between the Indian and U.S. Navies—the
M ALABAR exercise series—has gathered momentum since 2002. Just after
President Obama announced his plans for a pivot to the Asia-Pacific, the 2012
exercise, conducted in the Bay of Bengal, saw unprecedented contribution from
the American side—the Seventh Fleet’s Carrier Strike Group 1, which included
among other ships a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier and a nuclear submarine, participated.71 Though its scope may have been decided long before, coming in the
wake of the pivot this exercise conveyed a forceful message. The Indian and U.S.
Navies the same year also conducted a joint submarine-rescue exercise off the
coast of Mumbai, INDIAEX 12.72 Given the fact that the Indian Navy had recently
commissioned a nuclear-powered submarine, this focus on submarine rescue
suggested a new leap in naval cooperation. In July 2014, MALABAR exercises were
conducted off the coast of Sasebo, Japan.73 Japan participated in the exercise on
India’s invitation. A host of ships, including destroyers, submarines, and longrange maritime reconnaissance aircraft from all three states, were involved in
the exercise.
With regard to regional maritime cooperation, the Indian Navy has been partnering with various states in Southeast Asia and Oceania. The SIMBEX exercises,
between the Indian Navy and the Republic of Singapore Navy, take place annually
and have been conducted all over the Indo-Pacific, including the Malacca Strait
and the South China Sea.74 Indian naval ships have been regularly calling on ports
in Indonesia, Vietnam, and Australia.75 Both Australia and Indonesia have shown
interest in annual naval exercises with India, which may begin as soon as 2015.76
The real development, however, has been in maritime cooperation between
the Indian Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. Since 2007, the two
services have been constantly interacting with each other in trilateral and multilateral forums but until recently had eschewed bilateral naval engagement. In
2012, the two sides decided to conduct direct bilateral maritime exercises to enhance maritime security in the Asia-Pacific.77 The first-ever Indo-Japanese joint
naval exercise took place off the coast of Okinawa in June 2012; four Indian ships
participated.78 It was here that the Indian Navy observed the capabilities of the
Japanese US-2 amphibious aircraft, which India now desires to buy. In December
2013 the Japanese navy conducted its first bilateral maritime exercise with the
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Indian Navy in the IOR. Indian prime minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Japan in
September 2014 reinforced this emerging defense partnership. The Memorandum of Cooperation and Exchanges in the field of defense was signed, aimed at
institutionalizing the growing military cooperation between the two navies.79 In
fact, the Tokyo declaration indicates that rather than being an invited participant,
Japan may henceforth join the Indo-U.S. bilateral naval exercises as a full partner.
If “the future direction of the burgeoning Japan-India strategic relationship will
be one of the important indicator[s] of the degree to which U.S. allies and partners within Asia are prepared to align more closely with each other to maintain
a favourable strategic equilibrium in the region as the future of Chinese power
grows relative to the United States,” growing naval cooperation between the two
navies suggests that a local balance of power might be slowly emerging in the
waters of the Indo-Pacific.80
The naval strategy under the pivot focuses extensively on interoperability
with regional navies. Given that the new American strategy concentrates on
the Indo-Pacific, with a heavy emphasis on naval forces, the U.S. Navy expects
to strengthen interoperability with its Indian counterpart. Ever since the New
Framework for Defence Cooperation was signed in 2005, followed by the Maritime Security Cooperation Agreement, the United States has been pressing India
to conclude a Logistics Sharing Agreement (LSA). However, even after a decade,
the “New Framework” remains in limbo; the LSA and two other crucial strategic
agreements—the Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum
of Agreement (CISMOA) and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement
(BECA) for Geo-spatial Cooperation—have seen no progress. Proper logistical
support arrangements are important for practical cooperation between the two
countries. The most important aspect of the LSA is the element of interoperability, whereby collaborating nations can use each other’s military equipment,
leading to more efficient joint military operations. The strategy of the pivot necessitates increased strategic interaction and cooperation between the U.S. and
Indian Navies. But Delhi has given no indication that it is in a hurry to proceed.81
The new government in New Delhi under Modi has shown more willingness to
engage with the United States militarily. During Modi’s visit to the United States
in September–October 2014, the two nations not only renewed their 2005 defense cooperation agreement for another ten years but also expanded its scope,
by declaring that the two countries will “treat each other at the same level as their
closest partners” on issues including “defense technology, trade, research, coproduction and co-development.”82 In their joint statement both nations declared
their support for freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, signaling that
the Modi government is not reluctant to highlight New Delhi’s convergence with

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss1/20

64

60

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

War College: Winter 2015 Review

Washington on regional issues. The United States expressed its willingness to
enhance technology partnership with the Indian Navy. Though the two nations
have now decided to upgrade the MALABAR series of exercises, it is not yet clear
whether the Modi government is ready to move forward on the LSA, CISMOA,
and BECA.
Given that the United States is seeking new partners to provide international
public goods in the Indo-Pacific, one would expect India to take its constabulary role in the Indo-Pacific more seriously. However, in 2012, Admiral Nirmal
Verma, then the naval chief, categorically rejected any deployment of warships in
the Pacific: “At this point of time, Pacific and South China Sea are of concern to
the global community, but in terms of any active deployment from our side, it is
not on the cards.”83 At the same time, he expressed concern that the Indian Navy
could do much more in the Indian Ocean region than it was being allowed to.
According to the Indian Navy, in the last five years thirty-six of its combat vessels
have been involved in supporting maritime security in the IOR, an average of
six to seven vessels a year. Given the volume of trade involved and the vast geographical extent of India’s maritime interests, this is clearly not sufficient. Also,
the “deployment of warships in Gulf of Aden by various navies is not entirely
for anti-piracy operations”; it is helpful also for, as an Indian naval commander
points out, gaining “experience in out of area deployment,” developing “jointmanship,” and the most vital of all, increasing the “visibility of the Indian Navy.”84
In the last decade the Indian Navy’s real show of strength in the Indian Ocean
was in antipiracy operations in Somali waters in the summer of 2008. Since then
it has maintained a continuous presence in the western Indian Ocean and has
effectively dealt with specific pirate threats on multiple occasions.85
However, India remains reluctant to participate in Combined Task Force 151,
an initiative led by the United States, mainly because Pakistan is also a part of
it. The Indian Navy, just like those of China and Russia, prefers independent
antipiracy operations, or “national escort missions,” though it does coordinate
with other navies.86 Also, the navy’s deployment in the western Indian Ocean
took place only after a prolonged and bitter debate between the service and the
Ministry of External Affairs (MEA).87 The issue was the legality of unilateral Indian deployment of force in international waters. As of now, piracy is not a crime
under the Indian Penal Code (IPC). Prosecution of captured pirates, therefore,
cannot be taken to its logical ends. However, there is a bigger problem for Indian
Navy operations in international waters. According to the Parliamentary Standing Committee Report on Anti-Piracy Law, another “limitation of the IPC is that
the piratical acts by a foreigner committed outside territorial waters of India do
not constitute an offence under the IPC.”88
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This clearly limits the Indian Navy’s case for antipiracy operations in international waters. The navy considers that law should be an important enabler
in its efforts to curb piracy in the region. “A strong law is definitely needed to
avoid ambiguities that exist,” opines a senior naval officer who has commanded
warships in the Gulf of Aden.89 The MEA proposed such a bill in June 2012 but
immediately ran into controversy, because the ministry had not consulted the
states over its implementation and operationalization. As a result, the bill is still
pending in the Indian Parliament.90
The legal issue must be juxtaposed to India’s historical ambivalence toward
the use of force internationally. Traditionally, India has refrained from unilateral
use of force outside its territorial jurisdiction and has been comfortable only in
United Nations–mandated multilateral security operations. Such reluctance even
when the UN Security Council has authorized individual states to combat piracy
suggests deep-seated ideological resistance.91 It also reflects on India’s hesitant
attitude toward power projection. Given these realities, “ad hocism” pervades
India’s constabulary role in the Indian Ocean.
As a consequence, the Indian Navy has found it difficult to take full advantage
of the new strategic opportunities presented by the U.S. pivot toward the AsiaPacific. The next section explores the larger political context within India that has
prevented the Indian Navy from exploiting the potentials presented to it by the
changing strategic realities in the region.
POWER TRANSITION, UNCERTAINTY, AND STRATEGIC HEDGING
Notwithstanding expectations in Washington, Delhi has been a reluctant supporter of the American pivot. Indian official response indicates a preference for
hedging—India would not like to choose sides in this great game, at least before
the dust settles, allowing it to make informed choices. Former prime minister
Manmohan Singh has underscored uncertainty as the driving force behind India’s
reluctance to participate enthusiastically in the American designs, arguing, “If
you survey the global strategic environment over the past decade, it would not escape your notice that, just as the economic pendulum is shifting inexorably from
west to east, so is the strategic focus, as exemplified by the increasing contestation
in the seas to our east and the related pivot or ‘rebalancing’ by the United States
in this area. This to my mind is a development fraught with uncertainty.”92 Similar anxieties were expressed by the prime minister’s special envoy to the United
States, Ambassador Shyam Saran, back in February 2009. Commenting on a
future “fraught with deep uncertainty” due to the ongoing transitions of power
in Asia, Saran prescribed a policy of hedging vis-à-vis the battle between the two
great powers, the United States and China.93 Some in the military have argued
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similarly that a “balanced and interest based cooperation with both [the United
States and China]” allows India “to reduce the risk of over-investing in any of the
great powers.”94 This early emphasis on hedging is instructive, inasmuch as India
and the United States during the presidency of George W. Bush were openly talking of a strategic partnership, shaped partly by China’s growing influence. The
Indo-U.S. civilian nuclear cooperation agreement, the high-water mark of this
strategic partnership, had just been signed in 2008.
Compared with the Bush era, Indian-U.S. strategic partnership has lost some
momentum under the Obama administration. As a senator, Obama opposed the
civilian nuclear agreement. As president, in formulating his Afghanistan policy,
he tried to “rehyphenate” India and Pakistan, by bringing Kashmir back onto the
Indo-U.S. bilateral agenda, which drew a good deal of criticism from New Delhi.95
But it was Obama’s idea of a G-2 (a condominium of China and the United States
to manage Asia) that was most heavily contested in New Delhi.96 In the early
days of the first Obama administration senior American officials reportedly told
their Indian counterparts that the United States “was not doing balance of power
in Asia anymore.”97 This view was seen as in strong contrast to the Bush administration’s more geopolitical approach, and it created a flutter in Indian strategic
circles, bringing back the memory of American ignorance of Indian concerns
that had been the case during the first term of the Clinton presidency. Of course,
within two years, the Obama administration’s policy shifted in response to growing Chinese assertiveness, and the president declared the rebalancing strategy.
However, the damage had already been done—at least in perceptions. Hedging
made inroads in the Indian mind-set mainly as a result of the Obama administration’s initial strategy of accommodation vis-à-vis China. In the looming maritime
competition between India and China, the United States sought to play the role of
a distant “sea-based balancer” and “honest broker.” In reaction, India was forced
to recalibrate its own position. Reacting to the new stream of thinking in American strategic circles, India’s then national security adviser, Shiv Shankar Menon,
explicitly rejected the proposition that India would balance China on America’s
behalf: “Is it likely that two emerging states like India and China, with old traditions of state-craft, would allow themselves to remain the objects of someone
else’s policy, no matter how elegantly expressed? I think not.”98 India also seemed
to be recalibrating its activism in securing the Indian Ocean. Its unwillingness
to assume alone the mantle of maritime security was evident in the words of
Ambassador Nirupama Rao: “While India is seen as a net security provider, we
cannot carry the burden of regional security on our shoulders alone.”99 If some in
New Delhi saw American retrenchment as an extra burden on India, others were
deeply skeptical about whether the United States could sustain its commitment in
the region, given its dire fiscal state. Reliance on American primacy for ensuring
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regional stability appeared to be “an inherently problematic proposition because
it relies on U.S. military power which is not only getting thinner on the ground,
but no longer has the necessary economic underpinning.”100
Obama’s initial policy inclination to retrench from Asia and cede the traditional American sphere of influence to Beijing created a sense of vulnerability
in India. This vulnerability was accentuated by the fact that a rising India had
been used to American primacy. It was ready to take advantage of America’s
global leadership, but it was not yet prepared to assume any responsibilities of its
own. The uncertainty regarding U.S. intentions in the Asia-Pacific and its own
vulnerability in the face of American decline therefore largely determined India’s
lukewarm response to the pivot. Even as successive policy statements by American officials and government agencies have prodded it to play a bigger role in the
pivot and rebalancing, India has tried to distance itself from the more threatening
military connotations of U.S. strategy.
There are some domestic factors as well behind India’s cautious approach. New
Delhi remains conscious of the fact that any unilateral naval deployment might
provoke reactions from other regional actors. As has been noted, the Indian Navy’s
only show of strength in the IOR was in Somali waters in 2008, and its two major
tasks in the Indo-Pacific, supporting security for the littoral states and the global
commons, have been pursued only on an ad hoc basis.101 India’s preference is for
a concert of power in the region, one in which the United States would be just one
among several major actors ensuring collective security in Asian waters.102 This
view, however, clearly discounts the fact that a major military transformation is
under way in Asia, one that is fundamentally threatening, in that there exist real
conflicts among principal participants and uncertainty about their intentions.
Another problem may be the difficulty for India of abandoning its habit of freeriding on U.S. guarantees and assuming the weight of securing the Indian Ocean
highway from inimical forces.103 Lastly, India’s economic growth has stagnated
in the last couple of years, as is evident in the decrease in percentage growth of
India’s defense budgets. In November 2013, the prime minister warned India’s top
military commanders of an impending resource crunch.104 Capital investment in
military modernization may be the first casualty of the decrease in the growth
of India’s gross domestic product. Whereas rapid economic growth fueled India’s
naval expansion, it is possible that economic reversals may put limits on it. They
may direct India inward to the immediate confines of the Indian Ocean. All these
factors together have made it difficult for Delhi to assume a more prominent role
in the unfolding American foreign-policy posture of strategic rebalancing.
However, the coming into office of the Modi government has raised expectations that New Delhi may alter course. Though Modi’s reading of the future
Asian strategic landscape is also underlined by a sense of uncertainty, he seems
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more willing than his predecessor to take responsibility in shaping the regional
balance of power. This was underscored by his comments in Japan that “greater
uncertainty” in Asia only brings “greater responsibility for Japan and India.”105
He has also been unequivocal about China’s growing assertiveness in Asian waters, emphasizing prevalent tensions in the Indo-Pacific and warning that states
should not pursue “expansionist” policies.106 With the 2005 defense cooperation
agreement having been extended for another ten years, military-to-military ties
between the United States and India are likely to prosper further. Yet change will
not be drastic. The trust deficit accumulated over the last several years between
the United States and India will take great investment and time from both sides
to overcome. Moreover, lack of clear focus on the Indo-Pacific as Washington
continues to struggle to come to terms with multiple crises in the Middle East and
Europe will only encourage India to hedge its bets for the foreseeable future, even
as the geostrategic flux in the region is likely to shape its foreign policy choices
in unprecedented ways.
SITTING ON THE SIDELINES
The U.S. policy of a pivot to the Asia-Pacific requires a strategic partnership with
India to maintain a healthy balance of power in maritime Asia. Yet though the
Indian Navy has been constantly seeking a bigger role in the region, it appears
reluctant to increase its coordination with U.S. forces in the Indian Ocean and
beyond. This lack of enthusiasm arises from India’s hedging strategy. India does
not want to be seen as allied with the United States. Instead, it wants to sit on the
sidelines while the United States and China slug it out for dominance in the IndoPacific. India felt highly vulnerable when Washington tried to accommodate Beijing at the expense of other, smaller powers in the region between 2009 and 2011.
The idea of a G-2 has made a strong impression on India’s strategic thought. Even
now that Washington has committed itself to the pivot, Indian strategic thinkers
consider a G-2 a possibility that cannot be ignored. Also, the domestic debate in
India over New Delhi’s role in the pivot is fractured.
Nevertheless, India may well participate in the U.S. pivot, given strategic circumstances, if the domestic political context undergoes a change. Meanwhile,
there are a few things that the United States can do to decrease India’s sense of
vulnerability and encourage its participation.
First, the United States should provide the Indian Navy technological assistance in such key projects as nuclear propulsion and the design and construction of aircraft carriers. This could be the new “nuclear deal,” guiding the future
trajectory of Indian-U.S. relations; it would clearly indicate American resolve
to help India attain technological sophistication for its defensive preparedness. Indian Navy officials suggest that the force has embarked on an extensive
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modernization, which presents America with a rare window of opportunity to
establish a “comprehensive military partnership” by selling India “top of the
line” defense equipment, complemented by technology transfers. If it does not,
Russia would love to fill the gap. Given the fact that the shelf life of contemporary procurements is at least twenty or thirty years, Indian-Russian dependence
would continue, as was the case during the Cold War.107 American technological assistance, on the other hand, would strengthen the hands of those in New
Delhi who are proposing closer defense engagement with the United States, while
underscoring America’s commitment to India’s rise as a major regional-security
provider. Also, Washington should appreciate that a potent Indian Navy would be
an important lobbying force behind a gradual expansion of India’s constabulary
activity in the IOR. It would also prod the navy to expand its strategic reach to the
western Pacific, signaling a shift in the balance of power to Beijing. If the pivot
is meant to signal the same thing, technological assistance should guide the U.S.
and Indian Navies’ relations in the Indo-Pacific.
Second, Washington must be consistent in signaling its commitment and strategy with respect to the IOR. As is evident from the above discussion, Obama’s
early flirtations with China, followed by a more muscular approach in the form of
the pivot, created an environment of uncertainty for regional powers. Also, even
if other pressing issues—such as the perennial crisis in the Middle East or a sudden downturn in U.S.-Russian relations—might divert substantial strategic focus
and resources, Washington should be clear in its commitment to the Asia-Pacific.
It was America’s strategic uncertainty that motivated New Delhi to hedge. Hedging may be clever in the short term, but the long-term consequences of China’s
rise and assertiveness can be arrested only by a clear display of resolve and will
to balance its military power. Clarity and consistency on the part of the United
States would help regional powers shed their reluctance to commit themselves to
a stable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.
For its part, India needs to think carefully about its role as a security provider
in the Indian Ocean region and beyond. New Delhi’s credibility as a regional
balancer has already suffered because of its lackadaisical attitude toward power
projection. If it is serious about its emergence as a regional security provider,
New Delhi will have to rethink its opposition to the LSA, CISMOA, and BECA,
in order to enhance its practical cooperation with the U.S. Navy. There is also an
urgent need for a law that would provide strong support to Indian intervention
in international waters to combat piracy. Some in India want to wait for a “grand
bargain” in which India would become a security provider in the IOR only if the
United States assumed significant costs in terms of policies on China, Pakistan,
and technology transfer. If that is indeed attempted, New Delhi would be disappointed, as not even a Republican administration would be in a position to deliver.
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The larger conundrum remains unresolved: Will India see in the changing
regional environment sufficient cause to begin to act in the IOR of its own volition? Or will India step in only because the Americans want it to, hoping to extract concessions in return? Even as Washington and New Delhi try to work this
out, they need to acknowledge that they share strategic objectives in the larger
Indo-Pacific and should not let their historical baggage override the imperatives
of the future.
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Antipiracy, Engagement, and Image Enhancement
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n 3 September 2014, almost six years since Chinese warships first entered
the Gulf of Aden to fulfill antipiracy duties, China Central Television
(CCTV)–8 aired the first episode of “In the Gulf of Aden” (舰在亚丁湾).1 The
multidozen-episode program, designed to “ignite raging patriotism” (燃起熊
熊爱国心), given evening prime-time status, and attracting a popular audience with a star-studded cast, explores in dramatic fashion Beijing’s experience
Dr. Erickson is associate professor in the China fighting modern piracy. Produced by the People’s
Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI), in the Strategic
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Political DepartResearch Department of the Naval War College,
ment’s Television Art Center (海军政治部电视艺
Newport, Rhode Island; an associate in research at
the John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Stud- 术中心) over three years, the series offers a unique
ies, Harvard University; and a term member of the window into how the PLAN has conducted its
Council on Foreign Relations. He is the author, coantipiracy mission and seeks to portray its experiauthor, or coeditor of, recently, A Low-Visibility
Force Multiplier: Assessing China’s Cruise Missile ence to a Chinese audience.
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families, who are separated from service members by thousands of miles and
by limitations in information transmission.3 Gripping scenes portray PLAN
personnel constantly checking food quality, averting phytosanitary disaster by
switching in-port suppliers, refueling under way, weathering storms, exercising
with foreign navies and receiving their officers aboard, adjusting plans rapidly to
handle unexpected challenges, using special weapons and techniques to dispel
pirates nonlethally, saving wounded merchant seamen with emergency medical
treatment, and receiving gratitude from domestic and foreign ships they protect.
While some aspects of helicopter operations, weapons firing, and special
forces engagement with pirates appear embellished for cinematic effect, the series
uses real PLAN personnel and PLAN and civilian ships.4 Many details match
realistic documentation in China’s state and military media. Human experiences
are personified uniquely—as when a PLAN marine, Fang Xiaoba, pays respects
at the grave of his father, who died rendering medical assistance in Tanzania—but
collectively represent actual struggles and triumphs of sailors and families. A few
scenarios exceed actual events to date. Most prominently, on a small forested
island off Somalia, Team Leader Mao Dahua leads his special forces in a sixteenhour battle replete with exchanges of fire to evacuate thirteen Taiwanese fishermen cornered by pirates.5 Yet such heroics are not utterly fanciful and might well
foreshadow future PLAN operations.
Beyond simply serving as a blockbuster image engaging domestic dreams of a
strong military, however, since 2008 China’s antipiracy escorts have provided important soft-power benefits for Beijing on a truly international stage. For the first
time in its modern history China has deployed naval forces operationally beyond
its immediate maritime periphery for extended durations, to protect merchant
vessels from pirates in the Gulf of Aden. Over a six-year span beginning in December 2008, China has contributed over ten thousand navy personnel in nearly
twenty task forces. In nearly eight hundred groups, these forces have escorted
over six thousand Chinese and foreign commercial vessels and have “protected
and helped over 60” of them.6 As the PLAN’s commander, Admiral Wu Shengli,
informed one of the authors, the mission has achieved “two ‘100 percents’ [两个
百分之百]: providing 100 percent security to all ships under escort, while ensuring PLAN forces’ own security 100 percent.”7
Although it is uncertain how many task forces will be deployed and for how
long, China’s presence in the Gulf of Aden has extended through 2014, and the
PLAN appears almost certain to continue efforts through 2015;8 it will likely
persist for still longer if the United Nations further extends its mandate for navies to fight piracy off Somalia.9 The probability of this is arguably even higher
following the announcement in late 2014 that East Asian rival Japan’s Maritime
Self-Defense Force will soon take command of a major international antipiracy
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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coalition. While Admiral Wu acknowledges that new piracy challenges have
emerged in the Gulf of Guinea, “a concerning trend for all world navies,” he nevertheless maintains, “As long as Gulf of Aden pirate activities continue, so too will
the escort missions of international navies.” Six years ago, under United Nations
authorization, China began to dispatch antipiracy task forces to the Gulf of Aden.
At the beginning, China planned for only one year of antipiracy operations. This
period was then extended for another year, and another, and so on. “So far,” Wu
declared, “there is no end in sight for the mission.”10
China’s naval antipiracy mission represents an unprecedented instance of
conduct by the PLAN of sustained long-distance operations. It provides a rare
window through which outside observers can see how the naval component of
China’s “going out” strategy transects economic, political, and strategic dimensions. While many of China’s other maritime activities damage its international
image, antipiracy operations in the far seas project soft power and a constructive
image. Likely in part because of this positive publicity potential, Beijing has distributed copious details on its antipiracy operations via official media, including
in English.11
The Chinese navy’s antipiracy missions provide much-needed support for
Chinese overseas interests. But the PLAN has also crafted its antipiracy missions
to portray blue-water operations positively abroad. Increasingly, the PLAN’s
antipiracy mandate is oriented toward broader international security objectives.
Commercial escort statistics exemplify this trend: initially China’s navy was only
allowed to escort Chinese-flagged ships through the Gulf of Aden, but now in
some cases over 70 percent of ships in given Chinese escort flotillas have been
foreign flagged. Similarly, to secure the maritime commons Chinese commanding officers and sailors serving off Somalia have worked increasingly in the
framework of bilateral exchanges with other navies as well as in multistakeholder
settings.
This article explores the soft-power dimension of China’s far-seas antipiracy
operations. It addresses the extent to which Gulf of Aden deployments might
increase the PLAN’s prospects for cooperation with other navies and also the
impact of these missions on the role the navy plays within China’s larger diplomacy. Finally, it assesses how these deployments might shape future Chinese
naval development.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A sharp increase in piracy attacks off Somalia threatened to interfere with
China’s foreign trade. Several well-publicized pirate attacks prior to the PLAN’s
antipiracy deployment in 2008 demonstrated Chinese vulnerability. Tianyu 8, a
fishing boat with twenty-four crewmen; the Chinese tanker Zhenhua 4; and the
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss1/20
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Sinotrans-owned cargo ship Dajian—as well as two Hong Kong–registered ships,
Stolt Valor and Delight—were all pirated prior to the PLAN’s deployment.12 Over
1,200 Chinese merchant vessels transited the Gulf of Aden during the first eleven
months of 2008, and of this number eighty-three were attacked by pirate groups.
Direct threats to China’s economic interests and citizens abroad were thus important drivers of the PLAN’s first antipiracy deployment.
As the PLAN’s initial deployment prepared to set sail in December 2008,
Senior Colonel Huang Xueping, Ministry of National Defense secondary spokesman and deputy director of the ministry’s Information Office, convened a news
conference in which he clarified the points that, first, the mission’s primary
objective was to protect Chinese shipping interests, and that, second, it did not
represent a change in Chinese foreign policy or a desire to project greater bluewater naval capabilities.13 Idealistic and realistic interpretations of China’s antipiracy operations differ greatly. The former focuses on China’s desire to contribute
meaningfully to regional and international security, while the latter includes a
“desire to protect Chinese shipping, expand China’s influence, and to provide
opportunities for realistic training that will enhance the PLAN’s capabilities in
military operations other than war.”14
In line with the realists, economic interests in the Gulf of Aden had perhaps
the greatest impact on pragmatic Chinese policy makers. As Foreign Ministry
spokesman Liu Jianchao explains, “Piracy has become a serious threat to shipping, trade and safety on the seas. . . . That’s why we decided to send naval ships
to crack down.”15 China’s overseas maritime trade is highly dependent on vulnerable sea lines of communication (SLOCs), such as the Bab el Mandeb, Strait of
Hormuz, Indian Ocean, Strait of Malacca, Strait of Singapore, and South China
Sea. China currently relies on just five SLOCs for roughly 90 percent of its overseas trade. In particular, approximately 60 percent of all commercial vessels that
transit through the Strait of Malacca are Chinese flagged.16
For China, therefore, the economic benefits of protecting its international
trade are abundantly clear. China’s leadership continues to emphasize the PLAN’s
imperative to secure Chinese overseas maritime interests. Specifically, energy
supplies transported via international SLOCs will constitute a larger percentage
of China’s aggregate energy consumption. Having become a net oil importer in
1993, for example, China now relies on seaborne oil imports for over 40 percent
of its oil consumption.17 China’s oil import dependence will rise substantially
between now and 2030, by some estimates to as high as 80 percent.18
Oil and other energy imports constitute just one of many sectors in China that
face growing dependence on the sea. China Daily reported that as early as 2006,
maritime industries accounted for $270 billion in economic output, nearly 10
percent of China’s gross domestic product.19 In 2009, over 260 companies, across
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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various industries, reportedly engaged in international maritime shipping.20
In 2010 it was reported that each year over two thousand Chinese commercial
vessels were transiting the Gulf of Aden.21 In 2011, more than two years after
the PLAN’s first antipiracy deployment, a professor at China’s National Defense
University observed, “From the current situation, ocean lifelines have already
become a soft rib in China’s strategic security.”22
China’s growth as a sea power has been rapid. It currently has more seafarers,
deep-sea fleets, and ocean fishing vessels than any other nation. It has become,
in the words of Ju Chengzhi, of the Ministry of Transport, a “great maritime
shipping power” (海运大国). In 2009 China’s merchant maritime fleet reportedly consisted of over 3,300 vessels and forty thousand crewmen.23 People’s Daily
reported in 2011 that China surpassed South Korea as the world’s largest shipbuilder in terms of capacity and new orders.24 China’s maritime responsibilities
are huge, since it has thirty-two thousand kilometers of coastline and claims over
three million square kilometers of offshore waters.25
Public awareness of the importance of maritime issues is increasing. In 2008,
two Chinese media outlets reported separate public surveys in which 86 percent
and 91 percent of Chinese citizens polled supported the PLAN’s antipiracy deployment.26 Simultaneously, many Chinese “netizens” (frequent Internet users)
criticized their government for its inability to ensure Chinese sailors’ safety.27
Domestically, in the period before deployments began Beijing thus faced strong
political incentives to intervene decisively to protect its shipping.
These political concerns at home paralleled international expectations. Such
deployments, it was predicted, would enhance China’s image as a “responsible
stakeholder” in international society, particularly in the domain of maritime
security.28 In the years since, China’s antipiracy operations have already aided the
PLAN substantially in developing its blue-water capacity.
MILITARY DEVELOPMENT AND BLUE-WATER ASPIRATIONS
Beijing’s deployment of PLAN antipiracy forces appears to be spurring on Chinese military development. As the Chinese newspaper Global Times puts it, over
five years of deployments to the Gulf of Aden have transformed PLAN antipiracy
forces from “maritime rookies to confident sea dogs.”29 Since China has not fought
an actual war since its 1979 conflict with Vietnam, this experience of maintaining
multiyear, distant deployments of warships is extremely valuable.30 It has brought
PLAN vessels into what previously were—for China—literally uncharted waters.
China’s Navy Press has had to perform “nautical chart support tasks” for the Gulf
of Aden missions.31 In 2011, a PLAN senior captain effectively summarized the
multidimensional benefits of distant sea antipiracy operations: “The experience
definitely would be unprecedented not only for officers and sailors, but also for
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss1/20
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the durability and function of the ships.”32 Some of the PLAN’s most advanced
ships and personnel have gained valuable experience in the Gulf of Aden, and
officers serving with distinction there have enjoyed subsequent promotions.33
Furthermore, antipiracy operations have positioned the PLAN as China’s most
active service. By proving its effectiveness against threats to Chinese overseas
interests, the PLAN has ensured that it will continue to procure some of the military’s newest and best technology.34 More broadly, the persistent threat of piracy
in international waters has enabled China to expand its far-seas security operations under the umbrella of benign international cooperation.35
Close analysis of PLAN antipiracy activities reveals four primary conduits for
projecting soft power: the escort of commercial ships and other direct operational aspects of PLAN antipiracy missions; navy-to-navy meetings, combined
training, and other exchanges and instances of cooperation with foreign navies;
participation in multistakeholder dialogues on land and at sea related to international antipiracy operations; and, perhaps most significantly, a growing number
of port visits conducted by PLAN warships for replenishment and diplomatic
purposes before, during, and after service in the Gulf of Aden. Exploiting these
channels has positioned the PLAN as an important and highly visible player in
China’s comprehensive quest for international soft power.
Antipiracy services provided by the PLAN to commercial ships have primarily included area patrols, escorts, and on-ship protection.36 Wang Yongxiang,
deputy commander of the tenth escort task force, explains that specific tactics
depend on multiple idiosyncratic factors: “the schedules of the merchant vessels
to be escorted, their characteristics, and how well our warships have rested. We
want to not only ensure the safety of our charges, but also improve the efficiency
of escort protection.”37 Area patrol—monitoring certain maritime zones in and
around the Gulf of Aden—is the approach least employed by the PLAN. When
China’s navy does engage in area patrols, it typically maintains two base points
550–600 nautical miles apart—for example, one a hundred nautical miles north
of Yemen’s Socotra Island and the other seventy-five nautical miles southwest of
Aden Harbor.38 On a normal mission PLAN vessels travel between these points,
typically taking two to three days to do so.39
Of all the services provided by China’s antipiracy forces, the escort of civilian
ships is the most common; it has become a daily practice for PLAN task forces in
the Gulf of Aden. Task forces consist of two warships, usually a combination of
destroyers and frigates. They are typically accompanied by either a replenishment
or landing ship. However, since the first task force, two or more warships concurrently stationed in the Gulf of Aden have led separate flotillas of merchant ships,
sometimes in opposite directions, through an area west of longitude fifty-seven
east and south of latitude fifteen north.40
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PLAN escort efficiency has improved significantly since 2008. As a 2010 Liberation Army Daily article states, “From the first escort to the escort of the 1,000th
ship the Chinese naval task force used over 300 days, from the 1,000th to the
2,000th ship used over 220 days, and from the 2,000th to the 3,000th ship only
used over 180 days’ time.”41 As early as 2011, approximately 70 percent of ships
escorted by China’s navy at any given time were foreign.42 In terms of aggregate
escorts over the first four years, roughly 50 percent of PLAN-escorted commercial vessels were foreign flagged.43 People’s Navy reported in mid-2011 that China
had provided escort services to ships from over fifty foreign countries, and this
figure has likely increased over the past three-plus years.44 People’s Daily emphasizes that escort services are provided gratis for Chinese and foreign commercial
ships.45 That is, PLAN escort services are being provided as a complimentary
public good to the international community.
Foreign civilian ships can apply online to join a PLAN escort convoy via the
China Shipowners’ Association website. Zhai Dequan, deputy secretary-general
of the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, has asserted, “China
shoulders responsibility for foreign vessels based on growing national strength
and a friendly policy”; many other states do not send escort forces, because of
limited interest and the enormous costs. In Zhai’s opinion, “such international
cooperation and exchanges also help the rest of the world to know more about
China and accept it.”46
Given the international context in which China’s antipiracy operations take
place, the PLAN has taken steps to professionalize its services. For example, the
use of the English language is important while conducting international operations; the twelfth task force had an on-duty translator on board the frigate Yiyang
to liaise with foreign naval and merchant counterparts.47 Each PLAN task-force
member receives four “pocket books” covering the psychological aspects of deployment, security, international law, and the application of international law to
military operations. Also, naval officers specializing in international law provide
full-time legal support to officers and crews in meetings with ships of other nations.48 These efforts have assisted China’s internavy exchanges.
INTERNAVY EXCHANGES AND DIALOGUES AT SEA
Chinese and international commentators greatly value the unprecedented exposure of PLAN vessels and crews to foreign navies.49 Rear Admiral Michael
McDevitt, USN (Ret.), articulates the historical significance of the PLAN’s deployments in this way: “In terms of international engagement, the first decade of
the 21st century should be divided into a pre–anti-piracy operations period and
a post-anti-piracy period, because once the PLAN began to conduct anti-piracy
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operations, the entire nature of its approach to international naval engagement
changed appreciably.”50
The missions have had an undeniable impact on Chinese naval diplomacy;
interaction with foreign navies that was novel in 2008 is now routine in the Gulf
of Aden and adjacent waterways. In just a few of countless examples, in 2011 Han
Xiaohu, commander of China’s eighth escort task force, visited in March the flagship, a frigate, of NATO’s Operation OPEN SHIELD; in May, hosted the Singapore
navy’s Rear Admiral Harris Chan, then commander of U.S.-led Combined Task
Force (CTF) 151, on a PLAN warship; and in June hosted the European Union
Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) commander on board the frigate Wenzhou.51 The
PLAN and Singapore navy conducted bilateral exchanges in September 2010
in the Gulf of Aden, sending personnel on board each other’s ships.52 A similar
exchange occurred in those waters in June 2014.53 China’s navy conducted additional exchanges with CTF-151 in July 2012 and with NATO in April and July
2012.54 An article in People’s Daily stated in 2012 that Chinese naval escort task
forces continue to inform the outside world about the “activities of suspicious
ships through network mailbox and radio station every day and shared information resources with 50-odd warships of 20-plus countries and organizations.”55 In
July 2014, the PLAN’s seventeenth escort task force conducted the VENUS NO. 2
joint antipiracy exercise with EU Combined Task Force 465 in the western Gulf of
Aden. The guided-missile destroyer Changchun, the comprehensive supply ship
Chaohu, and a Z-9 shipborne helicopter participated in task-force maneuvering,
maritime replenishment, flashing-light signaling, and main gun antiship firing
drills.56
China’s naval diplomacy in the region goes well beyond shipboard interactions
with Western antipiracy forces. For example, PLAN task forces off the Horn of
Africa have also been active in a variety of bilateral exchanges. The PLAN and
the Russian navy executed joint antipiracy escorts for the first time in October
2009, during the PEACE BLUE SHIELD 2009 (平蓝盾—2009) exercise.57 Similarly,
China’s navy held extensive joint exercises with Russian navy BLUE SHIELD units
in May 2011 and conducted similar antipiracy joint exercises in both 2012 and
2013.58 Amid comprehensive Sino-Russian joint maritime exercises in 2012, Chinese and Russian naval forces performed extensive piracy-deterrence and rescue
joint training off the coast of Qingdao.59
The Chinese navy is not interacting only with large navies. During November
2009, PLAN military officials met with Dutch counterparts to perform on-ship
inspections and exchanges, and during 2010 PLAN forces collaborated with
South Korean naval units in antipiracy exercises in the Gulf of Aden.60 In 2012,
China and South Korea conducted joint antipiracy exercises in which helicopters of the two sides landed on each other’s warships for the first time.61 In April
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2011, China’s eighth escort task force sent Wenzhou and Qiandaohu to conduct
joint antipiracy exercises with the Pakistani guided-missile destroyer Khyber.62
These combined drills followed the Pakistani-hosted PEACE 11 multinational
maritime exercises, which included naval ships from, among other states, China,
the United States, Britain, France, Japan, and Pakistan. China sent guided-missile
frigates Wenzhou and Ma’anshan, two helicopters, and seventy special forces
commandos.63 More recently the PLAN conducted joint antipiracy training with
the Ukrainian navy in the Gulf of Aden. All of these efforts support China’s growing naval diplomacy.
CHINESE NAVAL DIPLOMACY
At-sea engagements with other navies are crucial for establishing a positive image
of China’s growing global maritime presence. These engagements are complemented by a growing focus by the PLAN on establishing effective relationships
with littoral states in and adjacent to the Indian Ocean region. Indeed, since
2008 the nature and scope of Chinese naval visits have expanded continuously.
Growing port calls bolster China’s far-seas soft-power projection by facilitating
interaction and dialogue between China and the many countries whose ports and
geographic locations heighten the strategic value of these relationships.
The PLAN is increasing port visits (see the table) as its far-seas antipiracy
presence matures. A small sample reveals the dynamism with which the PLAN
is engaging the navies, governments, and citizens of littoral states in connection with its antipiracy missions. For example, during September 2012, Yiyang
of the twelfth escort task force arrived in Karachi for a second cycle of rest and
replenishment, during which it held seminars and other exchanges with Pakistani
naval counterparts.64 Later that year Rear Admiral Zhou Xuming and members
from the twelfth escort task force met with Commodore Jonathan Mead, acting
commander of the Australian Fleet, in Sydney on an official visit. The Australian
chief of navy, Vice Admiral Ray Griggs, remarked, “I welcome the continued opportunity for our navies to share their experiences today as we exchange lessons
learned in the conduct of counter-piracy operations.”65 More recently, in late 2013
the fifteenth escort task force, in addition to holding friendly exchanges with
fleets from the EU, United States, and NATO, docked for friendly visits in Tanzania, Kenya, and Sri Lanka.66 The sixteenth task force conducted antipiracy duties
and dispatched the guided-missile frigate Yancheng to escort Syrian chemical
weapons to their destruction;67 it then “paid consecutive visits to eight African
countries for the first time.”68 It conducted antipiracy exercises with the navies of
several of those countries, including Cameroon, Namibia, and Nigeria.69
Clearly, uninterrupted operations in the Gulf of Aden have helped to facilitate
PLAN maritime engagement with other countries in the vicinity as well as those
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strategically situated on the route from China to Somali waters. China has effectively increased the role of naval diplomacy as a component of its antipiracy
deployments in a number of world regions. People’s Daily reports that “since
the 2nd Chinese naval escort task force, the Chinese navy has established a new
mechanism of organizing escort warships to pay friendly visits to foreign countries, and the Chinese naval escort task forces have successfully paid friendly visits to more than 20 countries, such as India, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates
(UAE) and Singapore.”70
Whereas in all of 2009, PLAN task forces berthed in foreign ports in just
five states, Chinese antipiracy flotillas have, among them, stopped in over ten
countries every year since 2010. Moreover, the nature of port calls has evolved
dramatically during the past six years. In 2009 and 2010 most Chinese port calls
were conducted for replenishment, rest, and relaxation. But by 2012 Chinese
antipiracy escort task forces had begun making several port calls for friendly
visits (i.e., goodwill exchanges with diplomatic elements) before, during, and
after their service in the Gulf of Aden. This trend has continued over the last two
years and demonstrates a growing share of Chinese naval resources devoted to
diplomacy. More importantly, it illustrates the efficiency with which the PLAN
is deriving soft-power capital from its contributions to international maritime
nontraditional security.
China has also bolstered international exchanges by hosting foreign navies at
Chinese ports and cities. In mid-May 2011 China invited twenty representatives
from eight African nations, including Algeria, Cameroon, and Gabon, to participate in a twenty-day maritime law enforcement program in Zhejiang Province.71
At the first International Symposium on Counter-Piracy and Escort Cooperation, in February 2012 at the PLAN Command College in Nanjing, Navy Military
Studies Research Institute senior researcher Cai Weidong stated, “The Chinese
navy hopes to build up a platform for international cooperation that will allow
naval forces of different countries to familiarize themselves with each other. I
hope the platform well serves our antipiracy goals.”72
As these examples illustrate, China has derived incrementally greater softpower benefits from its antipiracy operations by boosting the number of both
midmission port calls and goodwill visits en route home. Chinese scholar Wang
Yizhou has called for a higher degree of “creative involvement,” a foreign policy
concept that identifies and adapts creative and flexible modes of foreign engagement on a case-by-case basis.73 The PLAN seems to be applying Wang’s concept
in the far seas, perhaps most notably through its antipiracy operations, without
changing their fundamental form. Adding more stops before and after antipiracy
service in the Gulf of Aden has allowed the PLAN to accumulate larger soft-power
gains. This practice reflects the PLAN’s greatest lesson from far-seas antipiracy
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SELECTED PORT VISITS BY PLAN ANTIPIRACY FORCES
ALGERIA
Algiers
• 2–5 April 2013, friendly visit
AUSTRALIA
Sydney
• 18–22 December 2012, friendly
visit
BAHRAIN
Manama
• 9–13 December 2010, friendly
visit
BULGARIA
Varna
• 6–10 August 2012, friendly visit
BURMA
Rangoon
• 29 August–2 September 2010,
friendly visit
DJIBOUTI
Djibouti
• 24 January 2010, replenish/
overhaul
• 3 May 2010, replenish/
overhaul
• 13 September 2010, replenish/
overhaul
• 22 September 2010, replenish/
overhaul
• 24 December 2010, replenish/
overhaul
• 21 February 2011, replenish/
overhaul
• 5 October 2011, replenish/
overhaul
• 24–29 March 2012, replenish/
overhaul
• 14 May 2012, replenish/
overhaul
• 13–18 August 2012, replenish/
overhaul
• 1–6 December 2012, replenish/
overhaul
• 6–8 June 2013, replenish/
overhaul
• 28 July 2013, replenish/
overhaul
• 7–9 October 2013, replenish/
overhaul
• 22–26 February 2014,
replenish/overhaul

• 1–5 April 2014, replenish/
overhaul and friendly visit
EGYPT
Alexandria
• 26–30 July 2010, friendly visit
FRANCE
Toulon
• 23–27 April 2013, friendly visit
GREECE
Crete
• 7 March 2011, replenish/
overhaul
Piraeus
• 9–13 August 2013, friendly visit
INDIA
Cochin
• 8 August 2009, friendly visit
ISRAEL
Haifa
• 14–17 August 2012, friendly visit
ITALY
Taranto
• 2–7 August 2010, joint drills and
friendly visit
KENYA
Mombasa
• 2–5 January 2014, friendly
visit
KUWAIT
Shuwaikh
• 27 November–1 December 2011,
friendly visit
MALAYSIA
Port Kelang
• 6 December 2009, friendly visit
MALTA
• 26–30 March 2013, friendly visit
MOROCCO
Casablanca
• 9–13 April 2013, friendly visit
MOZAMBIQUE
Maputo
• 29 March–2 April 2012,
friendly visit
OMAN
Masqat
• 1–8 December 2011, friendly visit
Salalah
• 21 June–1 July 2009, replenish/
overhaul
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• 14 August 2009, replenish/
overhaul
• 2 January 2010, replenish/
overhaul
• 1 April 2010, replenish/
overhaul
• 8 June 2010, replenish/
overhaul
• 10 August 2010, replenish/
overhaul
• 8 January 2011, replenish/
overhaul
• 19 January 2011, replenish/
overhaul
• 10 April 2011, replenish/
overhaul
• 8–11 June 2011, replenish/
overhaul
• 23 June 2011, replenish/
overhaul
• 7–10 November 2011,
replenish/overhaul
• 21–24 February 2012,
replenish/overhaul
• 1–3 July 2012, replenish/
overhaul
• 9 July 2012, replenish/overhaul
• 28–29 March 2013, replenish/
overhaul
PAKISTAN
Karachi
• 5–8 August 2009, joint drills and
friendly visit
• 7–13 March 2010, joint drills and
friendly visit
• 13 March 2011, joint drills
• 8 September 2012, replenish/
overhaul
PHILIPPINES
Manila
• 13–17 April 2010, friendly visit
PORTUGAL
Lisbon
• 15–19 April 2013, friendly visit
QATAR
Doha
• 2–7 August 2011, friendly visit
ROMANIA
Constanţa
• 31 July–3 August 2012, friendly
visit
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SELECTED PORT VISITS BY PLAN ANTIPIRACY FORCES CONTINUED
SAUDI ARABIA
Jidda
• 27 November–1 December 2010,
friendly visit
• 3 September 2011, replenish/
overhaul
• 17 June 2012, replenish/
overhaul
• 1–6 January 2013, replenish/
overhaul
• 5–28 April 2013, replenish/
overhaul
• 14–18 September 2013,
replenish/overhaul
• 2–6 November 2013,
replenish/overhaul
SEYCHELLES
Port Victoria
• 14 April 2011, friendly visit
• 16–20 June 2013, friendly visit
SINGAPORE
Changi
• 5–7 September 2010, replenish/
overhaul and joint drills
• 18–20 December 2011, replenish/
overhaul and friendly visit
• 5–10 September 2013, friendly
visit

SOUTH AFRICA
Durban
• 4–8 April 2011, friendly visit
SRI LANKA
Colombo
• 5–7 January 2010, friendly visit
• 7–12 December 2010, friendly
visit
Trincomalee
• 13–15 January 2014, friendly visit
TANZANIA
Dar es Salaam
• 26–30 March 2011, joint drills
and friendly visit
• 29 December 2013–1 January
2014, friendly visit
THAILAND
Sattahip
• 16–21 August 2011, joint drills
and friendly visit
• 21–25 April 2012, friendly visit
• 12–16 September 2013, friendly
visit
TURKEY
Istanbul
• 5–8 August 2012, friendly visit

UKRAINE
Sevastopol
• 31 July–3 August 2012, friendly
visit
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
Abu Dhabi
• 24–28 March 2010, friendly visit
VIETNAM
Ho Chi Minh City
• 13 January 2013, friendly visit
YEMEN
Aden
• 21 February 2009, replenish/
overhaul
• 25 April 2009, replenish/
overhaul
• 23 July 2009, replenish/
overhaul
• 28 September 2009, replenish/
overhaul
• 5 February 2010, replenish/
overhaul
• 16 May 2010, replenish/
overhaul
• 26 July 2010, replenish/
overhaul
• 1 October 2010, replenish/
overhaul

missions: there is no substitute for experience, and six years of continuous operations have allowed China gradually to become more effective in securing its
comprehensive interests through the deployment of antipiracy task forces.74
Arguably even more than foreign port calls, other nontraditional maritime
security operations facilitated by Beijing’s Gulf of Aden antipiracy presence
contribute to China’s “blue soft power.” Escort of foreign vessels carrying Syrian
chemical weapons through the Mediterranean and active participation in search
and rescue operations during the frantic search for Malaysian Airlines Flight 370
in early 2014 are just two examples of how the PLAN has leveraged antipiracy
resources to contribute to international security.75
Some commentators are less sanguine about China’s attempts to expand its
maritime relations; it is important to note that there are objections to the notion that China’s antipiracy missions are benign. In that view, self-interested
economic and security calculations are arguably the largest drivers of the PLAN’s
deployment of warships to the Gulf of Aden, and viewing port visits as diplomatic exchanges risks oversimplification, since many states may view them as
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harbingers of creeping Chinese power projection.76 For example, the tiny islandstate Seychelles is one of several coastal and island African states in which China
has actively sought to enhance its soft power.77 China could be using antipiracy
operations to support an expansive naval development policy, as well as to pursue
a more active grand strategy that involves overseas access facilities and a longterm trend toward a greater overall global presence.
CHINESE NAVAL DEVELOPMENT
The PLAN is just one of several “independent” providers of antipiracy assets in
the Gulf of Aden. While the majority of naval antipiracy forces fight pirates under
the aegis of multilateral commands, several states—including China, India, Iran,
Japan, Malaysia, and Russia—have primarily operated on a unilateral basis rather
than under the command of multinational antipiracy forces such as CTF-151,
NATO’s Operation OPEN SHIELD, or EU NAVFOR. This posture suggests that
China is trying to learn as much as it can from other navies without revealing
much about its own operations, while also, clearly, maintaining ideological independence in foreign policy.
China’s preference to abstain from combined operations is driven by several
factors. First, greater independence allows the PLAN to conduct its preferred
method of antipiracy operations—relatively low-risk escort operations aimed at
deterring, rather than actively searching for, pirates. It also offers China an individual identity as a provider of maritime public goods, rather than as just another
state operating within Western-led security mechanisms. Moreover, if China
joined the existing security structure, potential frictions might arise that would
preclude meaningful integration, such as sensitivities related to information
sharing and technology theft. Some Western defense experts have questioned the
U.S. Navy’s invitation for the PLAN to participate in the historic 2014 RIMPAC
exercises and other joint maritime cooperation activities for such reasons.78
These concerns notwithstanding, China’s antipiracy operations over the past
several years have made meaningful contributions to Gulf of Aden security. In
addition, they have achieved unprecedented coordination between China and
other antipiracy maritime forces in the region, such as those of the United States.
While suspicions abound regarding China’s motives, antipiracy cooperation may
contribute to more positive outside perceptions of China and its international
status. China has been “ready to exchange information and cooperate with the
warships of other countries in fighting Somalian pirates” since its inaugural deployment in 2008.79 One PLAN antipiracy task force commander, Admiral Du
Jingcheng, has recalled that he was eager to “facilitate exchanges of information
with escort naval vessels from other countries.”80
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In the nearly six-year period beginning December 2008, the PLAN has coordinated information with over twenty nations, including the United States.81
Li Faxin, associate professor (and lieutenant commander) at the Naval Marine
Corps College, states that PLAN antipiracy forces have established “high-trust
partner relations” (高度信任的伙伴关系) with many nations operating in the
Gulf of Aden.82
Positive results have also been facilitated by Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE), a voluntary multistate antipiracy information-sharing mechanism. SHADE meetings occur quarterly in Bahrain and regularly host naval and
industry leaders from various states. Willingness on the part of independent navies, China’s in particular, to synchronize their antipiracy operations with those
of Western forces within the SHADE mechanism is a historic achievement for
twenty-first-century maritime commons governance.
China was denied SHADE chairmanship in 2009 but, notwithstanding, coordinates its antipiracy escorts with those of other SHADE members. For example,
China has participated in SHADE’s Convoy Coordination Working Group and
coordinates its monthly escort schedules with other navies providing independent escorts. China, India, and Japan reportedly began coordinating their antipiracy operations as early as 2011.83 They mutually arranged escort schedules
twenty-nine times between January and March 2012, with China acting as the
coordinator for ten escorts, India for ten, and Japan for nine.84
For six years the PLAN’s antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden have symbolized China’s burgeoning out-of-area naval activity. They also showcase Beijing’s
growing ability to achieve soft-power objectives while concurrently promoting
its overseas interests and military development. Important components of these
missions include escort of commercial ships, navy-to-navy meetings, participation in multistakeholder dialogues on antipiracy operations, and, most significantly, the growing number of port visits undertaken by PLAN warships. These
position the PLAN as an important and highly visible player in China’s recent
soft-power diplomacy.
China’s ongoing antipiracy operations in the far seas have generated many
positive assessments. In contrast to the contentious near seas, where Beijing is
consistently embroiled in sovereignty disputes that show no signs of abating,
antipiracy missions represent the most significant positive component of China’s
naval engagement to date, particularly with regard to the degree to which Chinese vessels and sailors are interacting with the outside world. This interaction
not only enhances China’s maritime image in the eyes of its antipiracy partners
but may help alleviate fears that China’s naval rise might one day threaten twentyfirst-century maritime prosperity in regions beyond the near seas. The United
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States and China reportedly planned over forty visits, exchanges, and other engagements for 2013, double the number in the previous year, and successfully carried out joint antipiracy exercises in 2012 and 2013.85 In July–August 2014, China
participated in RIMPAC for the first time, the U.S.-hosted forum that is currently
the largest naval exercise in the world.86 There, four PLAN vessels drilled with
international counterparts off Hawaii, on such subjects as antipiracy.87
China has received well-deserved credit for helping to reduce piracy dramatically in the Gulf of Aden. In 2007–2008, as Admiral Wu told one of the authors,
the area suffered about a hundred pirate attacks annually, of which between fifty
and sixty “hijackings” (piratings) were successful. In 2014, by contrast, there were
only seventeen attacks through September, none successful. China’s contribution entailed “major costs in forces, human resources, and money.” Admiral Wu
continued, “The U.S. Navy and other top-level U.S. leaders are very happy that
this is continuing. They are satisfied that China expends significant resources to
make a contribution,” thereby reducing the resource burden on the United States.
“There are just some members of Congress who remain opposed to the missions.”
Admiral Wu added that he wants to invite U.S. congressional representatives to
PLAN ships in the Gulf of Aden.88
The PLAN’s experience fighting piracy in distant seas is thus a benchmark
that can be used by Beijing to cement its positive image in the international
arena. Antipiracy operations prove that the PLAN can be a provider—not merely
a consumer or, worse, a disrupter—of maritime commons security. International society largely perceives Chinese naval contributions to fighting piracy as
positive developments, perceptions that stand in sharp contrast to China’s hardpower naval approaches in the East and South China Seas. Scholars constantly
scrutinize the nature and perceived efficacy of China’s soft power.89 While it is
too early to speculate exactly how Beijing’s contributions to antipiracy today will
bolster its future soft-power influence, the results should be at least moderately
positive. More generally, the Gulf of Aden case suggests that China will continue
to reap international political benefits commensurate with its contributions to
international maritime security.

NOTES

The authors gratefully acknowledge the
helpful suggestions of Ken Allen, Nan Li, and
William Murray.
A version of this article will appear as chapter
9 of the monograph Navies and Soft Power:
Historical Case Studies of Naval Power and
the Nonuse of Military Force, edited by Bruce

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss1/20

A. Elleman and S. C. M. Paine, forthcoming
from the Naval War College Press as Newport
Paper 42.
1.	“舰在亚丁湾今晚央八启航 钟雷演绎侠骨
柔情” [“In the Gulf of Aden” Sets Sail from
CCTV Tonight: Zhong Lei Plays Chivalrous
Role], 新华社 [Xinhua News Agency], 3

90

86

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

War College: Winter 2015 Review

September 2014, news.xinhuanet.com/.
CCTV-8 is China’s state television drama
channel, whose involvement indicates that a
mass audience is being targeted.
2.	Each PLAN vessel is organized into a command staff, which consists of the commander,
political officer, and executive officer, plus
various operational and administrative
“branches” (部门). Each branch has a chief
(部门长), and each branch chief serves as a
duty officer when the vessel is in port or as
a watch officer when the vessel is at sea. In
the U.S. Navy, “branches” are called “departments,” each of which has subordinate
divisions. (The authors thank Ken Allen for
his invaluable inputs concerning this and the
following point.) Sun’s position as a noncommissioned officer (NCO) offers one of many
realistic, instructive examples in the series.
He is a badly needed technical specialist in a
navy working hard to emulate international
“gold standards” but still in transition. Sun is
forced to spend an additional six months in
the Gulf of Aden when his equivalent in the
next task force’s Vessel 570 suddenly falls ill.
While failure to fly out a relief may be a useful plot device to allow Sun’s exuberant wife,
Yang Ling’er, to open a Hunanese restaurant
and play a central role in the Yulin Naval Base
community that represents the program’s
“home front,” it also suggests the PLAN’s
reliance on a still-small pool of NCOs. Sun’s
position results from a process in which the
PLA began turning over more than seventy
junior-officer billets, including some on
vessels, to NCOs in 2004. These “acting” (代
理) NCOs are filling officer billets up to the
company-leader-grade level (正连制), which
should technically be assigned to officers.
As the number of NCOs has increased, one
vessel squadron (大队) pioneered creation
of an “NCO leader” system (士官长制度).
Each vessel holds a meeting of all personnel
to select three third-grade NCOs as “NCO
leaders” on the basis of their political qualities, management capabilities, and prestige
within the crew. Once they are selected, the
NCOs are required to meet as a group once
a week individually with the commanding
officer, executive officer, and each branch
chief for training on basic vessel knowledge.
The NCOs are then to use this information as a basis for speaking with the other
enlisted crew members. If the NCOs discover
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problems, they are to solve them. This is
precisely the spirit that Sun exemplifies. 人民
海军 [People’s Navy], 3 June 2003, p. 2.
3.	The first episode is available at《舰在亚丁
湾》01, www.youtube.com/. The series may
be viewed at 舰在亚丁湾 (完结), www
.youtube.com/.
4.	The series is filmed in and around the Chinese military ports of Zhanjiang and Sanya, as
well as the civilian port of Qinzhou. Shooting
near Qinzhou during typhoon season allowed
for depiction of high winds and waves (sea
states 6–7). Eighteen advanced containerships, bulk carriers, and various foreign
vessels of ten thousand tons and above were
mobilized. These and countless other details
are documented in the “舰在亚丁湾” entry at
baike.baidu.com/.
5.	A less dramatic but still challenging and unpredictable rescue likely inspired this episode.
In July 2012, twenty-six Chinese and foreign
crew members from the Taiwan fishing vessel Shiuh-fu 1 were released after 571 days’
captivity in Somalia. Retrieving hostages from
shore in high winds and with the possibility
of pirate attack necessitated innovative special
forces planning and preparations so that a
helicopter could approach the wave-lashed
beach and ferry individuals in five batches
back to frigate Changzhou. 王志秋 [Wang
Zhiqiu] and 侯瑞 [Hou Rui], “索马里海域
大接护--十二批护航编队常州舰接护 ‘旭
富一号’ 渔船船员纪实” [Big Escort Pickup
in the Gulf of Aden: Real Account of the
Twelfth Naval Escort Task Force Changzhou
Warship’s Pickup and Escort of “Shiuh-fu
1” Fishing Boat Crew Members], 综合新闻
[General News], 人民海军 [People’s Navy],
25 July 2012, p. 3.
6.	“17th and 18th Chinese Escort Taskforces
Meet in Gulf of Aden,” Liberation Army Daily,
20 August 2014, eng.mod.gov.cn/; “18th Chinese Naval Escort Taskforce Sets Sail,” China
Military Online, 4 August 2014, eng.chinamil
.com.cn/; “中国海军护航编队执行第700批
护航任务” [Chinese Naval Escort Task Force
Carries Out 700th Escort Mission], 中国新闻
社 [China News Service], 5 April 2014, www
.chinanews.com/.
7.	Adm. Wu Shengli, discussion with author
and small group of Harvard administrators,
faculty, and students at Wadsworth House,
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[hereafter “Adm. Wu Shengli, discussion with
author”].
8.	Japan’s unprecedented contribution, enabled
by its historic reinterpretation of its constitution, will be more impressive to Western
navies than China’s well-established efforts in
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THE ANATOMY OF GULF OF GUINEA PIR AC Y
Commander Ali Kamal-Deen, Ghana Navy

A

s a global response to piracy off the coast of Somalia was taking place, alarm
bells were ringing about a similar growing insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea.
Today, the Gulf of Guinea stands as the most dangerous maritime area in terms
of the success rate of attacks and violence. The United Nations Security Council
adopted Resolutions 2018 (in 2011) and 2039 (in 2012) expressing grave concern
about the mounting insecurity in the region and its consequences for regional
and global security.1 A United Nations (UN) team was deployed to the region to
assess the situation.2
The UN resolutions and the report of the assessment team called on regional
states and institutions, as well as the international community, to respond, and
a code of conduct for the repression of piracy was
Commander Ali Kamal-Deen is the Director of Research at the Ghana Armed Forces Command and
adopted by Gulf of Guinea states in June 2013 at
Staff College, with additional responsibility as the
Yaoundé, Cameroon, with wide international supLegal Director of the Ghana Navy. He has previously
port.3 Nevertheless, piracy in the Gulf of Guinea
served in various appointments in the Ghana Armed
Forces, including deployments to Sierra Leone and region remains a serious threat. Indeed, in the
the Democratic Republic of the Congo on peacekeepmonth following the adoption of the code of coning missions in 2003 and 2007, respectively. He is a
duct a Maltese-flagged vessel, Cotton, was hijacked
Fellow of the Africa Security Dialogue and Research
Network, a Fellow of the Australian National Centre
off the coast of Gabon, the first attack of its kind
for Ocean Resources and Security, and an Associate
of the Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy, in the along that coast, portending a widening of the piUnited Kingdom. Commander Kamal-Deen holds
racy threat southward.4 It is also noteworthy that at
a doctor of philosophy degree from the University of
the close of 2013 the Gulf of Guinea recorded more
Wollongong, Australia. He also holds a master of law
incidents of attacks on the high seas than in previdegree in international maritime law and master of
arts in international relations.
ous years.5 This deepening threat has continued
into 2014, as Angola and Ghana registered their
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first significant hijackings (analyzed below). These
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss1/20

98

94

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

War College: Winter 2015 Review

developments reinforce the urgency of effective counterpiracy measures. Realistically, however, the success and efficacy of both regional and global response
will depend on a sound knowledge of the operational environment, awareness of
the actors, and most crucially, understanding of how the situation has evolved.
This article provides a critical analysis of the piracy situation in the Gulf of
Guinea. It sets the background with an overview of piracy statistics and a categorization of the coast according to the degree of risk of attack. This is followed by
an examination of the paradigm of Gulf of Guinea piracy, while the third section
analyzes the evolution of the piracy from its pre-2005 low levels into a regional
and global threat. The fourth section summarizes Gulf of Guinea piracy and examines future projections. The article concludes with a discussion of the imperatives for enhancing maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. It should be noted
first that the geographical scope of the region referred to as the Gulf of Guinea
varies depending on the issue or interest at stake. It is defined in this article as
comprising the coastal states stretching from Senegal to Angola and as embracing
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic
Community of Central African States (ECCAS).6
OVERVIEW AND DISTRIBUTION OF GULF OF GUINEA PIRACY
INCIDENTS
Piracy has historically been a threat to maritime trade and the good order of the
world’s oceans.7 To ensure the security of sea lines of communication (SLOCs),
international law imposes an obligation on states to cooperate in the repression
of piracy; it also grants universal jurisdiction over piracy, such that pirates may
be arrested and prosecuted within the legal system of any state.8 The requisite
international framework is codified in articles 100–105 of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), of 1982.9
To be classified as piracy, an act of piracy or depredation must have taken place
on the high seas.10 The “high seas” in this context include contiguous zones and
exclusive economic zones. In contrast to piracy, the terms “armed robbery against
ships,” “armed robbery at sea,” or simply “armed robbery” denote piratical acts
or thefts that take place within a territorial sea, internal waters, or, by extension,
archipelagic waters, ports, and anchorages.11 For practical purposes, however,
piracy and armed robbery pose similar threats to the safety and security of global
shipping, and the drivers and motivations behind the two crimes are largely the
same despite the legal distinction.12 For this reason “piracy” is used in this article
to cover both types of incidents.
Piracy Statistics in the Gulf of Guinea
Although the Gulf of Guinea has its own history of sea raids and piratical acts,
they did not constitute a major threat until recently.13 Within the past few years
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the region has seen a significant rise in piracy incidents. Table 1 reflects incidents from 2005 to 2013, as compiled from International Maritime Organization
(IMO) reports.14
The rising threat of piracy is evident. Attacks went from twenty-three in 2005
to sixty in 2007. For reasons that will be covered below, the incidents decreased
in 2008 and 2009, but they swelled again between 2010 and 2013; 2012 marked a
peak, with sixty-four incidents. The situation is actually worse than the statistics
depict, because, it is believed, unlike in other regions, only about half of the incidents of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea are actually reported by ships’ masters and
operators for fear of reprisal during their next visit.15 Even so, since 2009 the Gulf
of Guinea has been identified as the new piracy territory, displacing Somalia,
especially with regard to violence employed in the attacks.16
Piracy constitutes a major threat to SLOC security when incidents are not
confined to ports and anchorages but occur also in territorial waters and, more
importantly, on the high seas. The Gulf of Guinea manifests all these indicators,
and the percentage of successful attacks outside port areas has increased, as shown
in table 1. Robberies and attempted robberies in the territorial sea rose from only
five in 2005 to thirty-one incidents in 2007. The region recorded a single incident
on the high seas in 2005; the number jumped tenfold the following year, and the
number of successful attacks on the high seas has since grown. As early as 2006,
pirates hijacked a Russian oil tanker, Shkotovo, about sixty nautical miles off Guinea using automatic rifles and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), manifesting their
ability to hijack vessels far out to sea and their willingness to employ high levels of
violence.17 Significantly, seventeen out of the twenty-five high-seas attacks in 2012
were successful, and most attacks in 2013 were against moving vessels.
Piracy Hot Spots and Enclaves
Table 1 covers the entire Gulf of Guinea region, but two qualifications must be
made. First, piracy and robbery incidents have not affected the entire region
continually from 2005 to 2012. Second, even where incidents have been recorded,
their nature and trends are not monolithic. To allow a nuanced perception of the
dynamics of the problem, localities in the Gulf of Guinea can be categorized as
“hot spots,” “enclaves,” or zones of low risk. Piracy hot spots are rated according
to risk and danger of attacks, while enclaves—localities where pirates are based
and from which they operate—are classified as primary or secondary, depending
on the certainty of the presence of piratical groups.
Angola and Cape Verde are areas of low risk; there are hardly any reported
incidents of attacks off their coasts, and the trends on the neighboring coasts are
also limited—the hijacking of the tanker Kerala in February 2014 was the first
major incident off Angola. Incidents in and around the Democratic Republic of
Continued on page 97
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the Congo, the Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau,
Liberia, Sao Tome and Principe, and Senegal are also limited to theft from ships
in ports and anchorages, as well as occasional robberies in territorial seas. Attacks
off the coasts of Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea have declined substantially
since 2009, thus removing these two states from a high-risk ranking.
Recent multiple attacks, in contrast, have made Cote d’Ivoire a piracy hot spot.
Sierra Leone is in the same category, because although attacks off that coast are
fewer than off Cote d’Ivoire, they are very violent.
Guinea is both a piracy hot spot and the region’s secondary piracy enclave.
Attacks off its coast since 2009 have been characterized by heavy use of weapons,
violence, and sophistication. Shkotovo (as noted) and Maersk Belfast were attacked in 2006 with automatic rifles and RPGs;18 Isola Verde and Songa Emerald
were successfully boarded while under way in 2009 and 2010, respectively;19
more recently, in 2012, armed pirates attacked the Maltese-flagged Constanza
twenty nautical miles off Guinea, causing major damage to the ship.20 It is the
frequency and similarity of these attacks that suggest the existence of a piracy
base in Guinea and its environs.
The coasts of Nigeria, Benin, and Togo are collectively the most dangerous in
the region. However, Nigeria stands out as the epicenter of Gulf of Guinea piracy
and as the primary piracy enclave. Nigeria alone accounts for 80 percent of reported incidents of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.21
THE PARADIGM OF GULF OF GUINEA PIRACY
What fundamentally drives piracy, especially in its primary enclave? Who are the
primary actors responsible? Answers can be traced in the transmutation of an
insurgency into a ravaging piracy network.
The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) is a loose coalition of militant groups that emerged in 2005 in the Niger Delta of Nigeria, ostensibly seeking a greater share of oil revenue for the region.22 A Joint Revolutionary
Council surfaced in 2006 as an umbrella organization for MEND and other,
splinter groups;23 MEND is the most dominant and cohesive.24 MEND claims to
fight for “community” interests, but intense criminality dominates its practical
existence and activities.25 From its very inception, expatriate workers have been
regularly kidnapped by MEND activists for ransom at each okrika—area or axis
of control of a subunit or splinter group.26
The MEND insurgency gained notoriety at the strategic level for attacks on
critical installations in the Niger Delta, starting with oil pipelines ashore and
later expanding to offshore oil platforms.27 The federal government of Nigeria
responded with the establishment of a joint task force of security agencies to
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counter the insurgency. Despite the robustness of the joint task force, MEND
continued to be lethal, engaging government forces in gun battles.28 Three naval
personnel were missing and feared dead in 2007, nine were killed in June 2008,
and three in April 2009.29
Rising Threat and the Amnesty Pact
In late 2008, after almost four years of insurgent attacks, the federal government
of Nigeria entered into negotiations with MEND; a formal amnesty proclamation
resulted in June 2009.30 This rapprochement was influenced by the increasing
threat posed by insurgents to oil security, as epitomized by a successful attack on
the floating production, storage, and off-loading unit (FPSO) Bonga in 2008.31
The attack had serious implications for Nigeria, the wider Gulf of Guinea, and
beyond. The Bonga attack marked a peak in a series of threats to energy security
in the Gulf of Guinea, and it opened a new chapter in global asymmetric threats.
Indeed, excluding the attack on Aban VII off the coast of India in 2006, the
Gulf of Guinea has recorded the most attacks against offshore platforms in the
world, all of them off the coast of Nigeria.32 Bulford Dolphin, a mobile drilling
rig, was attacked in April 2007 by insurgents.33 In May 2007 Mystras was also
attacked, and three days later Trident VIII was targeted.34 In addition to the
physical damage and personal injuries inflicted by the insurgents, these incidents
impacted the operation of the platforms.35 The attack on Mystras was indeed very
significant, as it marked the second on an FPSO in two years.
These incidents boosted the confidence of the insurgents, and they culminated in the June 2008 attack on the Bonga FPSO—a major hub of the oil giant
Royal Dutch Shell—about 120 kilometers offshore.36 After the incident, Nigeria’s
oil production dropped to its lowest in twenty-five years and global oil prices
soared.37 The Bonga incident heightened global fears that even deep-sea energy
installations were not safe from insurgents and terrorists.38 In a statement MEND
affirmed that its grand objective was to disable oil export operations, described
the attack as a humiliating security breach for the Nigerian military, and warned
that MEND’s “next visit [would] be different.”39 Soon after, the Nigerian government and MEND group leaders came to the negotiation table and entered
into an amnesty pact. The arrangement involved insurgents laying down their
weapons in return for monthly allowances and skills training.40 However, some
commentators have charged that insurgent leaders were accommodated in luxurious hotels alongside high-ranking politicians and influential people and that
the insurgent leadership was to receive financial payoffs.41
The amnesty led to the demobilization of insurgent forces and of the organizational structure of MEND, as well as a decline in its activities starting in late
2008.42 Interestingly, in that period piracy attacks in the Gulf of Guinea decreased,
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from a high of sixty incidents in 2007 to fifty in 2008, reaching a low of forty-six
in 2009 (as shown in table 1).43 A review of piracy reports by the International
Maritime Bureau (IMB) for 2009 and 2010 shows that there were few piratical incidents in the last and first quarters of 2009 and 2010, respectively.44 However, the
arrangement became tenuous thereafter, partly because the amnesty “cake” had
not been shared among all actors (and certainly not in amounts satisfactory to all
members of the insurgency).45 Splinter groups announced an intention to resume
normal campaigns, and in the remainder of 2010 piracy attacks became prevalent once again.46 By the close of 2011 the Gulf of Guinea had recorded sixtyone piracy incidents, a sharp contrast to the low figures of 2009.
An Insurgency, Criminality, Piracy, and Security Complex
It is clear, then, that the creeks of the Niger Delta harbor dangerous pirates who
threaten the security of sea lines of communication in the Gulf of Guinea. Elements of MEND that are no longer attacking offshore oil platforms, kidnapping
offshore workers for ransom, or extorting money from oil companies have turned
to piracy as their principal activity. This insurgency/piracy nexus often exists
among different kinds of organized crime.47 In the Gulf of Guinea, however, piracy is committed with impunity, and insurgents, rather than achieving a symbiotic
relationship with pirates, have fully transformed into pirates themselves.
The crime of piracy is itself only part of a broad spectrum of actions and complexities that constitutes the piracy threat. It may, for instance, be argued that
dealing with the Niger Delta piracy is a matter of trading off one element of security for another. At any point in time—this was especially so prior to the amnesty
process—the Niger Delta insurgency poses a threat to five critical security interests: the national security of Nigeria, the investment security of oil companies,
global energy security, regional security and stability, and finally, the safety and
security of shipping. These five aspects of security are in many ways interlinked.
Insurgent activities impact Nigeria’s economic interests and stability, which are
key components of its national security. Insurgent attacks equally threaten the
investment interests of oil companies, as well as global energy security, the safety
and security of shipping, and regional stability. For Nigeria, safeguarding national
security became paramount following such incidents as the Bonga attack, making
the security of shipping a lesser concern. Oil companies initially secured their
investments by succumbing to the extortion demands of insurgent groups.48 The
amnesty arrangement offered assurance, albeit temporary, of Nigerian national
security, oil investment security, and by extension, the contribution of Nigeria’s
oil to global energy security. But protecting those security interests left regional
security and the security of shipping in peril. That peril may be regarded as unintended, or it can be viewed as Nigeria sacrificing one element of security interest
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for the other; indeed, as far as the shipping industry was concerned, Nigeria has
had “no political will to combat the problem of piracy.”49
EVOLUTION OF THE NIGER DELTA INSURGENCY INTO A
REGIONAL MARITIME SECURITY THREAT
The Niger Delta insurgency has evolved over time from the primary piracy enclave into a region-wide security threat, in scope, tactics, and trends. As in many
criminal progressions, the exact dates of transitions are difficult to pinpoint but
the patterns are discernible. What follows is a summary of the seven phases of the
evolution from 2005 through to the hijacking of Orfeas in October 2012.
Opportunistic Sea Robbery
The first phase of Gulf of Guinea piratical attacks may be described as “opportunistic sea robbery.” This taxonomy fits piracy incidents up to 2005 but also applies
in part as late as 2007. Two-thirds of attacks during this period took place in ports
and anchorages, interspersed with a limited number of robberies in the territorial sea. It needs to be emphasized, though, that the description of this phase of
piracy as “opportunistic” is not about the capability of the actors but highlights
the fact that robberies were conducted as subsidiary activities. The attention of
insurgents during this period was on attacking offshore platforms; some ships,
however, were hijacked and crews kidnapped for ransom.
Piracy reports during this period gave indications of what would become central in the profile of threats to SLOC security—that is, gangs of hijackers using
speedboats armed with heavy weapons. The use of speedboats can be contrasted
with Somalia piracy, wherein fishing vessels and skiffs are the principal platforms.
In 2006, four crew members of Northern Comrade were kidnapped for ransom.
In May 2007, over forty people armed with guns in six speedboats attacked Dlb
Cheyenne, engaged the Nigerian military in a shoot-out, and kidnapped the crew;
in the same month Oloibiri was attacked using explosives and its crew kidnapped
for ransom.50 Thus the tactic of kidnapping and ransoming expatriate oil workers
was being employed in conjunction with the hijacking of ships.
Widening the Enclave: Prodding and Surges
By 2009 there were signs of a new characteristic of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.
Unlike Somalia, where pirates set out to hunt for victim ships, pirates in the Gulf
of Guinea undertake surgical attacks, converging at locations of interest.51 Activities of insurgents during this period expanded beyond the southern and western
coasts of Nigeria, westerly swarms targeting vessels off the coast of Benin, and
those to the south attacking ships off Cameroon and the neighboring coast. In
2008 about ten armed persons in military clothing boarded the cement carrier
Elbia off the island of Bioko in Equatorial Guinea, identified themselves as
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Nigerian rebels, demanded food from the ship’s crew, and after six hours on
board disembarked into speedboats. Accounts of piracy incidents off nearby
coasts in 2008 described the pirates and robbers as “Nigerian rebels,” “Nigerian
militants,” and “protectors of the Bonny River.”52
These surges signaled an ability of the insurgents to increase the intensity and
extend the scope of their activities, with widening security consequences. This
was demonstrated by the alleged involvement of Niger Delta insurgents in a seaborne attack on the presidential palace of Equatorial Guinea in February 2009.53
The incident was the catalyst for the establishment of a subregional maritime
security framework by member states of the Economic Community of Central
African States in 2009.54 Despite the challenges confronting the ECCAS maritime framework (including inadequate logistics, funding, and legal framework),
it nonetheless weakened the southern wing of the insurgents, resulting in fewer
incidents in the southern Gulf of Guinea.
Pursuit and Violence
A further evolution of tactics became manifest in 2009 as the insurgents started
hunting vessels to attack, albeit selectively, but often with great violence. Once a
high-value target was identified, it was shadowed farther out to sea and at a vulnerable location was attacked violently. In February 2009 grenades were thrown
at the oil tanker Front Chief, killing a crew member. Seamen on board Emirates
Swam, Sevastopolskaya Buhta, and other vessels also suffered serious injuries
during attacks the same year.55 The high level of violence not only ensured quick
outcomes but compensated for the absence of sanctuaries where vessels could be
kept during ransom negotiations and moved the Gulf of Guinea toward the employment by pirates of violence and killing to subjugate theaters of operations.56
Full-Scale Insurgent Piracy
The transition from insurgency into full-scale piracy was a post-amnesty phenomenon, following the withdrawal of insurgent elements from the amnesty deal
of 2010. Attacks became more prevalent from 2010 through to 2013. They also
became more brazen, as indicated by the chasing of and firing on Elbtank Germany for over an hour and the shadowing of Cape Bon for two days, in February
and March 2011, respectively.57
In this transformation pirates have developed new measures. A variant of the
mother-ship concept has emerged wherein pirates use hijacked fishing vessels
to store fuel for extended operations. That is similar to Somali methods, but in
the Gulf of Guinea it is primarily a deception measure to get close to oil vessels.
Pirates have targeted especially ships loaded with refined oil, which they always
siphon into smaller tankers and then sell illegally, both within and outside the
region.58
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Regional Threat and Piracy Networks: The Benin Case
That the threat of piracy had become regional by mid-2011 was made evident by
multiple incidents off the coast of Benin. Piracy off the coast of Benin was by no
means new, but unlike earlier cases the June–July 2011 attacks amounted to an
invasion of Benin’s coastal space. The pirates of the Niger Delta had expanded
their enclave to Benin.59 Two significant trends emerged from the 2011 Benin
attacks, the first of which defies normal risk analysis regarding the safety and
security of ships. It is usual to assume that ships in port are shielded from violent
piracy, and crews normally lower their security posture, expecting at most only
minor robberies and minimal violence by actors from within the coastal state.
This assumption was crushed when pirates of the Niger Delta actually entered
port areas of Benin to hijack vessels. One ship, Aristofanis, was sailed to the open
sea, where its cargo was discharged.60
The second piracy trend that became apparent in the Benin onslaught was the
emergence of a growing transnational criminal network in the Gulf of Guinea.
This is evident from the hijacking of Duzgit Venture.61 The captain was forced
to sail the vessel all the way to the coast of Gabon, where the pirates planned to
transfer the oil into a barge. When the pirates failed to meet the barge, the captain
was forced to sail off Warri, Nigeria, to lighter the cargo. After a series of unsuccessful attempts to do so, the pirates disembarked into fast boats, kidnapping the
captain and another crew member. The pirates were in cahoots with other actors
about four thousand kilometers away from the point of hijack, and to meet them
they sailed the commandeered ship across the coastal waters of five states.62 The
incident also raises serious question about the capability of Gulf of Guinea states
to monitor their maritime domains.
Togo in the Claws: Post–Operation PROSPERITY
The multiple piracy attacks off the coast of Benin had a staggering economic impact on the country, including an estimated port-revenue loss of U.S.$81 million
in 2011.63 The president of Benin took two diplomatic steps in response to the
crisis. At the multilateral level, he requested the support of the international community, through the United Nations secretary-general.64 Second, he sought the
support of his counterpart in Nigeria.65 In August 2011 the two states launched
joint patrols; known as Operation PROSPERITY, they lasted a year and concentrated largely on the coast of Benin. Benin had operational command over the
patrols, while tactical command was exercised by Nigeria.66
Within months, a UN report indicated that Operation PROSPERITY had led to
a reduction in piratical incidents off the coast of Benin.67 This was corroborated
by the military chief of Benin.68 However, the fundamental question that should
have been asked was, What has been the effect of PROSPERITY on the immediate
regions of Nigeria and Benin?
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Since the launch of Operation PROSPERITY there has been, on the one hand, a
steady decrease in piracy off the coast of Benin, but on the other hand, an emergence of incidents off the Togolese coast.69 Interestingly, attacks off the Togolese
coast coincide with periods of few or none reported off Nigeria and Benin. Some
have occurred deep inside port areas of Togo, like the earlier attacks in Benin.
The IMB has noted that the Togo coast has become a piracy hot spot, with incidents increasing from a single attack in 2008 to fifteen in 2012.70 This indicates
that Operation PROSPERITY had simply pushed pirates and robbers farther to the
west. The short coastlines of Benin and Togo have allowed pirates to treat the two
coasts tactically as a single theater of operations. This can be inferred from two
reported incidents in September 2011.71 On the 14th, at 4:15 am, armed robbers
attacked Abu Dhabi Star, a Singapore-flagged chemical tanker, a few nautical
miles off Lomé, Togo, but aborted the attack upon being noticed by the ship’s
company. Four hours earlier, at 11:52 pm, two gangs of pirates had hijacked two
tankers, Mattheos I and Northern Bell, that were conducting a ship-to-ship transfer, sixty-two nautical miles off Benin. The pirates succeeded in sailing Mattheos
I to an unknown location, but the crew of Northern Bell regained control of their
ship.
Analysis of these two incidents, taking into account time, location, and distance, suggests that the same gang of Niger Delta pirates that lost control of
Northern Bell off the Benin coast sailed toward Togo, and then paid their predatory visit to Abu Dhabi Star. The IMB subsequently confirmed that Nigerian
pirates have expanded into Togolese waters.72
Cote d’Ivoire under Siege: Nowhere Is Safe
The hijacking of Orfeas in October 2012 marked the seventh phase of the evolution of piracy from a primary enclave in the Niger Delta into a well-entrenched
regional threat. Orfeas was hijacked on 6 October 2012 off the coast of Cote
d’Ivoire.73 Gaining control of the vessel, the pirates sailed it over two thousand
kilometers to the Niger Delta and stole the oil cargo, releasing the vessel two days
later.74 The hijacking encapsulates most of the tactics already discussed but also
brings to the fore the new sophistication of Gulf of Guinea piracy. Soon after the
hijacking, the pirates took the vessel into deeper water, both to make contact with
their criminal networks and to put the ship out of reach of rescue. In December
2012, armed pirates with machine guns attacked another oil tanker in a Cote
d’Ivoire port.75 These incidents show that attacks in the western Gulf of Guinea
have become more brazen.
EMERGENT PROFILE AND FUTURE PROJECTION
This seven-phase evolution shows that in the absence of robust responses the pirates are likely to consolidate and expand their activities. Effective counterpiracy
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action must take into account the modus operandi of pirates, the piracy profile,
and emerging trends. By the close of 2012, the evolving piracy profile of the Niger
Delta pirates had crystallized, as summarized in table 2.
The above profile reflects a primary focus on the Niger Delta. However, Gulf
of Guinea piratical activity is now marked by fluidity and increasing complexity.
Effective responses should therefore assume the scope of the broader maritime
security context, with particular attention on the evolving piracy track and criminal networks. The following trends should be closely watched.
Widening of the Niger Delta Factor
Unlike Somalia, where multilateral counterpiracy efforts have led to a steady decline in successful attacks since 2009, the Gulf of Guinea has seen an escalation.76
This suggests that pirates in the region are mastering its geography and shipping
profile. Distance is not a limiting factor for piratical activities; conversely, longrange attacks give pirates more time to plunder ships and transfer stolen cargo.
Clearly, there is no area in the Gulf of Guinea too remote or too secure for piracy.
Indeed, in the primary piracy enclave we see two mutually reinforcing developments: consolidation and further widening. It is logical for the Niger Delta
pirates to continue to view the coasts of Nigeria, Benin, and Togo as their normal
TABLE 2
PROFILE OF GULF OF GUINEA PIRACY AS OF 2012
Subject

Description/Outcome

Platforms

Speedboats, already used by insurgents. Ideal for piracy because of their speed and maneuverability.
Generally faster than victim ships and naval ships.

Grouping

Up to forty pirates in multiple speedboats. Large numbers ideal for overpowering crews.

Weapons

AK-47s, machine guns, RPGs, grenades, and knives. Able to stop ships under way with firepower.

Violence

High level of violence and injury to crew. Instills fear and ensures quick outcome of attacks.

Reach/range

Southward: Nigeria to Equatorial Guinea (over 1,550 km). Westward: Nigeria to Cote d’Ivoire (over
2,000 km).

Time

Operate day and night but shifting more to night operations. Surprise achieved through night
attack.

Target ships

Oil and product tankers; objective to steal refined oil cargo. Other vessels attacked for money and
valuables.

Mother ship

Hijacked fishing vessels occasionally used as resupply basis or as decoy when approaching targeted
ships.

Assisting ships

Tankers used to transfer stolen oil cargo.

Ransom

Increasingly not a prime motivation but still employed as a supplementary activity.

Networks

Stolen oil sold within and outside the region. Timing of attacks suggests prior information about
locations of oil tankers.
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zone while they venture into new areas. This new dynamic was unleashed in January 2014, with the hijacking of Kerala in Angola.77 The tanker was subsequently
sighted under the control of the hijackers off the coast of Nigeria, where part of
the oil cargo, worth eight million U.S. dollars, was stolen.78 This incident signified
a southerly expansion of piracy attacks. The months of June and July saw three
hijackings off Ghana, two of them of oil tankers, signifying a further enlargement
of piracy threat, this time westward.79 These attacks shattered the reputations of
Angola and Ghana as having coast waters among the safest in the region. The incidents also demonstrated that oil tankers will continue to be targeted, because the
financial rewards for the pirates and their accomplices, as well as for buyers of the
stolen oil, are extremely high.80 However, all other vessels are also susceptible prey.
Other Piratical Groups within the Primary Piracy Enclave
But even the primary piracy enclave can get more complicated. There is a history
of attacks by two organized groups in neighboring Cameroon that are completely
removed from the Niger Delta insurgency. One, the Bakassi Freedom Fighters
(BFF), is opposed to Nigeria’s return of the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon.81 The
BFF attacked an oil tanker in 2008, kidnapping the crew and detaining them for
ten days before negotiating a ransom payment.82 The second group, the Africa
Marine Commando (AMC), kidnapped a Chinese fishing crew in 2010 and extorted a ransom for their release.83 There have been no other discernible piratical
attacks by the BFF or the AMC, partly because of robust responses from the
Cameroon government, including lethal force.84 However, the groups are far from
being dismantled; reports indicate that the AMC was involved in the kidnapping
of local officials in 2011.85
Concerns in the Secondary Piracy Enclave
Another concern is the future safety of the coasts of Guinea and Sierra Leone.
Incidents in this enclave are fewer than off the Niger Delta but worrisome because of the high level of violence employed. There is also a very close correlation
between reported piracy off the coast of Guinea and incidents in neighboring
Sierra Leone—a portent of organized criminal activity in the latter area. In March
2007, pirates armed with machine guns boarded Atropos, which was under way
forty nautical miles off Sierra Leone.86 In August of the same year, thirty pirates
armed with guns boarded a United Kingdom–registered product tanker off
Guinea.87 That December pirates armed with AK-47s and wearing military-like
uniforms fired on and boarded a tanker off Sierra Leone.88 In August 2010, ten
pirates armed with AK-47s attacked a ship off the coast of Guinea;89 more recently, in 2012, a Maltese cargo ship, Costanza, was attacked twenty nautical miles
off Guinea by pirates, again armed with AK-47s, damaging the ship.90 These are
indications of entrenched piratical activity in this secondary enclave.
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Threats beyond Piracy
While the Gulf of Guinea grapples with a spate of piratical activity, new transnational actors are gaining notoriety in the region. The Nigerian extremist Islamist
group Boko Haram, whose activities were previously confined to the northern
part of the country, has broadened its operations across Nigeria and neighboring
states.91 In August 2011, the group claimed responsibility for a suicide attack on
the United Nations office in Nigeria, killing eighteen staff and injuring over a
hundred others.92 This attack dramatically changed earlier assessments that had
viewed the group’s threat as limited.93 In June 2013, following repeated attacks
on major cities and towns, the government of Nigeria officially declared Boko
Haram a terrorist group;94 the Nigerian minister of defense emphatically described it as a franchise of Al Qaeda.95
To date, there have been no reports of maritime attacks by Boko Haram. Although a strike on an onshore pipeline in February 2012 by militants “want[ing]
to register their presence” raised fears that Boko Haram may have been targeting
strategic oil assets, no connection with it has been established.96 Nevertheless,
the possibility of Boko Haram or another terrorist group, such as Al Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), targeting offshore oil and gas installations in the Gulf
of Guinea cannot be discounted.97 Indeed, the high value of these assets, coupled
with their vulnerability, makes them attractive targets.98
COUNTERPIRACY IMPERATIVES
This article has established an increasing threat of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.
As attacks spread southward from the secondary enclave in Guinea, a piracy arc
reaching to the primary enclave of the Niger Delta will be formed, leading to a
very grave situation for the safety of shipping, offshore energy security, and the
stability of the region. Effective remedial measures must be adopted by regional
states and the international community. In designing these measures lessons
from recent multilateral efforts in Somalia would certainly be useful, but cognizance should also be given to the distinctive dynamics of this new theater. On the
whole, five thematic areas must be addressed.
Improved Governance
The governance nexus with piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is important. The consequence of a governance deficit goes beyond the spiral of piratical attacks being
witnessed. It also finds expression in a myriad of maritime security challenges, including illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing and illegal migration by sea.99
The 2006 UN Niger Delta Human Development Report provides an incisive
description of the conditions of the people of the Niger Delta.100 The report notes
that the region has “dismal health and health service delivery,” that the people live
in “predominantly . . . poor quality [housing],” and that nearly all school facilities
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are in “a state of extreme disrepair.” It reports increasing “disillusionment and
frustration,” as well as “deepening . . . deprivation and environmental devastation.”101 Research suggests that the quantity of oil spilled in the Niger Delta over
the last fifty years is more than fifty times the volume spilled in the Exxon Valdez
accident of 1989—one of the greatest environmental disasters the world has ever
witnessed.102 Such poor environmental management has led to serious pollution
and environmental degradation, limiting the opportunity of people to earn a living from either farming or fishing.103
Realistically, therefore, bad governance must be said to lie at the heart of the
maritime security challenges in the Gulf of Guinea. Considering the tremendous
oil wealth generated by the Niger Delta region, the dismal social picture painted
by the UN report is otherwise difficult to comprehend. Resentment would be at
its height in such an environment, leading to restiveness, conflict, and crime.104 In
any case, poor governance creates a malignant environment that can be exploited
by pirates and transnational criminal networks.105
Enhanced Capability
The impunity with which ship hijackings are conducted in the Gulf of Guinea, at
times deep inside ports, is symptomatic of weakness in policing, surveillance, and
response capabilities.106 Although security-sector funding is generally inadequate
in the Gulf of Guinea, the situation with respect to navies and coast guards is
especially problematic. Angola’s allocation of resources for the protection of
its maritime estate is typical for Gulf of Guinea states. Angola has an estimated
coastline of 1,600 kilometers—the longest in the region. Its gross domestic
product is the second highest in the region, much of it derived from offshore
resources. Yet the personnel strength of the Angolan navy is only a thousand
(compared to a hundred thousand for Angola’s army and six thousand for its air
force), and its equipment state is palpably inadequate, in contrast to that of the
army.107 The Nigerian navy is similarly underfunded and limited in capability.108
Its personnel strength of eight thousand is the largest in the Gulf of Guinea but
in sharp contrast to the sixty-two-thousand-strong Nigerian army.109 Liberia
represents another anomaly, not just for the Gulf of Guinea but with respect
to how the global maritime community as a whole matches responsibility with
maritime interest. Although Liberia is the second-largest flag state in the world,
its diminutive coast guard has only fifty personnel and eight craft, all under ten
feet in length.110
A quick glance at the other navies and coast guards reveals a similarly
worrisome situation.111 It is evident that the maritime jurisdiction and interest
available to Gulf of Guinea states are not commensurate with the exercise of
responsibility to ensure the safety and security of their coasts.112 This capability
gap must be addressed.
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Effective Legal Framework
An inadequate legal framework too undermines maritime security in the Gulf
of Guinea. Article 100 of UNCLOS encapsulates two interrelated obligations
regarding piracy. States are required, first, to suppress piracy at the national level,
and second, to cooperate with other states in that effort at the regional and international levels.113 To give practical effect to the former, Gulf of Guinea states
must enact and enforce laws covering all aspects of the crime of piracy.114 With
respect to the second obligation, cooperative instruments and structures should
be established that facilitate the sharing of information, at the minimum, and also
possibly lead to joint patrols.
However, Liberia and Togo are the only states in the region that have up-todate piracy legislation.115 It was only in January 2013 that Nigeria initiated the
process of enacting a law to combat piracy and other maritime crimes.116 A UN
assessment mission observed that the definition in the national laws of Benin
of the crime of piracy was outdated and inconsistent with the provisions of
UNCLOS.117 In summary, there is a legislative deficit with respect to the crime
of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. Thus, even were states able to patrol their coasts,
they would be unable to prosecute or punish offenders. The likely result would
be a “catch and release syndrome,” as was manifested in the early periods of Somali piracy when counterpiracy forces frequently released apprehended pirates
because of difficulties in prosecution, thus further entrenching insecurity.118 The
Gulf of Guinea states must therefore create an effective counterpiracy regime,
first passing laws against piracy, with accompanying penalties, and second, providing the necessary prosecution and judicial structures.
A related important global instrument is the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988 (known
as the 1988 SUA Convention), and its protocols.119 The 1988 SUA Convention
established a basis for responding to a spectrum of violent crimes at sea, from
insurgency to terrorism.120 These crimes tend to fall outside the scope of piracy
as defined by UNCLOS.121 The 1988 SUA Convention has addressed such gaps,
giving Gulf of Guinea states the opportunity to respond effectively to these
threats.
Despite the relevance of the SUA regime, ratification and implementation of
SUA instruments by Gulf of Guinea states have been unsatisfactory. Only Cote
d’Ivoire is a party to all the SUA instruments, but only since 2012.122 Angola,
Cameroon, Republic of the Congo, Gabon, and Nigeria—all of them major oilproducing states with substantial offshore infrastructures—have not ratified the
1988 SUA Fixed Platform Protocol. States that have ratified SUA instruments
have generally failed to incorporate them into their domestic legal systems.123
For example, Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Nigeria have all ratified the 1988
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SUA Convention, but not one has incorporated the convention into its national
law.124 Since 2004 the UN has emphasized the importance of the SUA framework
for maritime security.125 It is therefore imperative that Gulf of Guinea states
ratify and implement the SUA instruments within their domestic legal and
policy frameworks. They should then develop regional responses, on the SUA
framework.
Robust Regional Cooperation
Maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea is increasing; however, it
is crucial that initiatives be tailored to meet the needs of the region. Member
states of the ECCAS in 2009 adopted a Protocol on Maritime Security, based on
a structure that divides the ECCAS grouping into zones to enhance joint patrol,
monitoring, and enforcement.126 This structure is being replicated for the entire
Gulf of Guinea as part of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct. For instance, ECOWAS
member states decided to establish a pilot Zone E, comprising Nigeria, Benin,
Togo, and the landlocked state of Niger.127 However, a number of issues have to
be addressed: information sharing, realistic funding, interoperability, and current
and future maritime boundary disputes.128
Viable International Cooperation
International maritime security cooperation too has gained traction in the
Gulf of Guinea; the United States has achieved a good deal of visibility in this
regard. The United States launched its Africa Partnership Station (APS) in 2007
with the deployment of the catamaran HSV-2 Swift and the dock landing ship
USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43) to the Gulf of Guinea, and there has since been a
consistent APS presence in the region.129 While serving as a platform for capacity
building and joint exercises, the APS also contributes to the strategic objectives
of power projection and cooperative engagement for the United States through
the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM).130 Other U.S. government and policy
institutions, including the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, at Fort McNair in
Washington, D.C., are also engaged in meeting nonmilitary maritime-security
needs of the Gulf of Guinea.
The European Union launched the Critical Maritime Routes in the Gulf
of Guinea (CRIMGO) project in January 2013.131 The initiative is designed to
improve safety and security off the coasts of seven states.132 Several other states
as well are keenly engaged with the Gulf of Guinea on maritime security, as
epitomized by the increasing port visits of foreign navies in the last couple of
years.133 Even the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy, which traditionally
has had no presence in the region, visited Cameroon in May 2014 and reportedly
undertook antipiracy joint drills with the host country.134 At the multilateral level,
both the International Maritime Organization and the United Nations Office
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on Drugs and Crime have maritime security capacity-building programs in the
Gulf of Guinea. There is also an initiative by the international police community
(INTERPOL) focused on the investigation of maritime-security incidents.135 This
will be a useful means of unearthing patterns of maritime crime and criminal
networks.
Although international cooperation holds out the prospect of enhancing
maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, a number of challenges have to be
addressed, of which two deserve highlighting here. First is the need for coordination of international partnerships. Multiple cooperative initiatives are currently
being unpacked in the region that national administrators and regional institutions are required to respond to and then implement. They overcrowd national
and regional policy, adversely affecting maritime-security decision making and
coordination. External actors, donor agencies, and relevant international organizations should instead engage with Gulf of Guinea states in a harmonized, coordinated way. Second, while maritime security cooperation is arguably a means
for nonregional states to pursue wider strategic interests, some have made no
allocation of logistical support or funds corresponding to the maritime-security
needs of the region. For example, France pledged only U.S.$1.6 million to support maritime security in 2013, while funding for the CRIMGO project is just
€4.5 million.136 This amounts to a fraction of the annual cost of the NigerianBenin joint patrols (Operation PROSPERITY), estimated by the UN at U.S.$112
million.137
Given the socioeconomic realities in the Gulf of Guinea, where many states
are at the bottom of the global development index, external partnerships should
contribute substantially to the enhancement of capacity and capability.138 An arrangement similar to the trust fund established under the auspices of the IMO
to facilitate counterpiracy initiatives in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden
is recommended for the Gulf of Guinea.139 Of course, the prevailing governance
nemesis in the region makes such a fund susceptible to corruption and abuse.
The framework must therefore have inbuilt mechanisms and checks to ensure
the transparent and efficient application of the fund.
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THE KEY TO MIDWAY CORAL SEA AND A CULTURE OF LEARNING

Carl Cavanagh Hodge

Was the battle of Midway won or lost? In a recent edition of the Naval War College Review, James Levy grappled with some of the recurrent issues found in the
scholarship of the battle of Midway, all of them related to the question whether
one or another aspect of the Japanese way of war led to a catastrophic defeat at
the hands of the U.S. Navy.1 Levy observes that an assumption common to many
works is “that the Japanese did as much to lose the battle as the Americans did
to win it, or more.”2 He takes issue with “cultural” explanations for the outcome
of 4 June 1942, specifically the extent to which Japanese war strategy and naval
doctrine were descendants of Oriental philosophy and the children of a culture
that valued conformity and obedience over creativity and personal initiative.
Levy rightly concludes that American “diligence” more than any other single factor contributed to the total destruction of the Japanese carrier fleet sent against
Midway.3
Levy devotes special attention to Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully’s book
Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway, a work whose scholarly
thoroughness he lauds yet one he simultaneously indicts for an obsession with
debunking myths about Midway and with demonstrating that its outcome was to
be found in Japanese practice and doctrine.4 In the
Carl Cavanagh Hodge is a professor of political sciprocess he gives rather short shrift to the degree
ence at the University of British Columbia, Okanagan. He is a former senior Volkswagen Research Felto which their account of the early episodes of
low with the American Institute of Contemporary
the war in the Pacific supports his own argument:
German Studies at Johns Hopkins University and a
that the U.S. Navy applied itself diligently and
former NATO-EAPC fellow. Professor Hodge has authored and edited nine books and numerous articles thoroughly to the requirements of carrier warfare
on European and American politics and history.
in the Pacific, in such greater measure than its
Naval War College Review, Winter 2015, Vol. 68, No. 1
adversary that the resulting triumph reversed the
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direction of the Pacific War within six months of its opening gambit at Pearl
Harbor. In a careful reading of both engagements, the battle of Midway and the
battle of the Coral Sea, one is struck by those specific qualities of the U.S. Navy
that in the first six months of the Pacific War made it especially ripe for a major
victory over the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN).
Admittedly, Parshall and Tully level many substantive criticisms against the established scholarly myths about Midway and trace much of the IJN’s thought and
action to systemic factors derived as much from a way of life as from the practical
challenges of modern naval warfare. Yet in this they are in the good company of
other works, such as Kaigun, by David Evans and Mark Peattie, that locate much
of the spirit of Japanese early naval thought in the mystical bent of Akiyama
Saneyuki, whose most baleful impact on the IJN of World War II was, ironically,
a Mahanian faith in decisive battle that the U.S. Navy no longer shared.5 In Levy’s
effort to make the case for American diligence in preparation for Midway, however, Levy himself fails to pay sufficient attention to a factor appropriately stressed
by Parshall and Tully in the introduction and conclusion of their analysis, one
that cannot be excluded from any responsible treatment of Midway—the learning culture developed in the white heat of conflict between the battle of the Coral
Sea and the battle of Midway. The U.S. Navy’s greatest triumph was the product
less of Japanese cultural pathologies than of the intellectual profit the Americans
gained from the lesser engagement only a month before. For Parshall and Tully,
Coral Sea was in many respects the overture to the opera, so much so that what
happened at Midway is not wholly comprehensible without an understanding of
the outcome of the earlier engagement, as well as of the American and Japanese
reactions to it. Any study of Midway ought to acknowledge that the limited encounter of the first instance that exerted decision influence on the main event of
the second is not unlike the relationship of the battle of Ligny to Waterloo.
All histories of Midway, of course, acknowledge up front the enormous contribution of the code breakers at Pearl Harbor in giving the U.S. Navy actionable
information on the movements of Japanese task forces in the Pacific, along with
coherent calculations of the intentions behind them. In the early months of 1942
the U.S. Navy had an emerging image of the overall operational situation in the
central and western Pacific, and in the weeks leading up to Midway it was also
able to sketch a plausible tactical picture of the coming clash with the IJN. As this
knowledge evolved, changes to command structure were also made, the better
to integrate intelligence with command. Whereas Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto
sailed with the Japanese Combined Fleet to Midway, which is consistent with the
custom of decentralized command common to all navies of the time, Admiral
Chester Nimitz remained at Pearl Harbor to orchestrate the U.S. Navy’s response
to the Midway attack. Eliot Cohen and John Gooch note in their study of failure
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in war that “Nimitz’s behavior at Midway suggests that the U.S. Navy did not simply refuse to change its traditional attitudes to command, painful as that might
prove.”6 Yamamoto’s preference for sticking with what he assumed to be the triedand-true meant that he had all the foggier notion of what awaited him at Midway.
What awaited him, however, had to a significant extent been determined by
the outcome of the Coral Sea battle only a month earlier and by the determination of the U.S. Navy to make the most of both the material balance of forces
following that battle, and the lessons learned in its prosecution. The battle of the
Coral Sea, the first-ever clash of aircraft-carrier fleets, had been occasioned by
Japan’s efforts in the first stage of the Pacific War to establish a chain of air bases
across the southwest Pacific and to seize Port Moresby on the southern coast of
New Guinea, to maintain access to the Coral Sea and any potential targets in
northeast Australia. These plans were short-circuited by the U.S. Navy’s Task
Force (TF) 17, commanded by Rear Admiral Jack Fletcher. On 7 and 8 May 1942,
attacks by Fletcher’s aircraft mauled the Japanese invasion in its opening phase
sufficiently to force the postponement of any follow-through on the larger plan.
Thus although the Coral Sea fight was a marginal tactical victory for the IJN, in
terms of ships and tonnage sunk, it amounted to a small strategic triumph for
the U.S. Navy.
However, the material knock-on effects of the Coral Sea conflict were highly
significant. At the beginning of 1942 the IJN had a quantitative edge over the
U.S. Navy’s carrier force. Japan had six fleet carriers—Akagi, Kaga, Hiryū, Sōryū,
Shōkaku, and Zuikaku. In addition, the light carriers Hōshō, Ryujo, Shōhō, and
Zuihō were available to support operations of the fleet carriers. The United
States had five fleet carriers available for operations in the Pacific. The design
and capabilities across all classes varied enormously; USS Lexington (CV 2) and
USS Saratoga (CV 3) were converted cruisers dating to the 1920s, whereas USS
Yorktown (CV 5), USS Enterprise (CV 6), and USS Hornet (CV 8) were the first
genuinely modern fleet carriers. At Coral Sea, Japanese aircraft were able to sink
Lexington and inflict serious damage to Yorktown. In return American aircraft
destroyed Shōhō.
Parshall and Tully, as well as Craig Symonds in his book on Midway, note that
the overall material damage rendered at Coral Sea to the IJN’s fighting capacity
went well beyond the ships sunk outright. Although Shōhō’s loss was hardly a
body blow, the damage to the fleet carrier Shōkaku was sufficient to strike it from
the roster for the Midway operation, and Zuikaku was withdrawn as well, owing
entirely to aircraft losses. In this instance a factor intervened in the aftermath of
Coral Sea that might be deemed “cultural” but that was, strictly speaking, organizational in nature. Parshall and Tully point out that the IJN could have attempted
to reconstitute Zuikaku’s air wing in time for Midway but that such a change
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss1/20
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would have violated an organizational custom that married Japanese air units to
specific carriers. If either a ship or its air wing were not in condition for operations, both were withdrawn. So Coral Sea took one light IJN carrier, Shōhō, out
of action permanently, while two heavy carriers slated for the attack on Midway,
Shōkaku and Zuikaku, would not be there.7 The IJN decided to take four, not six,
carriers to its showdown at Midway.
Furthermore, before Coral Sea the Japanese had a wide edge over the U.S.
Navy in experienced pilots. At Coral Sea they lost many of their best pilots, while
their comparatively green American adversaries gained valuable experience in
the art of attacking Japanese carriers.8 What Fletcher’s force achieved at Coral
Sea, therefore, amounted to much more than a short-term check to Japanese
strategic plans; it seriously compromised the total strength the IJN could bring
to bear against the American carriers at Midway. Paul Dull, in his battle history
of the IJN, wonders whether these losses alone might have deprived Japan of the
smashing victory at Midway.9
Even if one sets aside such speculation, Coral Sea was at the very least an installment on a future defeat. If a cornerstone of Japanese strategic doctrine was
to employ overwhelming force and advantage of numbers, Coral Sea sharply
reduced that advantage; “if an objective wasn’t important enough to require
sending all six carriers,” Parshall and Tully remind us, “it wasn’t worth going
after at all,” so that “Japan paid the ultimate price for her violation a month later
at Midway.”10
That the price at Midway turned out to be so high was the U.S. Navy’s achievement, both in making the most of the strategic opportunity that sound intelligence afforded it and in drawing tactical lessons from Coral Sea to maximize the
dividend offered by the opportunity at hand. The effect of the IJN’s decision to
scratch off two carriers from the Midway operation following Coral Sea was compounded by the U.S. Navy’s extraordinary efforts to ensure that Yorktown, badly
damaged but able to escape destruction, would be repaired and refitted in time
to rejoin the hostilities. Whereas under normal circumstances Yorktown would
have required three months to refit, Admiral Nimitz gave the 1,400 fabricators,
shipfitters, and welders at the dry-dock facility at Pearl Harbor less than three
days of around-the-clock labor in which to patch and replace what they could.
The effort drew so much electrical power that some districts of Honolulu suffered outages. Symonds stresses that “whereas Yamamoto assumed that the loss
of Shōkaku and Zuikaku only narrowed the Kido Butai’s [carrier force’s] margin
of superiority, Nimitz knew that if the Americans were to have any chance against
the oncoming juggernaut, they would need all three of their carriers.”11 By using
the available intelligence to contrive an ambush of the Japanese force in Midway’s
proximity, he improved the odds further. Along with Enterprise and Hornet, the
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presence of Yorktown plus the use of the airstrip on Midway Island would give
Nimitz four platforms from which to launch aircraft—parity with the Japanese
force that at no other time and place in the opening months of the war in the
Pacific had been possible.
Meanwhile, the Japanese command assumed that Coral Sea had put both Lexington and Yorktown out of action. Whether or not one indicts “victory disease”
for the overconfidence in proceeding with the Midway operation, the casualness
with which the IJN reduced by a third the forces it intended to employ stands in
stark contrast to American effort to retrieve Yorktown from near death to fighting fitness. It is important to underscore, moreover, that Yorktown’s presence
at Midway was valuable far beyond the mathematical balance of carriers. Specifically, the experience of Yorktown’s aviators at Midway sharpened American
air-strike capabilities significantly. John Lundstrom’s study of naval air combat
in the Pacific notes that Coral Sea was the first acid test of American naval carrier doctrine. Although there was little time between the Coral Sea and Midway
engagements to study and apply the lessons of the former for systematic application to the latter, “the Yorktown aviators were the only ones in a position to profit
from their hard-earned Coral Sea experiences, and their excellent performance
at Midway demonstrated the value of those lessons.”12 At Coral Sea, American
naval fighter pilots had been introduced to the storied A6M Zero fighter, and
they had appreciated the remarkable maneuverability of the Japanese fighter
while learning that their own F4F-3 Wildcats were its equal in speed and climbing ability and its superior in firepower and protection.13 Although Yorktown’s air
group was reorganized prior to Midway—both to facilitate an increase in overall
fighter strength in time for Midway and to integrate the new F4F-4 folding-wing
Wildcats into its numbers—leaders such as Lieutenant John S. (“Jimmy”) Thach
listened to the accounts of Yorktown’s flyers of their Coral Sea experiences. A
hastily innovated version of the “Thach Weave” beam-defense position debuted
at Midway under the most challenging circumstances and was remarkably effective in meeting Japanese fighter attacks.14 So, not only was Yorktown available
for action northwest of Midway Atoll on 4 June 1942, but the experience that its
aviators acquired at Coral Sea was integrated into the Midway force through the
American mix-and-match approach to carriers and air wings, an approach from
which the IJN abstained.
There is no need to engage in discussions of cultural contrasts between
American and Japanese naval traditions or to work over the latter for real or
imagined strategic pathologies to acknowledge that the United States brought
organizational flexibility to the engagement and extracted every ounce of innovative energy in its determination to prevail. Levy’s stress on American diligence is
wholly in harmony with Parshall and Tully’s observations that with the overnight
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refitting of Yorktown the U.S. Navy was already benefiting from superior organizational practices before the trial of strength at Midway.15 In addition, it mattered
a great deal not only that the U.S. Navy was to have a third carrier for Midway
but that Admiral Nimitz gave tactical command of the two task forces (TF 16,
with Enterprise and Hornet, and TF 17, with Yorktown), joined for the ambush
of the Japanese force closing on Midway, to Fletcher—together, a commander
and ships with more experience in combat with Japanese carriers than any other
combination available.
Owing to combat experience of Coral Sea battle and the efficient launch of
torpedo planes, fighters, and dive-bombers of Yorktown’s air group, Fletcher’s
team was the only force to arrive over its target almost exactly according to navigational calculation to deliver a timely and coordinated attack. Torpedo bombers
were launched first, followed by dive-bombers, and then, in turn, the fighters.
The objective of this procedure, that the three groups would rendezvous before
encountering the Japanese, involved a quantum of risk, but Yorktown had already
rehearsed en route with considerable success at Coral Sea. Other American carrier aircraft formations at Midway flew in small groups and became separated,
but Yorktown’s remained closely coordinated, “with each of the tactical elements
remaining in sight of each other up until the time they initiated their attack.”16
Because Yorktown’s dive-bombers, to their own amazement, came upon the Japanese carrier Sōryū without the cover of any combat air patrol (CAP), their attack
was devastating. Seventeen SBD Douglas Dauntless dive-bombers, under Lieutenant Commander Maxwell Leslie, scored three hits on Sōryū with thousandpound bombs, destroying its flight deck and gutting its hangar below.
In combination with the destruction of Akagi and Kaga by the dive-bombers
of TF 16, the IJN lost three of its four carriers (and the battle of Midway) in
scarcely more than five minutes of action.17 Because dive-bombers from Enterprise had initially been unable to locate the Japanese carriers and had arrived
over them from the southwest almost at the same time as Leslie’s strike force arrived from the east, the Japanese carriers were caught from two directions at the
moment of maximum vulnerability, when their flight decks were covered with
aircraft preparing for launch. Not only did the U.S. Navy air groups approach
from separate axes at approximately the same time, but they came in at high and
low altitudes, presenting the Japanese air defenses with a challenge beyond their
capability. Although coincidence accounted for this (what Parshall and Tully call
“a healthy dollop of bad luck”), the impression among the Japanese that the U.S.
Navy had such accurate knowledge of their position that it could synchronize
attacks from different directions must have been psychologically devastating.18 It
was certainly materially catastrophic.
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Other factors, then, contributed directly or indirectly to the scale of the
American triumph. Among them were the improvements made to the U.S. Navy’s
combat air patrol, based in part on the failure of American fighters at Coral Sea
to break up Japanese strike forces before they could close in on the American
carriers. Fighter direction and CAP at Midway were more effective (Task Force
16 escaped attack entirely) when the idea of a layered CAP, aircraft operating at
different altitudes, was applied to carrier defense. Even after Midway, American
CAP required further development, principally through multicarrier task forces
with highly integrated CAPs, but the effort to learn and adapt from recent experience was very much in evidence among the American fighters on 4 June 1942.
By contrast, the IJN’s CAP did not improve significantly between Coral Sea and
Midway and did little to compensate for Yamamoto’s misty appreciation of his
enemy’s dispositions around Midway. Admittedly, Japanese pilots had to operate
without the early-warning capabilities of radar; still, as Parshall and Tully point
out, relatively simple tactical improvements could have improved the defense of
the IJN’s carriers.19 One cannot help but be struck by the fact that the IJN’s CAP
in no way compensated at the tactical level for Japan’s inferior operational intelligence, so that the ambush effect hoped for by the U.S. Navy’s command unfolded
largely as planned.
The limitations of the damage-control practices on board Japanese carriers,
meanwhile, ensured that once the American dive-bombers scored major hits,
the chances of recovering operational effectiveness diminished quickly. We have
here another instance of contrast with the learning culture of the U.S. Navy following Coral Sea. It was at Coral Sea that Oscar Myers, Yorktown’s Air Department fuel officer, realized that among the factors that sealed the unhappy fate of
Lexington was the presence of aviation fuel on its hangar deck. Because the U.S.
Navy thereafter drained fuel systems after usage and filled the lines with CO2,
Yorktown was spared the ravages of a runaway fire when it absorbed a major Japanese dive-bomber assault. The patched-up Yorktown was actually more resilient
under attack at Midway; the carrier that had contributed so much to the U.S.
Navy’s heroic struggle in 1942 ultimately succumbed not to bombs but to torpedoes. Fifteen aircraft from Yorktown’s bombing group were able to participate
in the retaliatory strike from Enterprise that began the destruction of Hiryū, the
fourth and last IJN carrier at Midway.20 Lastly, the extraordinary performance of
the U.S. Navy’s torpedo bombers and dive-bombers must be noted—the former
sacrificed in the battle’s opening phase to annihilating attacks from Japanese
fighters while the latter delivered the fatal blows to the IJN’s carriers when there
were comparatively fewer Japanese fighters to meet them. Indeed, Yorktown’s
third bombing group was unruffled by fighters during or after its attack. After
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initial misses, the American dive-bomber pilots settled into a rhythm of multiple
hits with five-hundred-pound and thousand-pound bombs on such vital parts of
the Japanese carriers that even appropriate damage control would have been hard
pressed to save them.
Above all, it is Levy’s point about diligence (a point not missed, and indeed
stressed, by Parshall and Tully) that needs to be underscored. A culture of learning, arising from experience rather than theory and shared in the weeks between
Coral Sea and Midway at every level of the U.S. Navy’s carrier task forces, meant
that ultimately victory was earned by the Americans rather than thrown away
by the Japanese. Levy is right to conclude that military historians are too quick
to apportion blame. An almost perverse fascination with failure often seems
to mark qualification for the profession. I do not share his aversion to cultural
explanations for behavior in battle any more than I share the attraction of others to such explanations. Cultural factors are simply harder to measure and less
satisfying as an explanation than is a careful reconstruction of what actually happened. I do share Levy’s enthusiasm for Eric Grove’s scholarship on the Philippine Sea, and I recommend that his stress on technology and training be applied
to Midway, along with emphasis on the extraordinary application of hard-won
knowledge in evidence in the U.S. Navy in the early months of the Pacific War.21
This knowledge was remarkably on duty at all levels: Chester Nimitz’s courage
in acting on the intelligence in his possession, to toss the iron dice on a fight as
big and potentially disastrous as Midway, was complemented by the decisions
of Fletcher and Spruance (in a knife-edge balance of prudence with bravery)
to launch air strikes before they had perfect knowledge of the enemy’s position
and intentions. Their commitment to tactical conviction, however, was in turn
redeemed by the tenacity, skill, and personal sacrifice of the U.S. Navy’s bombers,
scout planes, and F4F pilots in delivering a staggering blow to Japanese carrierborne airpower. John Keegan points out that for Midway, American cryptanalysts
provided a picture “as clear as the obscurities of war will ever allow” but that a
little less intuition by the pilots engaged to act on it might have compromised that
advantage.22 Happily, the recent experience of Coral Sea in aerial reconnaissance,
tactics of aerial combat, and techniques of dive-bombing made that intuition
especially acute. Whereas the years between 1909 and 1941 witnessed the rise of
Japanese naval airpower, the spring of 1942 marked the beginning of its sudden
and steep decline.23
Nothing in the actions of the U.S. Navy indicates that its personnel believed
God was on their side at Midway and so all would simply be well; to the contrary,
every fiber of arm, heart, and brain was applied to narrowing the advantage of
a foe who had hitherto seemed invincible. If there was a “miracle” at work at
Midway, then surely it was that the U.S. Navy, at every level, drew all the right
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conclusions from one engagement for application to the next. Any familiarity
with military history teaches us that this virtue is so rare as to tempt the conclusion that, if not the Almighty, then surely Sweet Reason intervened wholly to the
benefit of one side.
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A STRATEGY HAS TO BE ABLE TO WORK TO BE MASTERFUL

Alan D. Zimm

This essay was written in response to an article by Angelo N. Caravaggio, “‘Winning’ the Pacific War: The Masterful Strategy of Commander Minoru Genda,”
which appeared in the Winter 2014 issue of the Naval War College Review (pages
85–118).
Dr. Caravaggio takes to task “criticisms leveled at the Japanese for their ‘ill
conceived’ or ‘poorly planned’ attack at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941.” Since
his endnote supporting this comment listed only my Attack on Pearl Harbor:
Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions as a source of this criticism, the finger appears to be pointed directly at me. Understandably, I was eager to learn more of
Genda’s masterful strategy and to learn how I had missed Genda’s “depth of vision
and professional intellect.” I was disappointed.
Dr. Caravaggio’s article never substantiates his view that Genda’s planning for
the Pearl Harbor attack was in any way masterful. None of my criticisms were
addressed, nor was there any explanation of how my analysis was inaccurate. I
found no evidence in the article of any strategic planning created by Genda—only
a few suggested courses of action that the author assumes were masterful, without
any real evaluation as to their feasibility.
Genda was the lead planner for the Pearl Harbor strike. In my previous life
as a commander in the U.S. Navy, performing exercise analysis, I gained some
experience in evaluating and criticizing operational planning. I found Genda’s
plan full of poor decisions, with some outright blunders, even considering the
state of the art of the time.
If Dr. Caravaggio contends that the attack was not “poorly planned,” he will
need to address the deficiencies that I have identified in Attack on Pearl Harbor
—twenty-one specific, major problems. The following are a few of the most significant that are related to planning.
Commander Zimm is a member of the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory’s principal professional staff, serving as section leader in the
Aviation Systems and Advanced Concepts Group.
He has published over ninety books and articles on
various subjects, including naval and military history. His most recent book, Attack on Pearl Harbor:
Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions, was published in 2011.
Naval War College Review, Winter 2015, Vol. 68, No. 1
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•	
Genda’s plan for the torpedo bombers employed a horrendously complicated targetprioritization scheme that could not have been
executed even under the best of conditions.
It resulted in an overconcentration on two
battleships, as well as other targeting errors.
One-third of the torpedo hits were wasted on
inappropriate targets or in overkill.
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• The prioritization scheme assigned primary (battleship) and secondary
(cruiser) targets. There was enough force to allocate killing firepower to six
of the eight battleships and all the cruisers. The plan, however, provided for
no positive command and control over the attack as a whole, with the result
that not one torpedo bomber intentionally attacked a cruiser, and only one
bomb hit a cruiser.

• The approach formation chosen by the planners for the torpedo bombers was dangerously wrong. The torpedo bombers did not approach in a
mutually supporting defensive formation but rather in long, one-at-a-time,
line-ahead “strings.” The heavily loaded aircraft, flying “low and slow” in this
formation, would have been appallingly vulnerable had there been any U.S.
fighters over the harbor—even a few of the obsolete P-26s based in the area.

• The torpedo bombers’ formation did not allow for anything other than “follow me” leadership, which contributed to poor target selection.

• Due to a lack of practice (another of the planner’s responsibilities) and
a poor means to communicate which attack plan had been selected, the
torpedo bombers spread and straggled, with aircraft intervals as large as five
hundred to 1,200 yards instead of the planned one hundred yards.

• The torpedo attack lacked simultaneity. The bomber strings attacked one at a
time. An attack that should have taken ninety seconds stretched into eleven
or twelve minutes, allowing time for more antiaircraft (AA) gunners to get
into the action. Five of the last seven torpedo bombers were shot down. Had
there been any warning, this would have likely been near the loss rate for the
entire torpedo force.

• No contingency plan was provided should the carriers be absent, other than
“find another target.” Some pilots misidentified USS Utah and wasted torpedoes on this demilitarized target ship. Others aborted their runs and chose
other attack routes to other targets.

• Attack routes conflicted. Many routes crossed within groups and among
groups. When the aircraft assigned to attack carriers went for other targets, the result was several near collisions, causing attack runs to abort and
one aircraft to jettison its torpedo. The reattacks allowed more time for the
defenders to shoot them down. This was the fault of the planners, not the
aviators.

• Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto’s objective was to sink battleships (the symbol of
sea power) and thereby inflict a shock to the morale of the American people
to induce them to come to a negotiated peace. Genda undermined his boss’s
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objective by disproportionately assigning torpedo and dive-bombers to
strike carriers.

• No fighter “top cover” was assigned. The few U.S. fighters that managed to
get aloft had clear runs at Japanese bombers.

• No fighters were assigned to escort the main effort—that is, the torpedo
bombers—to the harbor. The fighters broke off to strafe airfields, leaving
the torpedo bombers undefended for the last ten to twenty miles of their
approach.

• The plan assumed clear visibility and unlimited (CVU) weather conditions.
The dive-bombers were trained in an attack technique that required CVU
weather up to twelve thousand feet. When the second-wave dive-bombers
encountered dense clouds between three and five thousand feet, they could
not bomb, and their bombsights were not capable of lower-altitude glidebombing. As a result, the dive-bombers’ hit percentage was miserable. Only
two hits were scored on targets appropriate to the dive-bombers’ 250kilogram general-purpose bombs by the seventy-eight bombers that arrived
over the harbor. Their only “kill” was the naval shipyard “gedunk” wagon,
which was eviscerated, scattering ice cream and pies all over a quay near Honolulu. If the dive-bombers had performed as expected, with the firepower
they had they could have sunk all the cruisers in the harbor. As it was, they
scored only one hit on a cruiser—again, a result of poor anticipation by the
planners, not poor execution by the aviators.

• The plan, as briefed, included sinking a ship in the channel if one was found
under way. The second-wave dive-bombers found the battleship USS Nevada
under way, and probably fourteen to eighteen dive-bombers attacked it,
scoring five hits with bombs that did not have the capability to penetrate the
ship’s deck armor. The ship sank, but owing to damage-control and design
errors, which the Japanese could not have anticipated (and for which they
should not be given credit). The planners knew that these bombs were not
lethal against battleships and that it would normally take over sixty such hits
to produce any expectation of sinking one, yet they planned for it anyway—a
waste of bombs.

• The planners did not make the elementary calculation needed to determine
whether a sunken battleship could actually block the channel. As it was, even
if a ship had sunk at a right angle to the channel and in the exact center, the
channel was wide enough to allow ships to pass in either direction.

• There was no planned suppression of enemy air defenses, though the Japanese employed such techniques in China. U.S. AA was a major factor in
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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disrupting the attack and reducing weapons-delivery accuracy to well below
expectations.

• The planners assumed they would achieve surprise. There were no contingency plans should surprise be lost, even though they knew that the carrier
force would attack the island even if it had been sighted as much as twentyfour hours in advance. It was not until the day before the force departed
Japan, when Admiral Yamamoto reminded its crews of the quality of their
opponents and “the snare of overconfidence,” that the planners realized their
plan was not robust enough to deal with conditions other than those envisioned by their initial, rigid, assumptions. En route to the launch point, the
planners cobbled together an inadequate “no surprise” contingency plan. The
means by which it would be communicated to the first-wave aircraft, while
en route to the target, which plan was to be executed—by firing flares—was
not well considered. The flare signal was misinterpreted by some of the force,
which resulted in a string of blunders that caused the attacking formations to
lose all cohesion in their approach, while other elements executed the wrong
plan.
Overall, the attack force had the killing capacity to destroy or sink six battleships and eight cruisers, with additional overkill hits available to ensure this
result. The killing ordnance (actual hits delivered that were sufficient to destroy
or sink the target) destroyed or sank only three battleships. The attack achieved
21 percent of its potential.
This was a poorly planned attack. It does not reflect any particular depth of
vision or professional intellect. Dr. Caravaggio’s statement that any shortfalls in
the results arose because Genda’s plan was “just not executed as originally envisioned” is specious. Most of the faults of execution can be traced to deficiencies
in planning. It is possible that the author was referring only to masterful strategiclevel planning, but the text of his article is not clear on this. In Genda’s initial
evaluation of the idea of an attack on Pearl Harbor, he suggested that the strike be
followed by the invasion and capture of Oahu. Dr. Caravaggio chides those who
vetoed this idea, as if they had rejected a war-winning strategy. However, he does
not mention why the Naval General Staff originally dismissed it.
A member of the Naval General Staff Planning Section, Captain Shigenori
Kami, was asked to investigate an invasion of Hawaii. Kami found that the
islands were not self-sufficient in food, noting that 2,900,000 tons had been
shipped there in 1941. He calculated that, under Japanese occupation, thirty
ships a month would be required to feed the population, with another thirty
ships a month for military supplies. Considering the distance of the routes and
the turnaround times (as well as potential losses from submarines), far more than
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sixty ships would have been required, ships that Japan did not have. The Japanese
military had taken over two million tons out of commercial service to support
its offensive, which it intended to return before their absence could cripple the
industrial effort; to withdraw half a million tons permanently was not supportable, and the scheme would have presented a stream of targets that would have
been an American submariner’s dream. A discussion of this study can be found
in John Stephan’s Hawaii under the Rising Sun: Japan’s Plan for Conquest after
Pearl Harbor (2002), cited in the article’s endnotes. The Japanese rightly rejected
the idea of invading Oahu at the outset of the war. If they had taken Hawaii, they
could not have held it. This strategic idea was not masterful; it had no depth of
vision, because it did not consider what had to follow.
My own criticisms of the Pearl Harbor strategy are that the attack displaced
an existing plan around which the Japanese navy was designed and built and that
it forced the United States into a course of action that would nearly guarantee a
Japanese defeat.
The Japanese fleet was designed around a concept wherein the U.S. fleet would
be lured to the west, escorting the large amphibious force required to retake the
Philippines. The American fleet would be subject to attrition by submarines,
long-range aviation, carrier strikes, and destroyer and cruiser night torpedo attacks. After inflicting significant losses, the Japanese expected to close and crush
the U.S. fleet in a battle-line engagement. With the U.S. fleet annihilated (as the
Russians’ had been at Tsushima), there would follow, the Japanese assumed, a
favorable negotiated peace.
Their dilemma was that this plan had to be carried out early in the war, before
the vast American industrial capability could develop. The Japanese calculated
that the Americans were building three to five tons of warships for every ton
coming out of Japanese yards and that by 1944 the fleet tonnage ratio would be
ten to three. The Japanese needed to lure the Americans into a decisive battle
quickly, while the fleets were roughly comparable.
However, if the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor succeeded, they knew, the
Americans would not come early. There would be no incentive for the Americans to engage in decisive battle until their fleet was repaired and reinforced to
overwhelming strength. The strategic mechanism for victory, then, was changed
from that of annihilating the U.S. fleet to undermining the morale of the American people by sinking a few battleships at Pearl Harbor—a strategy forced on the
Japanese by Yamamoto. They rationalized the new strategy as “protecting the
flank of the southern advance,” when in fact a successful attack on Pearl Harbor
would negate Japan’s only potential war-winning strategy. Dr. Caravaggio does
not address this analysis or explain why he believes the strategy of an attack on
Pearl Harbor reflects depth of vision by Commander Genda.
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Genda originally suggested that the Japanese carriers remain off Hawaii and
deliver follow-on strikes to “deny the use of Pearl Harbor as an operating base.”
In my book, I calculate that, optimistically, a follow-on strike would destroy at
most 6 percent of the area of the naval shipyard, and I point out that there was significant regeneration capability in the tenders and civilian shipyard at Honolulu.
Even further reattacks would not eliminate Pearl Harbor as a base; the Japanese
carrier magazines simply did not carry enough ordnance. I would also nudge the
author toward the calculation of probable losses by the Japanese attackers from
AA and any residual fighter capacity. The Japanese carrier force could easily lose
half to three-quarters of its aircraft and pilots in repeated vain attempts to put out
of service a base that could be readily regenerated. Considering that the Japanese
had few aviators in reserve and a painfully small and inflexible pilot training
program, such losses certainly would have changed the course of the war in the
Pacific, putting half or more of the Japanese carriers out of service for six months
for lack of pilots. In addition, the idea of remaining off Oahu for repeated strikes
discounts the American submarine capability. There were four submarines in
Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack, with others operating in adjoining training areas. These submarines, even with defective torpedoes, could have severely
discomfited the Japanese fleet or any convoy of amphibious and support ships,
especially considering the poor Japanese antisubmarine warfare capability. Lastly,
the Japanese striking force simply did not have the fuel to hover off Oahu, nor
did it have a logistics train that could support extended forward operations far
from bases.
A strategy has to be able to work to be masterful.
Dr. Caravaggio seems also to believe that it would be possible to take Oahu
with two (later revised to three) Japanese infantry divisions. He does not identify
where these divisions would be obtained, along with the eighty-odd ships required for their transport, and more for their sustainment. The Japanese ThreePhase Offensive was stretched thin in troops and vessels, and Japan’s operations
in the Philippines, Indochina, and the Netherlands East Indies were only possible
through careful staging and reuse of merchant ships in each succeeding wave of
landings. The Imperial Army had refused to provide additional divisions to attack what it saw as naval objectives.
The author appears to agree with Genda’s assessment that taking Hawaii would
be a “knockout punch.” Yamamoto had considered this strategy and thought
that having 400,000 American citizens under his control would bring the United
States to the negotiating table. As in the case of his belief that sinking four battleships at Pearl Harbor would break the Americans’ morale, I suggest that this idea
is flawed. The capture of Oahu would likely have further enraged the American
population, possibly to the extent that the “Germany first” strategy would be
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss1/20
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abandoned and U.S. forces concentrated instead against the Japanese. Considering that most of the Japanese gains in the first phase of the war were due to a
vacuum of U.S. and British power, it is likely that, had U.S. air, ground, and naval
assets been directed initially against Japan, Japan would have been overwhelmed
earlier, resulting in a stay of execution for Germany but a disaster for Japan.
As noted, the author seems to accept that two or three Japanese infantry divisions could overcome Oahu’s two defending U.S. Army divisions, each with two
regular and one National Guard regiment. Japanese infantry divisions were not
well suited to combat against opponents heavy in firepower, as the 80 percent
losses suffered in 1939 at Nomonhan against the Soviets demonstrated, as did
the failure of Japanese wave attacks during the Guadalcanal campaign. The lack
of Japanese artillery would not be made up by shore bombardment or by close
air support, as the Japanese ships and carrier aviators were not trained, equipped,
or supplied for these roles. As for the prospects of success through a flanking
strategy, traversing a mountain chain on the eastern side of Oahu (as mentioned
approvingly in the article), Japan’s lack of success using a similar strategy in New
Guinea, along the Kokoda Trail, is well known.
Which brings us to what the article contends is the “opportunity lost”—
Genda’s proposal after Pearl Harbor to collect troops from Guam, survivors of
the Wake Island assault force, and forces earmarked for the seizure of Rabaul and
redirect them to invade Midway and Johnston Islands. Dr. Caravaggio contends
that this “plan” is a “clear [indication] of [Genda’s] impressive ability to connect
the strategic imperative with the tactical necessity.”
I would have been more impressed with Genda’s “strategy” (really, an offthe-cuff suggestion, with little thought to feasibility) if there had been a more
detailed look at the practicality of the suggested actions. From where were the
ships coming that would move these troops? Where were the logistics, and the
intelligence? Was there sufficient force to carry off multiple opposed amphibious
operations successfully?
The Japanese did not have a good record of opposed amphibious assaults. The
first landing at Wake Island was repulsed, the landings at Rabaul succeeded only
on beaches where they were unopposed, and the invasion of the Philippines at
Lingayen Gulf was nearly stymied by a single .50-caliber machine-gun post.
The Rabaul invasion force was embarked on 14 January 1942. This is the
earliest date on which Genda’s proposal could have been put into motion. There
was no shipping to pick up the troops occupying Guam without displacing
other Japanese movements, a very unlikely option. American reinforcements to
Midway began 17 December, and additional infantry, coastal batteries, and antiaircraft were in place by 26 December, while reinforcements were in motion for
Johnston. (See Glen Williford’s Racing the Sunrise: Reinforcing America’s Pacific
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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Outposts, 1941–1942, published in 2010, for more on the reinforcement of the
Pacific Islands after Pearl Harbor.) Genda’s “strategy” would not strike a vacuum.
It was impractical and not within the capabilities of the available forces.
The Japanese showed throughout the war that they lacked flexibility and were
less effective when operating outside preestablished plans. Genda’s strategic suggestion took no account of Japanese capabilities to execute the idea or of potential
U.S. countermeasures. Dr. Caravaggio would have a difficult time convincing any
U.S. Marine that a pickup team of Japanese soldiers without local intelligence or
proper assault or logistics planning, short on landing craft, and with no particular
preparation or advance planning could have taken and held these islands.
It is easy to say an idea is brilliant, divorced from messy questions regarding
feasibility. But details of practicability are important. Genda could just as well have
suggested an invasion of Los Angeles or the capture of Washington, D.C. Both
would have been brilliant coups and would have changed the course of the war,
but would have been masterful strategies only if they had potential to succeed.
However, Dr. Caravaggio is to be praised for bringing attention to the interviews between Gordon Prange and Genda and the other Japanese officers. He has
brought forward some new information to the historical community. Yet I would
caution readers to be careful in accepting the accompanying analysis. Dr. Caravaggio’s effusive praise for Genda’s strategy needs scrutiny before that strategy
can be accepted as masterful.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss1/20
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BOOK REVIEWS

WARTIME RELIGION
Jenkins, Philip. The Great and Holy War: How World War I Became a Religious Crusade. New York:
HarperOne, 2014. 438pp. $29.95

The roots of today’s sectarian-fueled
conflicts lie in the First World War. By
igniting “a global religious revolution,”
the “Great War” redrew the world’s
religious map both figuratively and
literally. Modern Islam, characterized as
“assertive, self-confident, and aggressively sectarian,” is a direct result, but
so too are the spread of charismatic
Christianity in Africa, an invigorated
Zionism that led to the eventual creation
of the modern state of Israel, and even
the “efflorescence of esoteric and mystical ideas that we often summarize as
New Age.” So argues Philip Jenkins. Like
other recent authors, Jenkins claims
that the Great War in effect “created our
reality.” This book, however, is noteworthy for placing the war’s political,
social, and cultural elements, and effects,
within an explicitly religious context.
Jenkins, distinguished professor of
history and member of the Institute
for the Study of Religion at Baylor
University, has written an ambitious
and highly readable book. Synthesizing military, cultural, and religious
history and drawing principally from
a vast body of secondary literature,

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015

the book is admirable in its reach even
when it exceeds the author’s grasp.
By focusing on the religious dimensions
and consequences of the war, this book
fills a historiographical gap, one in which
wartime religion is commonly regarded
as “irrelevant . . . window dressing” with
“each side cynically appropriat[ing] God
to its own narrow nationalist causes.” Instead, Jenkins takes seriously the decidedly religious worldview that informed
the war’s belligerents. While there were
national and religious disparities (for
example, where Orthodox Russians
cast the war in traditional “crusade”
language, British rhetoric emphasized a
“war for Christian civilization”), a common religious vocabulary of sacrifice,
holy war, divine mission/mandate,
crusade, and cosmic battle, marked by
both apocalyptic fears and millenarian hopes, was widely shared across
national and faith-group boundaries.
In Jenkins’s view, it was these war-fueled
expectations and the ensuing wartime
cataclysm that fundamentally shaped the
postwar world. A more secularized Europe was a reaction to wartime religious
excesses, even as that same “rhetoric of
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the holy war and holy nation” coupled
with apocalyptic ideas to “metastasize”
into “Fascism, Nazism, and racial extermination.” So too was the Russian Revolution a religious civil war, the Bolshevik
cause as messianic and millenarian in
vision as it was antireligious in doctrine.
Anti-imperial and anticolonial movements in Africa and elsewhere were also
parts of this postwar “worldwide millenarian upsurge.” Similarly, the war led to
a proliferation of “charismatic, fundamentalist, [and] traditionalist forms of
faith” within Judaism, Christianity, and
Islam. Moreover, the defeat and geographical division of the Ottoman Empire created not only the modern Middle
East but also, according to Jenkins,
modern Islam. The loss of a geopolitical center and the caliphate resulted in a
“postwar search for new sources of authority [that] led to the creation or revival of virtually all the Islamic movements
that we know in the modern world.”
Like many of the book’s broadest claims,
this last one falls a little short. Still, Jenkins’s book is important and timely. The
Great War might not have been a “war
of religion” per se, but Jenkins shows
how for its participants it was certainly
religious. Most of all, Jenkins reminds
us, as sectarian fighting continues over
national boundaries drawn following
that century-old war, of the continued
relevance of religion’s global effects.
BRAD CARTER

Naval War College

Manicom, James. Bridging Troubled Waters: China, Japan, and Maritime Order in the East China
Sea. Georgetown Univ. Press, 2014. 280pp. $54.95
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As the world reacts to an increasingly
powerful and assertive China, East
Asia’s maritime frontiers are emerging
as friction points that threaten regional
stability. James Manicom’s Bridging Troubled Waters presents a timely analytical
history of Sino-Japanese relations in the
East China Sea and makes important
contributions to understanding the
prospects for maritime cooperation. The
book authoritatively documents new
insights regarding this complex state of
evolving affairs, one that has included
elements of cooperation, compromise,
competition, and conflict. It employs a
helpful analytical framework from which
to argue for optimism, by demonstrating
that Chinese and Japanese leaders have
historically been able to manage tensions
by decoupling material issues from strategic and symbolic differences. Manicom
has a PhD from Flinders University in
Australia and is an expert in East Asian
security, specializing in maritime issues.
A research fellowship at the Ocean Policy Research Foundation in Tokyo and
trips to China and Japan positioned him
well to deliver this systematic analysis.
Manicom constructs a unique matrix
for evaluating the value of maritime
space vis-à-vis national objectives and
applies this construct to motivations for
cooperation versus conflict. Manicom
then uses this framework to interpret
case studies from the Sino-Japanese
maritime relationship, examining the
dispute over islands in the East China
Sea, fisheries management, agreements
governing research at sea, and cooperative arrangements in the Chunxiao gas
field. Building on the insights delivered
by these case studies, the book’s final
chapter and conclusion focus on the
current political dynamics in the SinoJapanese maritime relationship and
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assess the prospects for successful management of tensions through a sharedjurisdiction arrangement that satisfies
both countries’ territorial objectives.
The book is a densely packed, academic
work. The opening chapter, in which
Manicom lays his theoretical foundations and analytical framework, will
demand particular effort from readers
seeking immediate, practical insights.
However, this academic investment is
well worth the effort. The follow-up
analysis is exceptionally insightful for
not only academics but also policy makers, strategists, and military professionals. Its tone, however, reflects the fact
that the author did most of his research
in Japan (only five of the twenty-six
interviews were conducted in Beijing),
and Manicom seems intermittently challenged to shake a Japanese perspective.
A more significant shortfall is that the
book qualifies its strong case for optimism with two significant caveats. First,
Manicom notes that past cooperation
has only resulted when “material issues
have been separated from the more
symbolic aspects of [Sino-Japanese]
relations” and that the countries have the
greatest difficulty finding paths to cooperation over contested symbolic and
strategic issues. Second, he qualifies his
optimism also by stating that tensions
will be sufficiently managed to prevent
war only so long as “the leaders of each
state can exercise the necessary leadership to manage their respective national
pressures.” These caveats are of great
concern, because leaders in both nations
may find it increasingly difficult to manage the growing nationalistic demands
of their constituents. Furthermore,
because the years of cooperative efforts
expertly documented in Manicom’s
case studies have taken the edge off
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many of the material issues, the remaining tension points are predominantly
strategic and symbolic in nature. Still,
despite these criticisms, the lessons
contained in Manicom’s insightful
analysis will be of great value to those
seeking to understand Sino-Japanese
tensions and other maritime disputes.
CDR. JOHN BRADFORD

Commanding Officer, USS Stethem (DDG 63), and
LT. JOELLE PORTZER

USS Stethem

Westad, Odd Arne. Restless Empire: China and
the World since 1750. New York: Basic Books,
2012. 515pp. $32

The Norwegian historian Odd Arne
Westad, in this well-written history of
China over the past 250 years, tells the
story from a broad global perspective.
His approach tracks that of his earlier
works on the Cold War, where he placed
a binational rivalry into a larger world
context. Similarly in this work, he sees
the principal driver of China’s modern
experience as relentless internationalization. However, China is more than just
a country. It is, as Lucien Pye once described it, “a civilization-state, pretending to be a nation-state.” Imperial in every respect, it pushed out, and the world
has pushed back, powerfully, since 1750.
However, the adjective “restless” in the
title is an understatement. No country’s
modern history has been more tumultuous or more violent. Westad describes
episodes, including the worst, that
occurred in the time of “peace” that the
Communist regime was supposed to
usher in. The most deadly and destructive of modern China’s encounters with
the world, Westad astutely notes, was
between 1937 and 1945—its war with
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Japan. In a campaign breathtaking in
its brutality, Japan destroyed China’s
nascent republic, enabled the victory
of the Communists in their civil war
with the Nationalists, and destroyed
the old imperial order in Asia. Thus,
the new China was born into a world
of many possibilities. Unhappily, none
of the good ones, either domestically or internationally, was realized
until 1979, when China’s current
“rise” can be said to have begun.
Westad’s fine account of what has come
before brings us to realize that the rise of
China will not necessarily have a calming effect on either the Chinese people
or on others who live nearby. Since 1750,
“internationalization,” though not entirely a one-way street, has been mostly
that; now, the restless empire, once in a
defensive crouch, is moving out smartly
in all directions. Perhaps this should be
expected of a “civilizational state,” except
that today’s China offers to the world
nothing of what it once did—no high
culture, no attainments in intellectual
and philosophical life, and certainly no
models for wise and effective governance. Instead, as Westad helps us see,
the current regime is thrashing around,
which makes its own future, as well as
the futures both of its “near abroad” and
of the world at large, hard to predict.
Empires, we have been taught, are supposed to bring peace, but today’s Middle
Empire ruled from today’s Beijing
displays many indications that it is bent
on becoming a major disturber of the
peace. Yet even under a more enlightened outlook, there would be challenges: the Middle Empire borders on
three nuclear-weapons states—Russia,
India, and Pakistan—and probably also
a fourth, North Korea. Even so, from
his own well-informed examination of
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China’s modern experience Westad concludes that prospects for peace remain—
not a ringing vote of confidence in the
powers that be in Beijing, but neither is
it a wholly despairing outlook. After all,
Westad is an accomplished historian of
the Cold War, the nonviolent, freedomenhancing outcome of which reminds us
that things do not always turn out badly.
CHARLES HORNER

Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute
Washington, D.C.

Twomey, Christopher P. The Military Lens: Doctrinal Difference and Deterrence Failure in SinoAmerican Relations. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ.
Press, 2010. 240pp. $35

It has been said that “weapons speak
to the wise—but in general they need
interpreters.” The Military Lens, written by political scientist Christopher P.
Twomey, associate professor at the Naval
Postgraduate School, in Monterey, California, shows the difficulty of that quote.
Twomey makes a strong case that differing military languages and doctrines
explain otherwise puzzling examples
of deterrence failure and escalation.
The Military Lens is a welcome addition
to the literature on deterrence, which
too often treats actors as interchangeable “black boxes.” Twomey writes in the
spirit of authors who, like Robert Jervis,
explore psychological factors that led to
misinterpreting the actions of others.
Twomey’s work adds the new factor of
military doctrine. Every military has
its own doctrine, or “theory of victory,”
its vision of how military resources
are to be used to achieve operational
success. Twomey’s core argument is
that strategists look through a doctrinal “lens” when assessing capabilities
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and intentions and that this weakens
deterrence in two ways: the credibility
of others’ threats is discounted, because
their doctrines are thought to be ineffective, and the others’ signals are missed
by the use of one’s own doctrine as a
template for indicators. This attention to
misperceptions at the level of operational net assessment is new and of direct
relevance to planners and analysts.

strengthened by a larger universe of
cases that may answer such additional
questions as these: Are doctrinal differences more common in ground
than naval warfare, for example? Do
opponents in long-lasting rivalries
(compared to the United States /
People’s Republic of China in 1950)
fare better at assessing the others’
capability despite differing doctrines?

Much of the book tests the author’s
theory against three Korean War–era
episodes: China’s failure to deter U.S.
movement north of the thirty-eighth
parallel, American failure to deter China
from entering the war, and the less wellknown maritime story of how the United
States prevented a planned Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Twomey also traces how
greatly the United States and the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) underestimated
each other’s land warfare capabilities
and as a result issued threats that neither
considered credible. The PLA Navy,
with officers largely educated abroad,
understood that U.S. air supremacy rendered landings impossible. The choice
of the 1950 Korean cases was wise, as
most variables other than PLA army/
navy differences are constant. A notable
feature of the case studies is archival
research, both in the United States and
in China; fresh documentation alone
will appeal to Korean War specialists.

The Military Lens offers a warning that
clear, credible threats may not be understood as such by others. Since doctrinal
misperceptions take place at the military
level, the lessons here are particularly
relevant to planners, as they develop
assessments and deterrent options for
civilian leaders. This work also holds
implications for professional military
education, stating as it does that officers
should be encouraged to overcome doctrinal filters, that scholars should study
foreign doctrines, and that educational
exchanges might reduce misunderstandings (the author himself is involved
in U.S.-Chinese dialogues). Perhaps
weapons speak a common tongue, but
Twomey reminds us that militaries need
to be fluent in multiple languages.

Doctrinal difference fits the Korean
War, but the radical divergence of the
revolutionary PLA and atomic American
military makes this a relatively easy case,
as Twomey acknowledges. How often
do doctrinal differences generally lead
to deterrence failures? An additional
chapter on two Arab-Israeli cases argues
that deterrence failure is correlated with
doctrinal divergence. The evidence
is suggestive, but the book could be
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DAVID BURBACH

Naval War College

Kane, Tim. Bleeding Talent: How the U.S. Military
Mismanages Great Leaders and Why It’s Time for
a Revolution. New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2012. 271pp. $27

This book provides a critical analysis
and highlights a dysfunctional U.S.
Army officer personnel management
system. The author explains why the
best and brightest young officers depart
early for civilian careers and what can be
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done to encourage them to remain on
active duty. Kane also outlines why the
military’s leadership training is so successful and admired by civilian industry.
Tim Kane’s background as an Air Force
veteran and successful entrepreneur
with a PhD in economics gives him the
perspective, skill, and insight to offer a
comprehensive evaluation of the current
system and a blueprint for the future.
Kane conducted an online survey of
West Point graduates from six different classes at different stages of
their careers. Overall, it was a balanced sample, with approximately 250
respondents, both military and civilian.
Based on the results of a first survey,
Kane conducted a follow-up to gain
additional insight. The results highlight many reasons why young leaders
leave the service, and Kane suggests
what can be done to curb the exodus.
Kane proposes an alternative to the
current All Volunteer Force (AVF)—
what he calls the “Total Volunteer
Force” (TVF). He posits that there is
a “philosophical difference between
the current system, which gives people
freedom to choose only at the moment
of volunteering [the AVF], and a system
in which employees are free every day.”
Kane’s book is unique in that it offers
possible alternatives to many of the
Army’s current personnel policies that
young leaders despise. It is relatively
easy to criticize bureaucratic policies
without offering solutions, but Kane
does offer solutions, which the Army
has already begun to implement. For
example, Kane proposes allowing officers a break in service to enter civilian
industry, after which they can return
to the military without prejudice—a
policy that the Army recently embraced.
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One of Kane’s major criticisms of the
military is that officer promotions, unlike their civilian counterparts, are based
more on year seniority than on merit. “It
is fair to say that selection to general is
highly competitive, but the reality is that
longevity is a bigger factor than merit in
determining who makes that rank.” The
result is that in an effort to make the officer assignment process as fair as possible
the system has become outdated and less
than optimal for officers and commanders alike. Kane’s TVF proposes promotions based on merit and assignments
and using a market mechanism—
that is, an internal job market, in
which officers apply for any open job.
As a retired Army colonel with almost
thirty years of active-duty service,
many of them as a personnel officer,
I was skeptical when I started reading this book. It is difficult to criticize
something when you have been a part
of the problem. However, I found
that Kane has skillfully proposed a
series of recommendations that could
make a difference. Bleeding Talent is a
must-read for all on active duty today.
Kane’s writing style and method of
presenting counterarguments make
for thought-provoking proposals that
merit consideration in today’s Army.
THOMAS GIBBONS

Naval War College

Northrup, David. How English Became the Global
Language. New York: Palgrave, 2013. 220pp. $24

In this slim volume David Northrup,
a retired Boston College professor of
history, gives a clear and concise account
of the development of English into the
twenty-first century’s one truly global
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language. First he traces how English
became the predominant language in
the British Isles, overcoming such rivals
as Cornish, Welsh, and Gaelic. Then he
looks at how English spread throughout the British colonies that eventually
became the United States and Canada.
Finally, Northrup analyzes the culminating phase of the globalization of English
and its rise to its current status as the
lingua franca of the modern world.

on them by fiat. Instead, Northrup
sees people everywhere taking active
roles in their own educations, eagerly
embracing English in the hope that it
will allow them to trade more freely
with the international community, to
keep up with the latest developments
in science, technology, and popular
culture, and to take advantage of the
remarkable educational opportunities
available in the English-speaking world.

To account for this worldwide penetration Northrup points to a number of
related developments, especially the way
English has become the indispensable
medium of international communication in science, business, and higher
education. Northrup identifies the
meteoric growth of the World Wide Web
as the most important factor in spreading English to every corner of the globe.

Language is thus a prime example of
what the Austrian economist Friedrich
Hayek calls “spontaneous order.” Spontaneous orders are the result of human
action but not of human design. That
means that many orderly phenomena in
human life, such as the famous “invisible hand” of the market, result not
from government central planning but
from the seemingly chaotic interaction
of widely dispersed people pursuing
their individual self-interest yet in the
process producing a larger public good.

To his credit, Northrup rejects the easy
and fashionable narratives that view the
globalization of English as a worldwide cultural disaster and the success
of English as one more instance of the
West’s cultural imperialism. Northrup
shows that the spread of English has not
necessarily involved the death of other
languages. By learning English, in fact,
people around the world are generally becoming more bilingual and even
trilingual; as Northrup correctly insists,
the global diffusion of English is more
a matter of “pull” than of “push.” To be
sure, some governments have mandated
the learning of English. However, the
“push” of governments has been less
successful than the “pull” of people all
around the world who simply want to
learn the language to make their lives
better. Northrup rejects the common
view that people are passive with respect
to language, that they just sit around
waiting to have languages imposed
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Language is a human institution that no
one plans in advance but that grows out
of the active usage of millions of individuals. As Northrup shows, attempts
by linguistic experts to create a global
language “scientifically” have failed
completely, most notably in the case of
Esperanto. Despite all the efforts to promote it, even official recognition from
UNESCO in 1954, Esperanto has basically languished in the realm of faculty
lounges and parlor games. Contrary to
the conspiracy theories of postcolonialist
pundits, no central authority set out to
make English the global language that
it is today. Some accidents of colonial
history were undoubtedly involved in
the process, such as the fact that Britain
ruled over the populous Indian subcontinent for several centuries. Yet if
English had not appealed to millions
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of individuals around the globe on its
own, the language would never have
achieved the preeminence it now enjoys.
Unfortunately, Northrup’s book could
have profited from better copyediting
and proofreading. It has far too many
errors of grammar and spelling (on
the order of “Isaac Azimov” instead of
“Isaac Asimov”). Ironically, in view of
its subject, too much of the “research”
is straight from the Internet. I did
not expect to see so many citations to
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Wikipedia in a scholarly publication.
These problems aside, How English Became the Global Language offers a good
introduction to its subject for the general
reader, who will come away from the
book with a better grasp of what brought
about the globalization of English and
what it means for the world’s future.
PAUL A. CANTOR

Clifton Waller Barrett Professor of English
University of Virginia
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IN MY VIEW

NEARLY VERTICAL?

Sir:
While Lieutenant Commander Maksim Y. Tokarev’s article “Kamikazes: The
Soviet Legacy” (Naval War College Review, Winter 2014) was extremely informative regarding the history and theory behind Soviet anti-carrier doctrine, his
analysis of Japanese kamikaze tactics appears flawed with regard to his comments
about dive bombing. While kamikaze pilots may have made near-vertical dives at
times, such maneuvers were counter to Japanese doctrine as described by Rikihei
Inoguchi in his book The Divine Wind: Japan’s Kamikaze Force in World War II
(Naval Institute Press, 1958, paperback 1994). As stated by Inoguchi,
In a high-altitude approach, caution must be taken to insure that the final dive angle
is not too steep. In a long steep dive, as the force of gravity increases, a plane is more
difficult to pilot and may go out of control. It is essential, therefore, to make the dive
as shallow as possible, taking careful note of wind direction and the movement of the
target.

The majority of kamikaze pilots received just enough flight training to be
able to take off and fly straight and level. For such untrained pilots to attempt a
steep dive would most likely have resulted in a loss of control. Thus, the Imperial Japanese Navy’s strategy, as illustrated on page 91 of The Divine Wind, was
to approach the target ship in a shallow glide, attacking in a 45 degree dive from
an altitude of 1,000–2,000 meters. It is likely that the near-vertical dives alluded
to by Tokarev were kamikaze pilots falling out of the sky. In contrast to his statement, dive bombing accuracy is increased the closer an aircraft can be brought
to the near vertical.

THOMAS WILDENBERG

Tucson, Arizona
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OF SPECIAL INTEREST
RECENT BOOKS
A selection of books of interest recently received at our editorial office, as described by their publishers:
Marquet, L. David. Turn the Ship Around! A True Story of Turning Followers into
Leaders. New York: Penguin, 2012. 236pp. $25.95
When David Marquet, captain of USS Santa Fe, unknowingly gave an impossible
order, his crew tried to follow it anyway. It was then that Marquet realized he was
leading in a culture of followers. No matter your business or position, you can
apply Marquet’s radical guidelines to turn your own ship around. The payoff: a
workplace where everyone around you is taking responsibility for their actions,
where people are healthier and happier, where everyone is a leader.
Milqueen, Michael, Deborah Sanders, and Ian Speller. Small Navies: Strategy and
Policy for Small Navies in War and Peace. Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2014. 247pp.
$109
From Confederate commerce raiders in the nineteenth century, to Somali pirates
today, even the most minor of maritime forces can become a key player on a
global stage. Examining a broad range of examples, this volume addresses the
roles and activities of small navies in the past and present, in particular of the
different ways in which such forces have identified and addressed national and
international security challenges and the way in which they interact with other
navies and security agencies.
Santi, Federico. The Newport Naval Training Station: A Postcard History. Atglen,
Pa.: Schiffer, 2013. 79pp. $19.99
In the late nineteenth century, at the site of an old asylum for the poor on Coaster’s Harbor Island, off the city of Newport, Rhode Island, local residents made a
decision that would change American military history forever—they proposed
that the ninety-acre island become a U.S. Naval Training Center and the future
home of the Naval War College. Postcards and other artifacts document physical
changes over time. The collection in this book shows all the facets of life on the
base.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss1/20
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Aboul-Enein, Youssef H., ed. Reconstructing a Shattered Egyptian Army: War
Minister General Mohamed Fawzi’s Memoirs, 1967–1971. Annapolis, Md.: Naval
Institute Press, 2014. 231pp. $64.95
The memoirs of General Mohamed Fawzi, Egyptian war minister from 1967 to
1971, were first published in 1984, but never translated from Arabic and therefore remained undiscovered by most English-speaking readers. Aboul-Enein, an
American naval officer and established scholar whose personal and professional
background gives him a unique vantage point, is determined to bring to life the
military thoughts of this Arab war minister as part of his mission to introduce
America’s military leaders to Arabic works of military significance.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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REFLEC TIONS ON READING

Professor John E. Jackson of the Naval War College is the program man-

T

ager for the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program.

his is the twenty-fifth article in the “Reflections on Reading” series to appear
in the Naval War College Review since the Navy Professional Reading Program (NPRP) was established in 2006. A great deal has occurred in world affairs
over this period, and there have been major upheavals in the world of publishing.
During the June 2006 meeting at which the initial NPRP was approved, a preproduction model of a Sony e-reader was demonstrated to the Chief of Naval Operations. The new technology was being touted at the time as “seeking to do for the
written word what the iPod has done for digital music.” Little did any of us know
the tremendous impact that e-readers would have on book writing, production,
and distribution within a few short years. The purpose of what is now known
as the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program (CNO-PRP) is
to encourage sailors of all ranks to read—and also to write. Reading can help to
shape ideas and mentally refine concepts, and writing can help solidify ideas and
share them with others. The digital-book revolution has facilitated our sailors’
ability to perform both tasks.

To Read. In today’s world, if you want to read, you really don’t have to spend
much money. This is true in society at large, and it is particularly true within
the Navy. The no-cost options include borrowing hard-copy books from your
CNO-PRP library on ships and stations throughout the Navy (well over a hundred thousand hard-copy books have been distributed since the program began); borrowing e-books from the Navy General Library Program, accessible
through the Navy Knowledge Online (NKO) portal; and downloading them (as
loans or on a permanent basis) from a number of public sites. For example, the
Digital Book Index offers 140,000 free books, and Project Gutenberg offers over
forty-six thousand titles. With high-quality, portable e-readers widely available
for less than a hundred dollars you can gather an impressive personal library at
minimal cost. One of the most remarkable aspects of e-books is that they can
be downloaded virtually instantly wherever an Internet connection is available.
That means the assembled knowledge of the centuries is available with a few
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss1/20
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keystrokes, a situation that would have astounded even the most learned individuals only a generation ago.
To Write. No story illustrates the changing nature of the book publishing process better than that of the brilliant science-fiction writer Hugh Howey. In July
2011 he offered an e-book novella, Wool, for sale via Kindle Direct Publishing,
for ninety-nine cents. Traditional publishers had been largely uninterested in the
book, but self-publication in e-book form turned out to be a superior option.
His fascinating postapocalyptic story about the remnants of human society in
huge underground silos began to sell quickly, and Howey set about expanding the
smaller work into a full-fledged book, which went on sale as a digital download
in January 2012. By summer 2012 he was selling up to thirty thousand downloads a month, bringing in a monthly salary of $150,000. Two subsequent titles
completed the Wool trilogy and introduced Howey’s other clever books to a huge
audience. When traditional publishers ultimately came to him, offering exclusive
publishing contracts, Howey negotiated deals unheard-of in the industry, whereby he sold the hard-copy rights but retained rights to the digital format, which he
has continued to market directly to savvy readers.
The secret to e-publishing is the same as it is in the print world—quality sells.
Howey’s success is by no means typical, but it does demonstrate what is possible.
If you have a manuscript, fiction or nonfiction, that you would like to publish,
you can do so in a matter of hours utilizing programs such as Amazon’s Kindle
Direct Publishing, Smashwords, or Barnes and Noble’s Pubit. Authors have virtually complete control of their work, and they receive up to 70 percent of all
sales revenue. The big payoff is that your book becomes available to millions of
potential customers, and you can take pleasure in knowing that your ideas could
change the world. You can even offer your thoughts as free downloads, potentially reaching an even larger audience.
In August 2008, Admiral Jim Stavridis (now retired from the Navy and dean of
the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University) wrote, “So, dare
to read and develop your understanding. Carve out the time to think and form
new ideas. Dare to speak out and challenge assumptions and accepted wisdom
if your view differs from them. Have the courage to write, publish, and be heard.
Launch your ideas and be an integral part of the conversation.” We hope that the
CNO-PRP assists our sailors in the challenge so eloquently set forth by Admiral
Stavridis.

JOHN E. JACKSON
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